The Antioch Review

WINTER, 1957-58

Roots of Values

Contributions of the Social Sciences to Moral Philosophy

—A Symposium—

INTRODUCTION — Victor Ayoub

SOCIAL SCIENCE FACTS AND PHILOSOPHIC VALUES — Ethel M. Albert

ETHOS, WORLD-VIEW AND THE ANALYSIS OF SACRED SYMBOLS — Clifford Geertz

VALUES AND THE LAW — Yehezkel Dror

VALUES INSTITUTIONALIZED IN THE FAMILY — Morris Zelditch, Jr.

Poetry, short stories, book reviews, and a discussion of "Sociology and the Intellectuals."

A National Quarterly — Published in Yellow Springs, Ohio

5c

a critical interpretation of "Fitzgerald as Icarus"—page 481

MUTINY

presents a Special Issue

"The Twig . . . . The Tree"

in poetry:	Richard Eberhart	in prose:	Gil Orlovitz
	Edwin Honig		Robert Vaughan
	Isabella Fey		Hugh Hawkins
	John Tagliabue		Benita Galbraith
	and others		

AND four unpublished portraits by Gene Derwood:

Dylan Thomas	Oscar Williams
Max Ernst	George Barker

Subscription: $3.00 per year; single copies 75¢

MUTINY

Box 41, Village Station, New York 14, New York

SCHOOL and I

By FRANK P. WHITNEY

The Autobiography of an Ohio Schoolmaster

Summing up a lifetime in public education, the former principal of Collinwood High School in Cleveland and an experienced teacher and administrator presents his educational goals and ideals and how they worked out in actual school practice. In looking for solutions to today's crisis in public education, it behooves us to listen to the advice and examine the experience of those who have devoted their lives to the exciting challenges and awesome responsibilities of educating our youth. *SCHOOL AND I* is vital and stimulating reading for all of us—teachers, parents, citizens.

$3.00

THE ANTIOCH PRESS • Yellow Springs, Ohio

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

EDITORIAL BOARD
PAUL BIXLER
Chairman
NOLAN MILLER
Poetry Editor
IRWIN ABRAMS
VICTOR F. AYOUB
ERLING ENG
GEORGE R. GEIGER
RICHARD YALMAN
PAUL H. ROHMANN
Business Manager

Indexed in the
International Index to Periodicals

Published, Yellow Springs, Ohio, in March, June, September, and December by The Antioch Review, Inc., a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio. The Antioch Review is not an official publication of Antioch College and the views expressed in its columns are not necessarily those of the College. Subscription: $3.00 the year; Canadian, $3.50; Foreign, $4. Single copies, 75 cents.

Contributions should be sent to The Antioch Review, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Unsolicited manuscripts which are found unavailable for publication will not be returned unless accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelope. The Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by contributors.

National Distributor
B. DeBoer
Selected Outlets
102 Beverly Road
Bloomfield, N.J.

Publication Office
212 Xenia Avenue
Yellow Springs, Ohio

Entered as second-class matter, March 22, 1941 at the post office at Yellow Springs, Ohio, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Contents

Roots of Values: a Symposium 403
Introduction by VICTOR AYOUB

Social-Science Facts and Philosophical Values 406
ETHEL M. ALBERT

Ethos, World-View and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols 421
CLIFFORD GEERTZ

Advertisements ..... *Poems* 438
ROBERT S. SWARD

Values and the Law 440
YEHEZKEL DROR

"Values" Institutionalized in the Family 455
MORRIS ZELDITCH, Jr.

The Celebration ..... *a Story* 469
SYLVIA SHIRLEY

Fitzgerald as Icarus 481
ROBERT N. WILSON

Questionnaire ..... *a Poem* 492
PARIS LEARY

Adam ..... *a Poem* 494
SANDRA HOCHMAN

Eve ..... *a Poem* 495
ALLISON L. BURNETT

St. Anthony and the Glass Houses ..... *a Story* 496
ELIZABETH DE VEGH

Discussion 502
ARNOLD M. ROSE, ARTHUR W. CALHOUN

Once, Upon a Time ..... *a Poem* 508
HOLLIS SUMMERS

At Twenty I Was Forty ..... *a Poem* 509
ERIC PFEIFFER

Books 510
GERALD WEALES (The Not So Modern Temper), WILFRED E. BINKLEY (The President's Power), NOLAN MILLER (The New Fiction—a Summary), PHILIP ROTHMAN (A "Crash" Program for Education?)

VOLUME XVII DECEMBER, 1957 NUMBER 4

Copyright 1957 by The Antioch Review, Incorporated, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Contributions to The Antioch Review may not be reprinted in whole or in part without the permission of the Editor.

Editor's Shop Talk

In 1949 the Ford Foundation was seeking a general policy and program in keeping with its charter's commitment to "human welfare," and the committee deputized to do the job played around for a time with the concept of "survival." If I remember correctly, the first stimulus came from a group of medical men, but the basic idea of survival also held significance for Rowan Gaither, the committee's chairman. A San Francisco lawyer who developed wide associations in research laboratories, the universities and the foundations (he became President of the Ford Foundation, is now Chairman of its Board), Gaither well knows the problems of security. Emphasis of the recent report which bears his name fell inevitably (before the advent of Sputnik) on national survival.

Just what do we mean by "national survival"? Presumably the term includes enough military protection to give us an immanent sense of confidence, and a strong enough economy to give us time to think. Yet both of these needs mean, essentially, an improvement in what we already have. In the long view, national survival would seem to require something more shocking, a brand-new educational orientation toward foreign affairs.

Civilization, said H. G. Wells, is a race between catastrophe and education. His words might make more sense to us in America if we could ever learn to interpret such statements otherwise than in terms of crash programs. Not long ago the Fairlawn school district of Akron, Ohio inaugurated a program (enthusiastically supported by more than 95 per cent of the parents) by which all school children from the second to the sixth grades learn French. This is almost as astounding as if the children were to learn Russian. (One recalls the high percentage of Russian students who learn English.) The Fairlawn program is basic for national survival on two counts: it opens the windows on another culture, and it does so at an age when language and culture make a "permanent" impression.

One thinks of milder innovations on other educational levels: for high schools, a new approach and emphasis in the international language of the sciences; in college, study of a foreign culture and a year abroad in the country of one's choice. And on the graduate level? Here one might be willing, if necessary, to trade any number of reforms for one thoroughgoing new school of diplomacy.

National survival is psychological rather than material. Essentially it is a point of view.

* * *

We bring up the subject because even a quarterly must now and then be topical.

—P. B.

Roots of Values: A Symposium

Introduction

By VICTOR AYOUB

An introduction to the consideration of any weighty issue should, as a matter of policy, begin on an affirmative note. It is a moment of rejoicing. Clarity is to be triumphant. Problems are to be solved. A giant step forward will be taken. An epilogue is not the place for such expression; it may be too late. This is the ritual of introduction.

Yet if there is any problem that can inhibit the expression of such affirmation, that can make one feel almost a hypocrite if even the thought of singing an optimistic note occurs, it is the problem of value. The problem can be stated simply. Is there a source of knowledge and understanding to which contemporary men can be committed and from which they can derive a basis for selecting a core of experiences to be valued in common from the great diversity of experiences to which they are exposed? Stated in a more specific fashion, can the scientific enterprise be that source of knowledge and understanding?

To borrow a linguistic construction from Santayana, value is preference objectified. Different cultures, different societies, different men give value to different objects and relationships perceived. The articles which follow will document this beyond any need to do so here. In asking whether a common set of values can be established by exposing human action to the scrutiny of science, we are asking whether through the enterprise of science, we can adjudicate among values. Thus the issue shifts a bit. Are values susceptible to the judgment of science? Can there be a science of value? Philosophers who devote their attention to the logical analysis of scientific propositions have declared with vigor that such is not possible. Unfortunately, even when they dislike or disavow the possible consequences of their logic, it stands up as devastating criticism. That element in a statement which asserts a value, expressed as an imperative or as an emotional commitment, cannot be empirically verified. Thus it has no standing

as a scientific proposition. However, logic is meant to clarify experience, not to displace it. Logical analysis has admirably demonstrated the nature of value statements, but it has not done away with the problem of value. There is yet a psychological and sociological imperative to be satisfied.

There can be no better illustration of this imperative than the symposium on "Faiths for a Complex World" presented in the last autumn issue of *The American Scholar*. The editors of that journal asked several prominent persons to answer this question:

> What, in this tough and complex world of ours today, is a tenable faith that can bring sober sustenance to the many of us who are deeply troubled and perplexed by the various specters of the mid-twentieth century?

This is our problem stated differently. "To what source of knowledge and understanding," the questioner may as well have asked, "can we commit ourselves so that we may uncover a basis for providing order and meaning in this complex maze which is our world?" For it is a set of values reflecting a selection of prized experiences which gives order and meaning to our existence. To find such a set is our problem.

Yet, if the problem is persistent and a science of values is not logically possible, why commit ourselves to *science* as this source of knowledge and understanding? Why seek through it the values which will serve to order our existence in a way meaningful to us. John Dewey gave us an answer in his *Freedom and Culture*. "A culture," he wrote, "'which permits science to destroy traditional values but which distrusts its power to create new ones is a culture which is destroying itself." To use the language of an author in this symposium, it is the scientific "world-view" which dominates our culture. Our cognitive orientation to the physical world and to human action is conditioned by the enterprise of science, this, whether we like it or not. However, a world-view, scientific or otherwise, is completed and helps us organize our experience in a manner which suggests its significance to us only when an "ethos" is consonant with it. This sense of order and meaning is achieved, in other words, only when a particular cognitive orientation to the world is synthesized with an appropriate moral and aesthetic, or evaluative, orientation. An historical example will emphasize Dewey's point. The emergence of Christianity with a cognitive picture of man's place in nature which was in clear con-

trast to that of pagan Rome contributed mightily to the disruption of the traditional values of ancient society. The Church responded to this crisis by providing a moral and aesthetic orientation in keeping with the Christian view of man and nature. This synthesis of Christian "world-view" and Christian "ethos" ultimately gave an intellectual integration to medieval European society. Out of this integration there emerged a corpus of values about which there was far-reaching agreement. So it is believed. Such an integration may be needed for our time and place, but it must come from a synthesis of a world-view and an ethos which recognizes the dominance in contemporary society of the scientific outlook. It is this commitment which will bridge the gap between fact and value, between "is" and "ought," and which, it is hoped, will provide us with the means of achieving cultural unity in a core of values which enjoy far-reaching agreement.

The contributors to this symposium have in some measure, explicitly or implicitly, made this commitment. In each case the nature of their discussion attests to this. Thus each author analyses an aspect of man's participation in his culture in order to suggest what contribution such analysis can make to the problem of value. The subject matter of each article is different; the treatment given each subject is distinct. Yet there is a finding and an emphasis common to them all. It lies in the intimate relation which obtains among the various aspects of human action as embodied in society and culture. One article would impress on the reader the bond that must be made between the intellectual pursuits of social scientists and moral philosophers. Another article, as noted before, demonstrates the essential unity between two orientations to human experience, one labeled "world-view," the other, "ethos." A third article analyzes the relation of values to law, stressing the reciprocal relation between legal norms and other social norms and values. A final article, treating the family as an institution, analyzes the character of social norms. It seeks to demonstrate how social norms gain institutional status and how the values of a society are articulated with them. The subject matter of each is different, the terminology is often different, but the direction is the same. The thought need not be labored here, however. At this point, each author speaks for himself.

Social-Science Facts and Philosophical Values

By ETHEL M. ALBERT

NEARLY twenty-five centuries ago, Socrates asked: What is the good? We are still waiting for the answer. It is not as though nobody has tried. From the Academy to the cracker-barrel, philosophers have offered all too many answers. Perhaps the Socratic question is less a directly answerable query than a continuing symbol of perplexity. Its interpretation has varied with times and places and the ingenuity of philosophers, though the framework has remained much the same.

The mold of moral philosophy in occidental culture was cast in ancient Athens. Plato has left us the image of Socrates as the rational man of high principle, his eyes averted from the world as it is, fixed on an Ideal realm where Truth, Goodness and Beauty are somehow one, truly real, absolute and eternal. To the Sophists he left politicking and the dirty business of getting on in the world. They were very happy to inherit this-worldly good. Their acceptance of the rules of the game as all the ethic we need and their refusal to be bound by the rule of reason made the Sophists philosophy's pariahs. Aristotle shared Plato's disdain for them, although he could not share Plato's conviction that the Good had to be sought in some better world than this. Rejecting out of hand the relativism and hedonism of the Sophists, Aristotle proposed a "practical science" of ethics, based on knowledge of what

---

ETHEL M. ALBERT was associated with the "Comparative Study of Values in Five Cultures" of the Laboratory of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1953-55, and served as consultant to "Cooperative Research in the Near East and the United States" of Rice Institute, 1954-55. She spent eighteen months, 1955-57, in Central Africa for field work and documentation of two African groups. At present she is in residence at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in California.

different men find good. The true good for man he equated with what the good man—the philosopher—found good.

None of the parties to the disputes in Athens doubted that different people valued different things. The relativity of values at the descriptive level has never been a problem for philosophy. But the Sophists deduced from it that values are essentially relative. Socrates and Aristotle concluded from the same data that lots of people do not know what is really good.

More than two thousand years of discussion of the relationships between what is valued and what is worthy to be valued have yielded many permutations and combinations of the themes proposed by the Athenian philosophers: absolutism vs. relativism; exalted moral idealism vs. interest in the world as it is; rationalism vs. irrationalism; pure theoretical vs. practical ethics; facts vs. values—both what is valued vs. what is valuable and what is valued vs. what is actually done. In the interval, the meaning of each of the basic themes has changed considerably. Relating values to the facts of life, even in the sophisticated form given them by the sciences of human behavior, is a delicate operation.

In the contemporary scene, ethical relativism is a natural point of contact between moral philosophy and the sciences of human behavior. By and large, philosophers who seek knowledge about what is valued tend to be relativists. From the other side, there is the assumption in many places that social science somehow implies ethical relativism. The logic and the assumption would horrify Aristotle, and properly so. Whatever else the facts about values may mean for ethics, they do not logically imply or prove any particular ethical theory.

Let us limit ourselves to anthropology. Cultural relativism was brilliantly expounded by Ruth Benedict as an anthropological principle. The idea that each culture is a unique and integral unit has become associated with a broad ethical relativism, in effect a plea for tolerance for different patterns of culture and for all the races of man. Yet, nineteenth-century chauvinism used what was known about different cultural value systems to construct evolutionary moral scales. Invariably, African or Australian morality was on the lower rungs and European morality at the top. Pure logic does not account for the shift from chauvinism to relativism. It is more likely due to the unforeseen and tragically negative effects of culture contact between

Europeans and the so-called simpler peoples. Postwar research in cultural values by anthropologists like Clyde Kluckhohn illustrates another combination of anthropological facts and ethical interpretation. Here, the ideal of respect for different life-ways is maintained, but it is associated with mapping universals in cultures and values. Kluckhohn's approach calls for a review of the fundamental issues of cultural relativism and value relativism.

II

The notion that there's nothing right or wrong but thinking makes it so is better poetry than logic. Several million Bantu, like so many million others, can be wrong. We side with Columbus and against the many who thought the earth was flat, because he had the evidence on his side. In the long run, standards of evidence weigh more heavily than opinion, even majority opinion, when we want reliable knowledge. But in ethics, we do not have norms of right and wrong to compare with those of logic and scientific method in definiteness and universality. Contemporary positivists suggest a qualitative difference between scientific theory and ethical theory as the reason why. Scientific judgments can be verified, they argue, but value judgments cannot, for they are only expressions of emotion. This may in some respects be so, but the followers of John Dewey reject the distinction on principle. They maintain that it closes out further inquiry in ethical theory. Although social-science facts do not imply values logically, they may yield creative suggestions for a sound moral philosophy.

The relativity of values to culture, society, personality and history is different in kind from ethical relativism. The latter deals with the essence or inner nature of values. This is properly speaking a question of the metaphysics of morals. Relativists and absolutists disagree about what value really is. Then, relativists among themselves disagree as to what value is relative to—pleasure, or interest, or attitude, or likes and dislikes—and absolutists disagree among themselves as to which value is absolute—the Idea of the Good, Loyalty, Charity, Benevolence. Few, if any, of the definitions of the metaphysical nature of the good can be used for scientific research.

For the Sophists, the good was relative to pleasure, in the form of roistering, wealth, social position and political power. They assumed

that every individual differed from every other in what pleased him. To this highly individualistic hedonism, they matched their "practical" rules: might makes right, self-interest dictates ends, and any means that gets you what you are after is good. Here was radical ethical relativism, morally naked and unashamed. Some two thousand years further along in the history of moral philosophy, Bentham based his utilitarianism on the notion that man's good is pleasure and pain his evil. But his felicific calculus was designed to aid legislatures to make laws that would promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." This sociable hedonism is a world away from the moral anarchy of the Sophists.

A mischievous man, Bentham made no provision for qualitative differences among pleasures. Pushpin, he insisted, is as good as poetry. John Stuart Mill attempted to remedy this excessive egalitarianism of pleasures. His solution was borrowed from Aristotle: the tastes of the refined man could show us which are the higher pleasures. It came to very little. What is worse, in defending his relativism, he made an error in reasoning so startling that it finds its way into most logic textbook chapters on fallacies. When something is seen, he argued, it is visible; hence, when something is desired, it is desirable. As any beginning logic student has learned to discern, "visible" means "is or can be seen," while "desirable" means "ought to be desired." The passage from "is" to "ought" is not so easily maneuvered.

About a generation later, John Dewey proposed that the gap between desired and desirable be closed with relevant scientific knowledge. We can judge whether a desire is worthy of satisfaction in the future, once we know the consequences of satisfying it. The biological, psychological and sociological requirements for well-being must be known before what is valuable can be judged from what is valued. He held, moreover, that values must change with the times. What was good for ancient Athens or Galilee is by no means necessarily good for contemporary America or for the world of tomorrow. Value, then, is relative to the on-going of life—a sort of relativistic absolute, or, better yet, the matrix of evaluation.

Ethical relativism based on anthropology and cultural relativism is similar in many ways to Dewey's pragmatic ethics. The good is meant for man, not man for some fixed and culture-bound notion of what is good. Sensitivity to political, social and other conditions of life

and to change is characteristic. Values are assumed relative to well-being as defined within each cultural unit. The unwary may mix together metaphysical relativism with cultural relativism. Extreme ethical relativism results, making unwilling bedfellows of the tough-minded Sophists and humanitarian, social-science-minded relativists.

That whatever is valued by any culture is what is really valuable sounds well enough when it goes with an argument for respect and tolerance. It is not so convincing when the logic is carried to the bitter end. It is not easy, just for consistency's sake, to respect and tolerate intolerance and its sometimes fatal consequences, sadism, cannibalism and slavery, as well as such relatively innocent institutions as pushpin, polygamy or paganism. An ethic of anything-goes is hardly any ethic at all.

One remedy for the dilemmas of relativism is to abandon the word "relativism" itself, for the sake of release from the confusions tradition has tied to it. A more direct attack, with a similar goal, uses more of the hair of the dog, in the form of relating specific values to specific cultural, social and personality factors.

III

From the look of things in current research, the conclusion that all values are relative was somewhat hastily drawn. Available data suggest the pedestrian hypothesis that some values are relative and some are not. Some are relative to personality, sex, age, I.Q.; some to social class, economic factors, political position; some to culture, technology, language. Not the least interesting consequence of a hard look at the data is the realization that in our part of the world there is a powerful tendency to overgeneralize and oversimplify. Really, everyone—or nearly everyone—knows, or would not be surprised to learn, that there are some values that all—or nearly all—men have in common, and others that vary, to a greater or lesser degree, according to personality, society, history and culture. The best that can be said for overgeneralizing is that it can keep a brisk fight going for a very long time.

A change in method may help to reduce apparent relativism in values. If we share Kant's fascination with the starry skies above and the moral law within, we may do worse than to examine them both according to the same general principle. Stars or values, if we look

only at what immediately meets the eye, we find a helter-skelter scattering. It is all very interesting and pretty but not meaningfully ordered. Without pushing too far a risky analogy, we can nevertheless experiment with looking at values as we do at stars, to find regularities in relationships. Variation in values then becomes an absorbing object of research, rather than occasion for despair for ethical theory.

To begin with the obvious, every known society has a value system—a set of rules and goals that guide conduct and judgments of it. Every known value system represents an ideal, violated in fact at some point by virtually every individual in the society governed by it. The need for inducements for the "do's" and the likelihood of violations of the "don'ts" is taken for granted. Rewards and punishments are an integral part of the value system. When a series of value systems is examined, it becomes apparent that within each, absolutism prevails. In some cultures, it is believed that the local system is right for all men, and missionary activity may be engaged in to make it so. In others, it is taken for granted that each nation has its own ideas of the good. Within different cultures, there are different degrees of tolerance for those who hear a different drummer, though the limits of tolerated deviation tend to be small. But the business of social life proceeds on the assumption that the values established in the group are the ones that must be respected and enforced. When an individual begins to doubt his own values, his integration as a personality flags. When a community becomes confused about its customary rules and goals, social disorganization follows, though sometimes as a transition to a revised value system. The absolutism within value systems is part of what makes for relativism in the comparative, external viewing.

The helter-skelter state of values at the descriptive level has, of course, to be the starting-point of the search for regularities. So: here we find monogamy the only approved form of marriage; in other places, it is the unhappy lot of a man too poor to have many wives. In one place, respect for parents means nurturant care until they die of old age; elsewhere, they are dropped out of trees to prevent their after-life being marred by the infirmities of old age. A good spanking is the standby of one community for teaching children how to behave; in another, the sight of a grown person striking a little boy, especially his own, is shocking. In one society, women are little better than work-horses; in another they are tenderly placed on pedestals. Here, milk

is considered a perfect food; in other places, it may be as obscene as other bodily discharges. There are hundreds of similar cases.

A quite different statement of the same data can be made. Every culture has its own marriage rules, the requirement that children look after their parents and parents socialize their children, division of labor according to sex, age, position, etc., and rules about what is fit to be eaten. If we raise the question at this point, but which kind of marriage, which interpretation of respect for parents, which method of raising children, is the right one or the best one, we will find ourselves deep in the traditional dilemmas of relativism. It may be precisely because this question is raised too early that it has gone on being asked. It would seem more judicious to be patient and to see what comes of the hypothesis that there is a common basis for value systems, linked to common human activities for which rules must be made, but the specific content of the rules will vary with the culture. Stated the other way round, the specific rules that govern marriage, child-rearing and other basic human-social activities vary with social structures and organization.

There are some quite specific rules that appear to be cultural universals, though here again, the details are variable from one society to another. All societies forbid and punish murder, incest, adultery, theft. All reward or require caring for one's family, helping others, assuming responsibilities, doing as you would be done by. As we should expect, the specific manifestations of "murder" are different in a feudal kingdom from what they are in a democracy. For a king or prince to kill a commoner is not murder. In an egalitarian society, the same act is defined as murder. Still, in no society is every killing a murder. There is a clear distinction between legal killing—as in war or the execution of criminals—and criminal killing, which is murder. In our country, motive figures heavily in differentiating manslaughter from murder. Among the Navaho, no less democratic or morally sensitive, intentions do not count. A man is just as dead whether he was killed accidentally or with intent, in anger or in cold-blooded premeditation. Whatever the details, murder is a serious affair in every community.

Nobody has as yet been able to explain why the incest taboo is universal. The best we have is Freud's ungracious reminder that a taboo is needed only if the primal desire already exists. Something

more will have to be learned about the matter, for the specific rules as to whom you may or may not marry vary markedly according to the system of kinship in force. It is fairly certain that anyone called "brother" or "sister" is taboo as a partner. However, this term applies in some places to children of one or both parents only, in others to these and also to the offspring of the parents' brothers or sisters. The royal houses of ancient Egypt, Siam, Hawaii and Madagascar required brother-sister marriage as a religious obligation. These exceptions to the brother-sister incest taboo are of the kind that so frequently crop up in generalizing about specific rules. There is some comfort in the knowledge that there are no known exceptions to the taboos on parent-child marriage. It is also generally true for incest, as for murder, adultery, food taboos and so on, that discovery of violation evokes severe punishment from society, and usually the threat of worse to come from supernatural sources.

When we examine standards of good and bad character, we find a great deal of variation, but we also find that notions familiar in one society appear in others. The Zuñi priest shares with the Supreme Court justice and the African chieftain a well-defined set of realizable ideals, given excellent formulation in Confucius' model of the "superior man." Benevolence and wisdom, dignity and self-control, justice and peace-making skills, command of the spoken word and sharpness of wit despite the white hairs, moderation and foresight . . . the elder thus defined is known everywhere, his judgment sought when things get out of hand.

No matter how differently cultures define the associated actions, "respectability" and "modesty" are the qualities that girls must have to get the best husbands. The "other kind" usually have to take what's left over. A good wife anywhere is one who looks after her husband, her children and her home. It is, for some reason, more difficult to find a general pattern for good husbands. Young people, no matter how easy-going the child-rearing practices of their society, owe respect to their elders, obedience and gratitude, conformity to the society's norms. Anywhere, envious and jealous people are mistrusted; quarrelsome, irresponsible, wasteful individuals are disapproved; meddlesome and malicious gossips and isolates are feared. Sometimes such people are called "witches." Whatever name is given them, they are not acknowledged as "normal" or acceptable members of the community.

The elements that make up an intercultural base-line morality are, it must be evident by now, tied to the familiar. We are, then, indebted to the flights of radical relativism for the occasion to reconsider the extent to which values are relative and where the relativity is located. The greatest amount of common ground among cultural value systems is, at rock bottom, at the level of prerequisites for social existence. Variation appears when the common list of virtues and vices is made specific for different forms of social, political and other institutions. In this case, the problem of variation in values is no greater than the problem of variation in social forms, personality types and cultural idioms. Variation is perhaps one of the "givens" of social science. In the realm of values, it is at a maximum in philosophical explanations of why murder is wrong or respect for parents right.

Situational relativism in evaluation becomes more manageable when we start out from homely truths. Any system of values has within it different clusters of values that are appropriate for different occasions and circumstances. For example, when a death occurs, the workaday routine is radically transformed. The grief of survivors must be given some expression and practical details of burial and redistribution of property taken care of. Nobody is expected to behave as though nothing has happened. The same kind of adjustment of values is seen in the release from everyday morality at a New Year's Eve party or a Mexican fiesta, a Zuñi Shalako or Scandinavian Midsummer's Night. Rugged individualists work or fight side by side when called to help a neighbor in trouble or to serve their country. This sort of shift of relevant values with changes in circumstances is not casual. It is very clearly controlled by implicit but definite rules. Those who keep the same values despite changes in circumstances are not being "consistent" but deviant.

Orderly variation of much the same kind exists at the level of individual differences. Nobody expects wisdom or even responsibility of children; everybody expects it of mature persons. The village idiot and the court jester enjoy privileges denied ordinary people. Nobody expects generosity from a pauper; everybody criticizes a wealthy man who keeps his wealth for himself. However, a Zuñi will call such a man a witch, whereas our Scrooges are spoken of as misers, and social sanctions vary accordingly. It is nonetheless true of all societies that

value judgments and appropriate conduct are relative in a systematic way to age and sex, intelligence level and physical strength, social rank and economic standing. Personality factors and situational changes may combine to change radically the judgment of a particular individual. In Navaho mythology and American sociological studies alike, there is the familiar figure of the peacetime "bad boy" whose very deviance is what enables him to become a hero in times of stress.

In its further reaches, the adjustment of values to life-situations may go very far. Fatalism is a permanent condition of the world-view of many peoples of the world. It becomes an appropriate, if unconsciously adopted, philosophy for a normally self-confident, aggressive man who finds himself in the midst of battle, ignorant of whether or not his number is up.

Comparative study yields a model of realistic, practical ethics among peasants and other "simple" people, tied to a view of life in which fear figures prominently. The realism and practicality, as well as the fear, are perhaps related to the fact that theirs must perforce be an ethic for survival. Aristotle sought a luxury, an ethical system to assure true happiness. He took the precaution of specifying that to be truly happy, a man had first to be assured of a good family name, good health, good looks and a good income. We may do worse than ponder this difference between an ethic of survival and an ethic of happiness.

IV

No matter how often we pick up the question, what is the good? we answer it almost inevitably in terms of the further question whether the good is the same or different for different men. Or, if we ask, what is really right? we almost inevitably come up with one of our culture's stock of answers—custom is king; thinking makes it so; divinity or reason reveals; conscience dictates; respect for life tells us; or even, might makes right. The choice is wide enough, but the alternatives do not seem to settle anything. Not even in a comparative study can we see ourselves as others see us, nor can anyone see the world in perfect objectivity and freedom from his particular cultural world-view. But a redirection and rephrasing of ethical questions and answers may be possible if we consider formulations that occur in other systems of thought.

Though it has to get across ideas to get done the same basic job of guiding conduct and judgments of it, the language of the Navaho, for example, is vastly different from our own. It is primarily a language of verbs, so that what is happening is more central for the Navaho than what things are. It is difficult to say in their language that something "is" good or bad. Rather, it does good or it does harm. Value judgments, like other judgments, are linked by the structure of the language to the contexts of actions and to their consequences. In one case, an action had bad consequences; ergo, it was a bad action. In another case, what we would call the "same" action had good consequences; ergo, it was a good action. The specific judgments are not tied to the specific actions but to the principle that whatever promotes harmony among men is good, whatever destroys it is bad. There is a fixed value placed upon harmony, but judgments of specific situations are relative to fulfilling the ideal.

Perhaps the most instructive quality of the Navaho ethic is a tendency, determined by language, to consider moral and other value qualities *aspects* of action, not different *kinds* of action. There is no problem of reconciling conflicts between moral principles and practical demands. For them, to solve a value problem involves weighing the different components always present in each situation.

Conflicts between moral values and material interests or between moral and aesthetic values are part of the stock in trade of our tradition. Another example of our proclivity for phrasing value issues as conflicts of opposites is revealed in John Ladd's analysis of the Navaho moral code. There, self-interest and altruism are assumed as interdependent. Western ethical theory has taken it for granted that conflict between individual and social good is inherent in human nature. The Navaho in fact largely have a high degree of harmony between individuals and the group, whereas we largely do not. The self-society conflict is one of our culture's problems, not a universal one. It is perhaps intensified by the belief that it is inevitable.

Comparative study makes it clear that the very definition of morality and the inventory of moral problems are tied to a life-way. Europeans who went to Africa and Australia early learned that their own notions of sin were by no means the same as those of the people they visited. They concluded that all these others "have no morals." More relativistically viewed, there are some societies which consider

polygamy or premarital child-bearing simply as customs, not as moral issues in the sense in which crimes are singled out as wrong or the golden rule right. Looked at the other way around, our culture manifests a very flesh-bound conception of what moral judgment is relevant to. An adequate drawing of the map of morals, or of values generally, requires more knowledge than our culture can of itself provide.

Professional moral philosophy in the western tradition has been largely the province of saints and gentlemen, social reformers and apologists for some existing moral code. The least common denominator has been devotion to reason as the method of inquiry. Academicism is a frequent outcome of insistence upon logic, but it is neither inevitable nor typical. Plato himself must be numbered among those whose ethical theory was tested in action. His experiment in making a philosopher-king failed, but there are success stories enough. Bentham and Mill had an indisputable effect on British legislation. Marx's philosophy erupts so violently into the daily affairs of men that we forget how much of his life was spent in the library. As for a personal moral philosophy, Socrates' preference for death to dishonor went far beyond lip-service when he drank the hemlock. The great philosophers took their theories seriously enough to put them to the test. Contact between philosophy and the world of action is as much or more a part of the tradition as Sid Caesar's burlesque of the incomprehensible professor.

Establishing meaningful connections between theoretical ethics and the life of our times is, it can hardly be denied, an immense and difficult chore. That such great diversity of cultures should so abruptly have become one world with one common fear makes the doing more urgent, but hardly easier. Responsibility does not lie with any single individual or group. If we want to determine the appropriate role of philosophy, we start with a handicap. So changed are conditions of life and methods of speculation that there is critical uncertainty about the very conception of what moral philosophy is and what use it can be put to. The only statement that can be made with confidence is that it will have to be different in some respects from what has come before. Beyond this, there are only guesses and experiments.

V

Moral philosophy does not have to be a flight from reality. It tends to become that in part because we are given to generalizing too fast and too far. Compared with other moral systems, moreover, our own appears excessively pleased with high ideals that nobody is expected to realize in action. Where high-flown moral idealism is linked to proportionately noble actions—in saints, Chinese sages, and Hindu yogis—all is well. But it is only the exceptional individual who brings his ideals to bear in practical situations, and that often inconsistently. It has been noted often enough that the most eloquent appeals to ideals—rightist or leftist, other-worldly or humanistic—may merely mask hypocrisy. Or, worse yet, they may be put into action through murderous persecution or cruel repression of alternative moralities and ideologies. Sincere conviction can lead almost anywhere.

The solution, if there is one, to our contemporary value problems does not seem to lie in simple borrowing from other cultures where facts and values are on speaking terms, nor in struggling with the inherited questions of our philosophic tradition. The spirit of rational inquiry can be retained, but the letter of its objectives and methods must be revised. A comprehensive and orderly knowledge of what is valued may serve as the reality in which philosophic values can be rooted. This does not mean a crude, earth-bound value system. Creativity in moral philosophy, as in art, may be limited by its medium without having its wings clipped. The realities as well as the potentialities of human existence challenge philosophical creativity. Between what is valued and what is worthy to be valued, the philosophical space is very large. Value relativism does not force a choice between anarchy and absolutism. On the contrary, it offers a model for analysis that is a first step toward closing the gap between social-scientific facts and philosophical values.

What is considered good in practical moral situations is always related to some specific individual or group, living in specific social and cultural ways and facing some specific situation. The social sciences are well on their way to documenting what values are actually held in different parts of the world and what solutions are produced for concrete problems. Convergence upon common human solutions for common human problems is becoming evident. One of the principles

is already quite clear: values are not the only relevant factors in solving problems, no matter how distinctively moral they may be. Further, it would seem to make sense to ascertain what is actually possible in a situation before deciding what to do about it. When we have the relevant information about the persons, time, place and circumstances, and when we know the real alternatives in the specific case, we find ourselves with fewer and smaller value problems. Real-world difficulties are great enough, but not as problematic as all the possible if's and but's make them appear.

Moral problems are faced at intervals by every individual and group. They are, however, different in kind from a problematic state of moral philosophy. In specific moral problems, the principles are taken as established. What moral philosophy deals with, however, is the validity of those principles. Between these extremes lie other types of problems about principles. If a question of hanging arises in a court of justice, the law decides the appropriate punishment, the court decides whether or not it is to be dealt out in each particular case. It is somewhat more difficult to settle the question whether hanging, or other capital punishment, shall be prescribed by law. Agreement about exactly which punishment fits the crime does not necessarily follow from agreement that justice and social welfare shall be served. Here is a problem in interpreting how wide general principles will be expressed in narrower ones. Of a different sort but hardly less problematic are conflicts between equally important principles in a specific instance. Mercy and justice do not necessarily lead to the same judgment, social welfare does not always coincide with individual good, happiness and duty do not necessarily prescribe the same action. Applied morality in daily life, law and religion require formulas for solutions. These formulas, explicit or not, ultimately satisfactory or not in their results, are a natural but untapped source of knowledge for ethical theory.

In moral philosophy, formal and otherwise, it is the "ultimate" principles of values that have been sought. They are usually given as a simple panacea. Connections between the panacea and the real-life situations it is supposed to deal with are sometimes clear, sometimes not. What has yet to be tried is the building of ultimate principles from the ground up. This requires systematic knowledge of values in operation. First, what is actually valued must be understood in relation to

specific societies and individuals. Then, we may look at solutions of daily moral problems where the specific principle is clear. Next, we may risk analysis of the stickier problems where the same principles seem to imply different courses of action, going on to those where action has had to be decided on in spite of conflicts of moral directives. From an analysis of actual solutions, perhaps there will come inspiration for a moral philosophy at the same time intellectually satisfactory and practically meaningful.

It is as well to be candid. Not even the most up-to-date philosophy and social science, separately or together, give us at this moment what we are looking for. From social science, there is not yet enough information about values and their functioning. In philosophy, the realization is still too new that traditional ways of dealing with values are no longer appropriate. When we ask what is good, what is right, what ought to be done, we get no direct replies but only evasions or hypotheses. But at least, and for now at best, there is also hope.

The temptation has been strong to write off as nonsense the whole of moral philosophy, because the questions and proposed answers have been so badly stated. Not a few contemporary philosophers have fallen prey to it. Throwing out the underlying predicament with the badly phrased question does not turn the trick, if, as seems to be the case, there are genuine value problems. It would seem well to seek a way to restate the real predicaments in intelligible form. The Socratic question represents a genuine perplexity, but it is an incomplete question. If we ask simply, what is the good? we can only answer, that depends. When we ask, what is the good in a specific situation, for a specific individual or group with specific characteristics, we may be able to come up with some answers.

Ethos, World-View and the Analysis of Sacred Symbols

By CLIFFORD GEERTZ

RELIGION is never merely metaphysics. For all peoples the forms, vehicles, and objects of worship are suffused with an aura of deep moral seriousness. The holy bears within it everywhere a sense of intrinsic obligation: it not only encourages devotion, it demands it; it not only induces intellectual assent, it enforces emotional commitment. Whether it be formulated as *mana*, as *Brahma*, or as the Holy Trinity, that which is set apart as more than mundane is inevitably considered to have far-reaching implications for the direction of human conduct. Never merely metaphysics, religion is never merely ethics either. The source of its moral vitality is conceived to lie in the fidelity with which it expresses the fundamental nature of reality. The powerfully coercive "ought" is felt to grow out of a comprehensive factual "is," and in such a way religion grounds the most specific requirements of human action in the most general contexts of human existence.

In recent anthropological discussion, the moral (and aesthetic) aspects of a given culture, the evaluative elements, have commonly been summed up in the term "ethos," while the cognitive, existential aspects have been designated by the term "world-view." A people's ethos is the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood; it is the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world that life reflects. Their world-view is their picture of the way things, in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas

---

CLIFFORD GEERTZ was a member of a research team studying Indonesia under sponsorship of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1952-1954, and he is at present in Indonesia doing further research. He holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from Harvard University.

of order. Religious belief and ritual confront and mutually confirm one another; the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the world-view describes, and the world-view is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs of which such a way of life is an authentic expression. This demonstration of a meaningful relation between the values a people holds and the general order of existence within which it finds itself is an essential element in all religions, however those values or that order be conceived. Whatever else religion may be, it is in part an attempt (of an implicit and directly felt rather than explicit and consciously thought-about sort) to conserve the fund of general meanings in terms of which each individual interprets his experience and organizes his conduct.

But meanings can only be "stored" in symbols: a cross, a crescent, or a feathered serpent. Such religious symbols, dramatized in rituals or related in myths, are felt somehow to sum up, for those for whom they are resonant, what is known about the way the world is, the quality of the emotional life it supports, and the way one ought to behave while in it. Sacred symbols thus relate an ontology and a cosmology to an aesthetics and a morality: their peculiar power comes from their presumed ability to identify fact with value at the most fundamental level, to give to what is otherwise merely actual, a comprehensive normative import. The number of such synthesizing symbols is limited in any culture, and though in theory we might think that a people could construct a wholly autonomous value system independent of any metaphysical referent, an ethics without ontology, we do not in fact seem to have found such a people. The tendency to synthesize world-view and ethos at some level, if not logically necessary, is at least empirically coercive; if it is not philosophically justified, it is at least pragmatically universal.

Let me give as an example of this fusion of the existential and the normative a quotation from one of James Walker's Oglala (Sioux) informants, which I find in Paul Radin's neglected classic, *Primitive Man as a Philosopher*:

> The Oglala believe the circle to be sacred because the great spirit caused everything in nature to be round except stone. Stone is the implement of

destruction. The sun and the sky, the earth and the moon are round like a shield, though the sky is deep like a bowl. Everything that breathes is round like the stem of a plant. Since the great spirit has caused everything to be round mankind should look upon the circle as sacred, for it is the symbol of all things in nature except stone. It is also the symbol of the circle that makes the edge of the world and therefore of the four winds that travel there. Consequently it is also the symbol of the year. The day, the night, and the moon go in a circle above the sky. Therefore the circle is a symbol of these divisions of time and hence the symbol of all time.

For these reasons the Oglala make their *tipis* circular, their camp-circle circular, and sit in a circle at all ceremonies. The circle is also the symbol of the *tipi* and of shelter. If one makes a circle for an ornament and it is not divided in any way, it should be understood as the symbol of the world and of time.

Here is a subtle formulation of the relation between good and evil, and of their grounding in the very nature of reality. Circle and eccentric form, sun and stone, shelter and war are segregated into pairs of disjunct classes whose significance is aesthetic, moral and ontological. The reasoned articulateness of this statement is atypical: for most Oglala the circle, whether found in nature, painted on a buffalo skin, or enacted in a sun dance, is but an unexamined luminous symbol whose meaning is intuitively sensed, not consciously interpreted. But the power of the symbol, analyzed or not, clearly rests on its comprehensiveness, on its fruitfulness in ordering experience. Again and again the idea of a sacred circle, a natural form with a moral import, yields, when applied to the world within which the Oglala lives, new meanings; continually it connects together elements within their experience which would otherwise seem wholly disparate and, wholly disparate, incomprehensible.

The common roundness of a human body and a plant stem, of a moon and a shield, of a *tipi* and a camp-circle give them a vaguely conceived but intensely felt significance. And this meaningful common element, once abstracted, can then be employed for ritual purposes—as when in a peace ceremony the pipe, the symbol of social solidarity, moves deliberately in a perfect circle from one smoker to the next, the purity of the form evoking the beneficence of the spirits—or to construe mythologically the peculiar paradoxes and anomalies of moral experience, as when one sees in a round stone the shaping power of good over evil.

II

It is a cluster of sacred symbols, woven into some sort of ordered whole, which makes up a religious system. For those who are committed to it, such a religious system seems to mediate genuine knowledge, knowledge of the essential conditions in terms of which life must, of necessity, be lived. Particularly where these symbols are uncriticized, historically or philosophically, as they are in most of the world's cultures, individuals who ignore the moral-aesthetic norms the symbols formulate, who follow a discordant style of life, are regarded not so much as evil as stupid, insensitive, unlearned, or in the case of extreme dereliction, mad. In Java, where I have done field work, small children, simpletons, boors, the insane, and the flagrantly immoral are all said to be "not yet Javanese," and, not yet Javanese, not yet human. Unethical behavior is referred to as "uncustomary," the more serious crimes (incest, sorcery, murder) are commonly accounted for by an assumed lapse of reason, the less serious ones by a comment that the culprit "does not know order," and the word for "religion" and that for "science" are the same. Morality has thus the air of simple realism, of practical wisdom; religion supports proper conduct by picturing a world in which such conduct is only common sense.

It is only common sense because between ethos and world-view, between the approved style of life and the assumed structure of reality, there is conceived to be a simple and fundamental congruence such that they complete one another and lend one another meaning. In Java, for example, this view is summed up in a concept one hears continually invoked, that of *tjotjog*. *Tjotjog* means to fit, as a key does in a lock, as an efficacious medicine does to a disease, as a solution does to an arithmetic problem, as a man does with the woman he marries (if he does not, they will divorce). If your opinion agrees with mine we *tjotjog*; if the meaning of my name fits my character (and if it brings me luck) it is said to be *tjotjog*. Tasty food, correct theories, good manners, comfortable surroundings, gratifying outcomes are all *tjotjog*. In the broadest and most abstract sense, two items *tjotjog* when their coincidence forms a coherent pattern which gives to each a significance and a value it does not in itself have. There is implied here a contrapuntal view of the universe in which that which is

important is what natural relationship the separate elements have to one another, how they must be arranged to strike a chord and to avoid a dissonance. And, as in harmony the ultimately correct relationships are fixed, determinate, and knowable, so religion, like harmony, is ultimately a kind of practical science, producing value out of fact as music is produced out of sound. In its specificity, *tjotjog* is a peculiarly Javanese idea, but the notion that life takes on its true import when human actions are tuned to cosmic conditions is widespread.

The sort of counterpoint between style of life and fundamental reality which the sacred symbols formulate varies from culture to culture. For the Navaho, an ethic prizing calm deliberateness, untiring persistence, and dignified caution complements an image of nature as tremendously powerful, mechanically regular, and highly dangerous. For the French, a logical legalism is a response to the notion that reality is rationally structured, that first principles are clear, precise, and unalterable and so need only be discerned, memorized, and deductively applied to concrete cases. For the Hindus, a transcendental moral determinism in which one's social and spiritual status in a future incarnation is an automatic outcome of the nature of one's action in the present, is completed by a ritualistic duty-ethic bound to caste. In itself, either side, the normative or the metaphysical, is arbitrary, but taken together they form a gestalt with a peculiar kind of inevitability; a French ethic in a Navaho world, or a Hindu one in a French world would seem only quixotic, for it would lack the air of naturalness and simple factuality which it has in its own context. It is this air of the factual, of describing, after all, the genuinely reasonable way to live which, given the facts of life, is the primary source of such an ethic's authoritativeness. What all sacred symbols assert is that the good for man is to live realistically; where they differ is in the vision of reality they construct.

However, it is not only positive values that sacred symbols dramatize, but negative ones as well. They point not only toward the existence of good but also of evil, and toward the conflict between them. The so-called "problem of evil" is a matter of formulating in world-view terms the actual nature of the destructive forces within the self and outside of it, of interpreting murder, crop failure, sickness, earthquakes, poverty, and oppression in such a way that it is possible to come to some sort of terms with them. Declaring evil fundamentally

unreal—as in Indian religions and some versions of Christianity—is but one rather uncommon solution to the problem; more often, the reality of evil is accepted and characterized positively, and an attitude toward it—resignation, active opposition, hedonistic escape, self-recrimination and repentance, or a humble plea for mercy—is enjoined as reasonable and proper, given its nature. Among the African Azande, where all natural misfortune (death, illness, crop failure) is seen as caused by the hatred of one man for another acting mechanically through witchcraft, the attitude toward evil is a straightforward and practical one: it is to be dealt with by means of reliably established divination in order to discover the witch, and proven methods of social pressure to force him to abandon his attack, or failing this, by effective vengeance-magic to kill him. Among the Melanesian Manus, the conception that illness, death, or financial failure are the result of a secret sin (adultery, stealing, lying) which has offended the moral sensibilities of the household spirit is coupled with an emphasis on public confession and repentance as the rational way to cope with evil. For the Javanese, evil results from unregulated passion and is resisted by detachment and self-control. Thus, both what a people prizes and what it fears and hates are depicted in its world-view, symbolized in its religion, and in turn expressed in the whole quality of its life. Its ethos is distinctive not merely in terms of the sort of nobility it celebrates, but also in terms of the sort of baseness it condemns; its vices are as stylized as its virtues.

The force of a religion in supporting social values rests, then, on the ability of its symbols to formulate a world in which those values, as well as the forces opposing their realization, are fundamental ingredients. It represents the power of the human imagination to construct an image of reality in which, to quote Max Weber, "events are not just there and happen, but they have a meaning and happen because of that meaning." The need for such a metaphysical grounding for values seems to vary quite widely in intensity from culture to culture and from individual to individual, but the tendency to desire some sort of factual basis for one's commitments seems practically universal; mere conventionalism satisfies few people in any culture. However its role may differ at various times, for various individuals, and in various cultures, religion, by fusing ethos and world-view, gives to a set of social values what they perhaps most need to be coercive:

an appearance of objectivity. In sacred rituals and myths values are portrayed not as subjective human preferences but as the imposed conditions for life implicit in a world with a particular structure.

III

The sort of symbols (or symbol complexes) regarded by a people as sacred varies very widely. Elaborate initiation rites, as among the Australians; complex philosophical tales, as among the Maori; dramatic shamanistic exhibitions, as among the Eskimo; cruel human sacrifice rites, as among the Aztecs; obsessive curing ceremonies, as among the Navaho; large communal feasts, as among various Polynesian groups—all these patterns and many more seem to one people or another to sum up most powerfully what it knows about living. Nor is there commonly but one such complex: Malinowski's famous Trobrianders seem equally concerned with the rituals of gardening and those of trade. In a complex civilization such as that of the Javanese—in which Hinduistic, Islamic, and pagan influences all remain very strong—one could choose any of several symbol complexes as revealing one or another aspect of the integration of ethos and world-view. But perhaps the clearest and most direct insight into the relation between Javanese values and Javanese metaphysics can be gained through a brief analysis of one of the most deeply rooted and highly developed of their art forms which is at the same time a religious rite: the shadow-puppet play, or *wajang*.

The shadow play is called so because the puppets, which are flat cut-outs of leather, painted in golds, reds, blues, and blacks, are made to cast large shadows on a white screen. The *dalang*, as the puppeteer is called, sits on a mat in front of the screen, with a *gamelan* percussion orchestra behind him, an oil lamp hanging over his head. A banana tree-trunk lies horizontally in front of him into which the puppets, each of them fastened to a tortoise-shell handle, are stuck. A performance lasts a whole night. As the play progresses, the *dalang* takes and replaces characters from the tree-trunk as he needs them, holding them up in either hand over his head and interposing them between the light and the screen. From the *dalang*'s side of the screen—where traditionally only the men were permitted to sit—one sees the puppets themselves, their shadows rising up dominant on the screen behind them; from the reverse side of the screen—where the women and

children sit—one sees their shadows only.

The stories dramatized are mostly episodes taken from the Indian epic Mahabarata, somewhat adapted and placed in a Javanese setting. (Stories from the Ramayana are sometimes dramatized, but they are less popular.) In this cycle there are three major groups of characters. First, there are the gods and goddesses, headed by Siva and his wife Durga. As in the Greek epics, the gods are far from uniformly righteous, are marked by human frailties and human passions, and seem peculiarly interested in the things of this world. Second, there are the kings and nobles, who are, in theory, the ancestors of the present-day Javanese. The two most important groups of these nobles are the Pendawas and the Korawas. The Pendawas are the famous five hero brothers—Yudistira, Bima, Arjuna, and the identical twins, Nakula and Sadéwa—who are usually accompanied, as a general advisor and protector, by Krisna, an incarnation of Visnu. The Korawas, of whom there are a hundred, are cousins of the Pendawa. They have usurped the kingdom of Ngastina from them, and it is the struggle over this disputed country which provides the major theme of the *wajang*; a struggle which culminates in the great Bratajuda war of kinsmen, as related in the Bhagavad Gita, in which the Korawas are defeated by the Pendawas. And, third, there are those Javanese additions to the original Hindu cast of characters, the great low clowns—Semar, Petruk, and Garèng, constant companions of the Pendawas, at once their servants and their protectors. Semar, the father of the other two, is actually a god in all-too-human form, a brother to Siva, king of the gods. The guardian spirit of all Javanese from their first appearance until the end of time, this gross and clumsy fool is perhaps the most important figure in the whole *wajang* mythology.

The types of action characteristic of the *wajang* also are three: there are the "talking" episodes in which two groups of opposed nobles confront one another and discuss (the *dalang* imitates all the voices) the issues between them; there are the fighting episodes, in which diplomacy having failed, the two groups of nobles fight (the *dalang* knocks the puppets together and kicks a clapper with his foot to symbolize the sounds of war); and there are the slapstick comic scenes, in which the clowns mock the nobles, each other, and, if the *dalang* is clever, members of the audience or the local powers-that-be. Generally, the three sorts of episodes are differentially distributed over

the course of the evening. The declamatory scenes are mostly toward the beginning, the comic ones toward the middle, and the war toward the end. From nine until midnight, the political leaders of the various kingdoms confront one another and state the framework of the story—a *wajang* hero wishes to marry the daughter of a neighboring king, a subjugated country wants its freedom, or whatever. From midnight until three o'clock or so difficulties of some sort set in—someone else is bidding for the daughter's hand, the imperialist country refuses freedom to its colony. And, finally, these difficulties are resolved in the last section, ending at dawn, inevitably, by a war in which the heroes triumph—an action followed by a brief celebration of the accomplished marriage or the achieved freedom. Western-educated Javanese intellectuals often compare the *wajang* to a sonata; it opens with an exposition of a theme, follows with a development and complication of it, and ends with its resolution and recapitulation.

Another comparison which, offhand, strikes the Western observer is with Shakespeare's chronicle plays. The long formal scenes in the courts with the messengers coming and going, interspersed with short, breathless transitional scenes in the woods or along the road, the double plot, the clowns speaking a rough common language full of worldly-wise ethics, caricaturing the forms of action of the great nobles, who speak an elevated language full of apostrophes to honor, justice, and duty, the final war, which, like those at Shrewsbury and Agincourt, leaves the vanquished beaten but still noble—all these suggest Shakespeare's historical dramas. But the world-view the *wajang* expresses, despite the surface similarities in the two feudal codes, is hardly Elizabethan at base. It is not the external world of principalities and powers which provides the main setting for human action, but the internal one of sentiments and desires. Reality is looked for not outside the self, but within it, and consequently what the *wajang* dramatizes is not a philosophical politics but a metaphysical psychology.

For the Javanese (or at least for those of them in whose thought the influence of Java's Hindu-Buddhist period from the second to the fifteenth centuries still is dominant), the flow of subjective experience, taken in all its phenomenological immediacy, presents a microcosm of the universe generally; in the depths of the fluid interior world of thought-and-emotion they see reflected ultimate reality itself. This inward-looking sort of world-view is best expressed in a concept the

Javanese have also borrowed from India and also peculiarly reinterpreted: *rasa*. *Rasa* has two primary meanings: "feeling" and "meaning." As "feeling" it is one of the traditional Javanese five senses—seeing, hearing, talking, smelling, and feeling, and it includes within itself three aspects of "feeling" that our view of the five senses separates: taste on the tongue, touch on the body, and emotional "feeling" within the "heart" like sadness and happiness. The taste of a banana is its *rasa*; a hunch is a *rasa*; a pain is a *rasa*; and so is a passion. As "meaning," *rasa* is applied to the words in a letter, in a poem, or even in common speech to indicate the between-the-lines type of indirection and allusive suggestion that is so important in Javanese communication and social intercourse. And it is given the same application to behavioral acts generally: to indicate the implicit import, the connotative "feeling" of dance movements, polite gestures, and so forth. But in this second, semantic sense, it also means "ultimate significance"—the deepest meaning at which one arrives by dint of mystical effort and whose clarification resolves all the ambiguities of mundane existence. *Rasa*, said one of my most articulate informants, is the same as life; whatever lives has *rasa* and whatever has *rasa* lives. To translate such a sentence one could only render it twice: whatever lives feels and whatever feels lives; or: whatever lives has meaning and whatever has meaning lives.

By taking *rasa* to mean both "feeling" and "meaning," the more speculatively inclined among the Javanese have been able to develop a highly sophisticated phenomenological analysis of subjective experience to which everything else can be tied. Because fundamentally "feeling" and "meaning" are one, and therefore the ultimate religious experience taken *subjectively* is also the ultimate religious truth taken *objectively*, an empirical analysis of inward perception yields at the same time a metaphysical analysis of outward reality. This being granted—and the actual discriminations, categorizations and connections made are often both subtle and detailed—then the characteristic way in which human action comes to be considered, from either a moral or an aesthetic point of view, is in terms of the emotional life of the individual who experiences it. This is true whether this action is seen from within as one's own behavior or from without as that of someone else: the more refined one's feelings, then the more profound one's understanding, the more elevated one's moral character, and the more

beautiful one's external aspect, in clothes, movements, speech, and so on. The management of the individual's emotional economy becomes, therefore, his primary concern, in terms of which all else is ultimately rationalized. The spiritually enlightened man guards well his psychological equilibrium and makes a constant effort to maintain its placid stability. His inner life must be, in a simile repeatedly employed, like a still pool of clear water to the bottom of which one can easily see. The individual's proximate aim is, thus, emotional quiescence, for passion is crude feeling, fit for children, animals, madmen, primitives and foreigners. But his ultimate aim, which this quiescence makes possible, is gnosis—the direct comprehension of the ultimate *rasa*.

Javanese religion (or at least this variant of it) is consequently mystical: God is found by means of spiritual discipline, in the depths of the self as pure *rasa*. And Javanese ethics (and aesthetics) are, correspondingly, affect-centered without being hedonistic: emotional equanimity, a certain flatness of affect, a strange inner stillness, is the prized psychological state, the mark of a truly noble character. One must attempt to get beyond the emotions of everyday life to the genuine feeling-meaning which lies within us all. Happiness and unhappiness are, after all, just the same. You shed tears when you laugh and also when you cry. And, besides, they imply one another: happy now, unhappy later; unhappy now, happy later. The reasonable, prudent, "wise" man strives not for happiness, but for a tranquil detachment which frees him from this endless oscillation between gratification and frustration. Similarly, Javanese etiquette, which comprises almost the whole of this morality, focuses around the injunction not to disturb the equilibrium of another by sudden gestures, loud speech, or startling, erratic actions of any sort, mainly because so doing will cause the other in turn to act erratically and so upset one's own balance. On the world-view side, there are yoga-like mystical techniques (meditation, staring at candles, repeating set words or phrases) and highly involved speculative theories of the emotions and their relations to sickness, natural objects, social institutions, and so on. On the ethos side, there is a moral stress on subdued dress, speech and gesture, on refined sensitivity to small changes in the emotional state both of oneself and of others, and on a stable, highly regularized predictability of behavior. "If you start off north, go north," a Javanese proverb says, "don't turn east, west, or south." Both religion and

ethics, both mysticism and politesse, thus point to the same end: a detached tranquility which is proof against disturbance from either within or without.

But, unlike India, this tranquility is not to be gained by a retreat from the world and from society, but must be achieved while in it. It is a this-worldly, even practical, mysticism, as expressed in the following composite quotation from two Javanese petty traders who are members of a mystical society:

> He said that the society was concerned with teaching you not to pay too much attention to worldly things, not to care too much about the things of everyday life. He said this is very difficult to do. His wife, he said, was not yet able to do it much, and she agreed with him, e.g., she still likes to ride in motorcars while he doesn't care; he can take them or leave them alone. It takes much long study and meditation. For example, you have to get so that if someone comes to buy cloth you don't care if he buys it or not . . . and you don't get your emotions really involved in the problems of commerce, but just think of God. The society wants to turn people toward God and avoids any strong attachments to everyday life.
>
> . . . Why did he meditate? He said it was only to make the heart peaceful, to make you calm inside, so you will not be easily upset. For example, if you're selling cloth and are upset you may sell a piece of cloth for forty rupiah when it cost you sixty. If a person comes here and my mind is not calm, well then I can't sell him anything. . . . I said, well, why do you have a meeting, why not meditate at home? And he said, well, in the first place you are not supposed to achieve peace by withdrawing from society; you are supposed to stay in society and mix with people, only with peace in your heart.

This fusion between a mystical-phenomenological world-view and an etiquette-centered ethos is expressed in the *wajang* in various ways. First, it appears most directly in terms of an explicit iconography. The five *pendawas* are commonly interpreted as standing for the five senses which the individual must unite into one undivided psychological force in order to achieve gnosis. Meditation demands a "co-operation" among the senses as close as that among the hero brothers, who act as one in all they do. Or the shadows of the puppets are identified with the outward behavior of man, the puppets themselves with his inward self, so that in him as in them the visible pattern of conduct is a direct outcome of an underlying psychological reality. The very design of the puppets has explicit symbolic significance: in Bima's red, white and black sarong, the red is usually taken to indicate

courage, the white purity, the black fixity of will. The various tunes played on the accompanying *gamelan* orchestra each symbolize a certain emotion; similarly with the poems the *dalang* sings at various points in the play, and so on. Second, the fusion often appears as parable, as in the story of Bima's quest for the "clear water." After slaying many monsters in his wanderings in search of this water which he has been told will make him invulnerable, he meets a god as big as his little finger who is an exact replica of himself. Entering through the mouth of this mirror-image midget, he sees inside the god's body the whole world, complete in every detail, and upon emerging he is told by the god that there is no "clear water" as such, that the source of his own strength is within himself, after which he goes off to meditate. And third, the moral content of the play is sometimes interpreted analogically: the *dalang*'s absolute control over the puppets is said to parallel God's over men; or the alternation of polite speeches and violent wars is said to parallel modern international relationships, where so long as diplomats continue talking peace prevails, but when talks break down war follows.

But neither icons, parables, nor moral analogies are the main means by which the Javanese synthesis is expressed in the *wajang*; for the play as a whole is commonly perceived to be but a dramatization of individual subjective experience in terms at once moral and factual:

> He [an elementary school-teacher] said that the main purpose of the *wajang* was to draw a picture of inner thought and feeling, to give an external form to internal feeling. He said that more specifically it pictured the eternal conflict in the individual between what he wanted to do and what he felt he ought to do. Suppose you want to steal something. Well, at the same time something inside you tells you not to do it, restrains you, controls you. That which wants to do it is called the will; that which restrains is called the ego. All such tendencies threaten every day to ruin the individual, to destroy his thought and upset his behavior. These tendencies are called *goda*, which means something which plagues or teases someone or something. For example, you go to a coffee-shop where people are eating. They invite you to join them, and so you have a struggle within—should I eat with them . . . no, I've already eaten and I will be over full . . . but the food looks good . . . etc. . . . etc.
>
> Well, in the *wajang* the various plagues, wishes, etc.—the *godas*—are represented by the hundred Korawas, and the ability to control oneself is represented by their cousins, the five Pendawas and by Krisna. The stories are ostensibly about a struggle over land. The reason for this is so the

> stories will seem real to the onlookers, so the abstract elements in the *rasa* can be represented in concrete external elements which will attract the audience and seem real to them and still communicate its inner message. For example, the *wajang* is full of war and this war, which occurs and reoccurs, is really supposed to represent the inner war which goes on continually in every person's subjective life between his base and his refined impulses.

Once again, this formulation is more self-conscious than most; the average man "enjoys" the *wajang* without explicitly interpreting its meaning. Yet, in the same way as the circle organizes Oglala experience, whether the individual Sioux is able to explicate its significance, or indeed has any interest in doing so, so the sacred symbols of the *wajang*—the music, characters, the action itself—give form to the ordinary Javanese experience.

For example, each of the three older Pendawas are commonly held to display a different sort of emotional-moral dilemma, centering around one or another of the central Javanese virtues. Yudistira, the eldest, is too compassionate. He is unable to rule his country effectively because when someone asks him for his land, his wealth, his food, he simply gives it out of pity, leaving himself powerless, poor or starving. His enemies continually take advantage of his mercifulness to deceive him and to escape his justice. Bima, on the other hand, is single-minded, steadfast. Once he forms an intention, he follows it out straight to its conclusion; he doesn't look aside, doesn't turn off or idle along the way—he "goes north." As a result, he is often rash, and blunders into difficulties he could as well have avoided. Arjuna, the third brother, is perfectly just. His goodness comes from the fact that he opposes evil, that he shelters people from injustice, that he is coolly courageous in fighting for the right. But he lacks a sense of mercy, of sympathy for wrongdoers. He applies a divine moral code to human activity and so he is often cold, cruel or brutal in the name of justice. The resolution of these three dilemmas of virtue is the same: mystical insight. With a genuine comprehension of the realities of the human situation, a true perception of the ultimate *rasa*, comes the ability to combine Yudistira's compassion, Bima's will to action, and Arjuna's sense of justice into a truly moral outlook, an outlook which brings an emotional detachment and an inner peace in the midst of the world of flux, yet permits and demands a struggle for order and justice

within such a world. And it is such a unification that the unshakable solidarity among the Pendawas in the play, continually rescuing one another from the defects of their virtues, clearly demonstrates.

But what, finally, of Semar, in whom so many oppositions seem to meet—the figure who is both god and clown, man's guardian spirit and his servant, the most spiritually refined inwardly and the most rough-looking outwardly? Again one thinks of the chronicle plays and of, in this case, Falstaff. Like Falstaff, Semar is a symbolic father to the play's heroes. Like Falstaff, he is fat, funny, and worldly-wise; and, like Falstaff, he seems to provide in his vigorous amoralism a general criticism of the very values the drama affirms. Both figures, perhaps, provide a reminder that, despite over-proud assertions to the contrary by religious fanatics and moral absolutists, no completely adequate and comprehensive human world-view is possible, and behind all the pretense to absolute and ultimate knowledge, the sense for the irrationality of human life, for the fact that it is unlimitable, remains. Semar reminds the noble and refined Pendawas of their own humble, animal origins. He resists any attempt to turn human beings into gods and to end the world of natural contingency by a flight to the divine world of absolute order, a final stilling of the eternal psychological-metaphysical struggle.

In one *wajang* story, Siva comes down to earth incarnated as a mystical teacher in an attempt to bring the Pendawas and Korawas together, to arrange a negotiated peace between them. He is succeeding quite well, opposed only by Semar. Arjuna is therefore instructed by Siva to kill Semar so that the Pendawas and Korawas will be able to get together and end their eternal struggle. Arjuna does not want to kill Semar whom he loves, but he wishes a just solution to the differences between the two groups of cousins and so goes to Semar to murder him. Semar says: so this is how you treat me after I have followed you everywhere, served you loyally, and loved you. This is the most poignant point in the play and Arjuna is deeply ashamed; but true to his idea of justice, he persists in his duty. Semar says: all right, I will burn myself. He builds a bonfire and stands in it. But instead of dying, he is transformed into his godly form and defeats Siva in combat. Then the war between the Korawas and the Pendawas begins again.

Not all people have, perhaps, so well developed a sense for the

necessary note of irrationality in any world-view, and thus for the essential insolubility of the problem of evil. But whether in the form of a trickster, a clown, a belief in witchcraft, or a concept of original sin, the presence of such a symbolic reminder of the hollowness of human pretensions to religious or moral infallibility is perhaps the surest sign of spiritual maturity.

IV

The view of man as a symbolizing, conceptualizing, meaning-seeking animal which has become increasingly popular both in the social sciences and in philosophy over the past several years, opens up a whole new approach not only to the analysis of religion as such, but to the understanding of the relations between religion and values. The drive to make sense out of experience, to give it form and order, is evidently as real and as pressing as the more familiar biological needs. And, this being so, it seems unnecessary to continue to interpret symbolic activities—religion, art, ideology—as nothing but thinly disguised expressions of something other than what they seem to be: attempts to provide orientation for an organism which cannot live in a world it is unable to understand. If symbols, to adapt a phrase of Kenneth Burke's, are strategies for encompassing situations, then we need to give more attention to how people define situations and how they go about coming to terms with them. Such a stress does not imply a removal of beliefs and values from their psycho-biological and social contexts into a realm of "pure meaning," but it does imply a greater emphasis on the analysis of such beliefs and values in terms of concepts explicitly designed to deal with symbolic material.

The concepts used in this paper, ethos and world-view, are vague and imprecise; they are a kind of proto-theory, forerunners, it is to be hoped, of a more adequate analytical framework. But even with them, anthropologists are beginning to develop an approach to the study of values which can clarify rather than obscure the essential processes involved in the normative regulation of behavior. One almost certain result of such an empirically oriented, theoretically sophisticated, symbol-stressing approach to the study of values is the decline of analyses which attempt to describe moral, aesthetic and other normative activities in terms of theories based not on the observation of such activities but on logical considerations alone. Like bees who fly despite

theories of aeronautics which deny them the right to do so, probably the overwhelming majority of mankind is continually drawing normative conclusions from factual premises (and factual conclusions from normative premises, for the relation between ethos and world-view is circular) despite refined, and in their own terms impeccable, reflections by professional philosophers on the "naturalistic fallacy." An approach to a theory of value which looks toward the behavior of actual people in actual societies living in terms of actual cultures for both its stimulus and its validation will turn us away from abstract and rather scholastic arguments in which a limited number of classical positions are stated again and again with little that is new to recommend them, to a process of ever increasing insight into both what values are and how they work. Once this enterprise in the scientific analysis of values is well launched, the philosophical discussions of ethics are likely to take on more point. The process is not that of replacing moral philosophy by descriptive ethics, but of providing moral philosophy with an empirical base and a conceptual framework which is somewhat advanced over that available to Aristotle, Spinoza, or G. E. Moore. The role of such a special science as anthropology in the analysis of values is not to replace philosophical investigation, but to make it relevant.

Advertisements

By Robert S. Sward

FLESH, FILTER, PAPER

Portrayed here is a special flesh,
And a special brand
Of cigarette. The luxurious white paper has,
In fact, a sister in the woman. Her neck
And arms are long, costly and white.
Their skin supplants, for one's eyes, —
For the moment of regard, — her soft bones
And mild, smoking veins.

The filter-mouthpiece has, as well, its equal
In the woman. She is recessed
Into a customed world. Smoked fugues
Drift across the background; and only the flavor,
Classic in taste, may ever touch your lips, or eyes.
She is herself a flavor. And lit, both she
And her world recede, trailing a taste
And only the finest smoke. Yorker & Hedges.

One must not follow, — one may only gape
And buy; and puff. The taste, however,
Still lingers after; and the aura
Of a restrained, and barely burning world.
Can such a Yorkness ever be attained by one?
This is not the question here; but rather,
This woman, in a tobacco context: one involving
Flesh, ashlessness, and a filtered bit of fire.

Robert Sward has published poems in a wide variety of poetry and literary journals. He is attending the Poetry Workshop at the University of Iowa.

A NEW OPULENCE

1. It is complete, and in one
full-page moment.
2. Its doors are *now*, upholstered
to the windows;
3. Its leather, chrome and carpeting,—
a tuxedo-blue.
4. And the headless man, just outside
the door, decapitated
5. By the page's end. The Buicklady,
seated, smiles (*GM*-esque).
6. One delights in opulence; she wears a white,
pubic-mink conception: something new
7. In finecar appointment. She invites the reader
to her side,—each seat is topped
8. In soft, supple, hand-buffed leather;
the floor itself is cushioned:
9. With carpeting. The headless man's whiteshirt
creates both a backdrop, and a halo
10. For the lady; her very- to the elbow- gloves
fulfill her
11. As she makes an air-cooled, aluminum plea,
a welcome to the reader.

Values and the Law

By YEHEZKEL DROR

ONE OF THE MORE IMPORTANT repositories and expressions of the values of any society is its law. By its very nature, law consists of a number of norms which constitute obligatory rules of behavior for the members of the society. These legal norms are closely related to various social values, being either a direct expression of them or serving them in a more indirect way. Furthermore, the extent to which the various legal norms command obedience depends to a large extent on the degree to which they express or are in accord with generally accepted social values. Additional factors—such as the relative severity of sanctions applied to persons who transgress the legal norms —also are of importance.

The examination of the relationships between values and the law can be approached from several different points of view, depending on the purpose we have in mind. In philosophical discourse law can be regarded as a special part of moral philosophy, which mainly translates abstract values and imperatives into more concrete standards for action. Within jurisdiction, there is a school which regards law as a closed system of norms at various degrees of concreteness, which comes into contact with other normative systems only at the highest level of the "Supreme Norm," while there is another school which regards law as totally divorced from morals and other value systems and as expressing only the will of the sovereign. Still another school regards law as a set of rules which enable us to predict the behavior of judges and courts. Additional schools of jurisprudence regard law as an expression of the struggle of social forces, a device for ensuring the perpetuation of the class structure, an expression of the Volksgeist or national history, a series of rules designed by God to regulate human

---

Trained as a lawyer and interested in the sociology of law, YEHEZKEL DROR is now teaching at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Israel.

behavior, and more. From the point of view of the social sciences, law is viewed as a part of culture, a social phenomenon revealed in regular patterns of behavior and generally accepted belief systems. The relationship between values and the law is susceptible to examination within any one of these universes of discourse using the specific conceptual tools and methodological approach peculiar to that level of discussion.

Our problem is to select the approach which will contribute most to clarifying the relation of values to law as a social institution. In order to do so, we shall rely on a jurisprudential analysis of the nature of law and first examine the normative character of law and the ways in which values are expressed in it. We shall then proceed to an examination of the distinction between values embodied in law and the other value systems, namely ethics, religion and aesthetics, examining both jurisprudential and sociological differences between them. Finally, we shall examine the functional relations between law and legal values on one hand and other value systems on the other, utilizing mainly the approach of social science. In so doing, we can look at the problem of the relationships between values and the law either from a static or a dynamic point of view. Looking at law and values as static phenomena, the question arises, how are different parts of the law related to the various systems of values operating in every society? Regarding law and values as dynamic phenomena, the problem to be faced is how changes in social values bring about changes in the law and vice versa.

By thus synthesizing various approaches to law and values, an effort will be made to show different aspects of the relationships between them, without exhaustively discussing any one topic.

II

Let us first examine more closely our introductory statement, that law consists of norms and values. The concept perhaps best suited to serve as a bridge between the normative form of most parts of the law and their value content is the concept of "purpose," as used by Professor L. L. Fuller of Harvard University. It is impossible to assign meaning to any part of the law and apply it to concrete cases without regarding the purpose (or purposes) which that part of the law is

designed to serve; that purpose constitutes the value (or values) reflected in the law. In some cases, it is very easy to discern the purpose served by a particular statute or judicial decision; for example, the prohibition of murder is clearly directed at safeguarding human life. Here the main value expressed in the law is the sanctity of human life. Similarly, the prohibition of theft has as one of its purposes the protection of private property.

But in most areas of the law, the situation is more complex. Certain documents must be in writing, regulations require private companies which issue stocks for public sale to publish information on their financial situation, technical rules exist on how to endorse a negotiable instrument—all these serve a number of purposes, such as furthering trade, preventing fraud, protecting private property—which in turn express a variety of values. But however difficult it may be to reach agreement on the purposes served by any part of the law and on the values expressed in it, the very *nature* of law (which consists of a number of specific commands: "Thou shalt not kill," "If you want the courts to help you enforce an agreement to sell land, the agreement must be under seal") involves purposes and values expressed and served by every part of the law.

The various parts of the law of a society are closely interrelated. While some contradictions between different statutes and decisions are found in every society, the law cannot operate unless it possesses a basic unity and serves some basic purpose shared by all of its components. It is, therefore, theoretically possible to compile a list of basic values embodied in a certain legal system which could be broken down into various subvalues and subpurposes embodied in the various components and parts of the law. At times, some of these basic values are expressed and enumerated in a separate document such as a constitution, a declaration of independence or a bill of rights; in other cases, the basic values must be discovered through inductive examination of the various statutes and judicial decisions.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that a number of social scientists have tried to compile a list of basic values or "cultural themes" of different societies, and lately some efforts have been made, especially by Adamson Hoebel, to examine empirically the correlation between such basic values accepted in a certain society and the basic values stated in the law of those societies. Because of the difficulties

faced by such investigations in complex societies, these researches have dealt up to now with primitive and noncomplex tribal societies. As it is rather difficult to distinguish between legal, ethical and religious values and norms in those societies, the conclusions of these studies cannot, as yet, help in our examination of the relationships between law and values, one of the main problems of which is the distinction between legal values and values belonging to the areas of ethics, aesthetics and religion. This, by the way, is the reason why we cannot, in this paper, introduce the many interesting studies being done on values and law in primitive societies. The differences between those societies and modern societies make deductions from one to another nearly impossible. In this paper we are dealing with the problem in its more complex form, as found in highly developed and differentiated societies, such as are most national states.

III

While most of the norms embodied in law are rooted firmly in the ethics and religion of a society, there are some significant differences between legal norms and other norms, even if, ultimately, they both serve the same basic values. Furthermore, only some of the ethical and religious values are adopted by the law and expressed in it.

Comparing law in general with ethics, aesthetics and religion, there seem to be both qualitative and quantitative differences which distinguish between law on one hand and all the other value systems on the other. One such a qualitative difference concerns the activities at which the various norms are directed: legal norms nearly always are directed at *overt* behavior and overt behavior only, while all other main value systems are concerned with *both* overt behavior and internal thought. Law in general is not interested in what a person thinks or feels as long as he commits no overt act. Even intention to commit a criminal act such as murder is never punishable as such as long as it does not bring about an attempt to commit murder. However, this statement needs some qualification. The saying by Brian, Chief Justice of Britain during the reign of Edward IV, "The thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man," contains only a half-truth. Even if it should become technically possible, through the use of drugs or hypnosis to examine

thoughts reliably, any attempt to direct legal norms at internal mental processes as such would constitute a radical change in the very nature of law as developed in all democratic and most totalitarian societies. When, however, an overt act occurs, the law *can* get interested in the internal mental processes associated with it and thus the same overt act can constitute excusable homicide, accidental homicide, manslaughter or murder in the first degree, depending on the intentions and thoughts of the accused, but the legal norm *itself* is directed primarily at overt acts and not at the mental processes behind them. On the other hand, the norms of ethics, aesthetics and religion are primarily concerned with the thoughts and feelings of man, regarding overt behavior as important chiefly because it reflects these thoughts and feelings. The typical ethical norm deals with feelings and thoughts, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," "Do not envy," and so on, while the typical legal norm deals with overt behavior, e.g. "It is forbidden to drive on the left side of the road," "Anyone taking and carrying away, without the consent of the owner and without a claim of right made in good faith, any movable property is guilty of stealing," etc.

Another qualitative difference between legal norms and the other value systems lies in the nature of the sanctions applied to transgressors and in the agencies which apply them. In all modern societies, sanctions for noncompliance with legal norms are applied and administered by official agencies of the state such as courts and the police, while sanctions for transgressions against ethical, aesthetic and religious norms are applied by informal bodies such as friendship groups, or by various associations to which the transgressor belongs, such as churches, clubs and so on. Concerning the sanctions themselves, when only the state is permitted to use physical coercion, then sanctions such as death, imprisonment, compulsory actions, etc. are legitimately applied only against transgressors of legal norms, while the sanctions that can be applied to transgressors against ethical and religious norms include various kinds of social ostracism.

In addition to these qualitative characteristics of legal norms as contrasted with ethical, aesthetic and religious norms, there can be discerned a *quantitative* difference in the degree of tension between these various systems of norms and actual social behavior. Legal norms are never completely identical with actual behavior. There has never

been a society in which all legal norms were perfectly realized in actual behavior; deviations always occur and while the bulk of the population on most occasions does behave in accordance with the important legal norms, there is always a certain discrepancy between actual social behavior and the behavior required by the legal norms. At the same time, there are definite limits to the tolerance of a society to tension between legal norms and actual behavior: if actual behavior becomes more and more divorced from the behavior required by the legal norms, then the legal norms lose their validity and effectiveness, and until adjusted to actual social behavior or until social behavior is adjusted to them, the legal framework of society can break down and endanger the existence of society itself. In the case of ethical, aesthetic and religious values and norms, it seems that the amount of discrepancy between the thoughts and actions prescribed by these value systems and the actual occurring behavior can be, and generally is, much higher than the degree of tension tolerated between legal norms and actual behavior. In other words, the values expressed in ethics, aesthetics and religion are more idealistic and more difficult to realize in actual life. They are also better able to withstand nonperformance without causing a crisis in the society or in the value systems themselves.

This quantitative difference between legal norms and other value systems is closely related to a somewhat different distinction between the social functions of legal norms and other normative systems. Law in general includes a core of norms and rules of conduct which are essential for the existence and development of a society and which set down minimum standards of conduct at potential points of stress where deviations could endanger social existence. The other systems of norms also include additional values and norms which give deeper meaning and significance to life and which order aspects of behavior that are not always of general social significance. In large modern societies, legal norms constitute the basic rules of behavior which provide the framework for all social and individual activities and which are the background of the common and obligatory values on which the other value systems depend. It is especially within a modern democratic state, with its wide scale of ethical values, that the significance of the common backdrop of legal norms is so crucial.

If the functioning of modern society depends to a considerable

extent on the existence of legal norms and a substantial amount of popular compliance with them, the effectiveness of law itself in turn depends on the existence of various other value systems which support the values expressed in the law. Most people, on most occasions, behave automatically in accordance with the legal norms because they are conditioned by their upbringing to do so, but nearly all persons sometimes feel temptation to transgress some legal norm and are prevented from doing so not so much because of the fear of being caught and punished as because of an inner sense of duty to follow the imperatives of the law.

This sense of obligation can be either towards the law as a whole —as best expressed in Plato's dialogue *Crito*—or towards the various concrete legal norms which are parts of the law. Law, as such, enjoys high respect in all value systems: Judeo-Christian religious values emphasize the duty to behave in conformity with secular law as long as it is not countermanded by a more basic religious directive, and nearly all nonreligious systems of ethics also accept the value of obedience to law as such. Thus, the felt moral authority belonging to even those legal norms which are opposed to one's value system just because they are a part of the law is strongly rooted in religion and ethics which enjoins us to obey the law as a whole.

Leaving aside the general duty to obey law in principle, there are significant differences in the extent to which various concrete legal norms, as distinguished from the law as a whole abstract body, are reinforced by other systems of norms, and these differences help to explain the variations in compliance with different parts of the law. Let us illustrate this point with some concrete examples. A rather special case is provided by international public law. International public law lacks two of the characteristics of national domestic law: there are no recognized agencies for systematically applying sanctions to transgressors, and there are no generally accepted and powerful values supporting compliance with public international law. The theory of dual morality, which permits states to ignore the ordinary values of ethics and religion when dealing with one another, is still generally accepted and prevents the development of a sense of duty, based on extralegal values, to comply with public international law. The lack of sanctions and the absence of supporting values weaken the standing of this branch of law and explain, together with some

additional factors, the difference between the extent of compliance with international and with domestic law.

In domestic law itself, various parts embody to a different degree extralegal values. If for example, we contrast traffic regulations with criminal law (both full members of the law) we see that while most provisions of criminal law directly express values which are also basic values of ethics and religion such as the sanctity of human life, traffic regulations, while ultimately serving these values, do not directly express them. Therefore, the norms of the criminal law are strongly reinforced and strengthened by parallel religious and ethical norms while the traffic regulations receive no similar extralegal support. This may well be one of the main reasons for the higher respect paid to criminal law and the much lower amount of compliance with traffic regulations.

Similarly, there are significant differences in the degree to which the various norms of commercial law, family law, law of associations, taxation law, constitutional law, administrative law, antitrust law and so on are reinforced by extralegal values which support the values expressed in these different parts of the law. Also, the extent to which a certain legal norm enjoys support by extralegal values may vary in different parts of the population. Some groups may regard the antitrust laws as "just" and in accord with their ethical values while others may regard them as "unjust," and counter to their ethical values.

In general it seems that, other things being equal, legal norms which are in accord with extralegal values are more realized in actual behavior than legal norms which are neutral from the point of view of ethical and religious norms, and legal norms which are neutral from the point of view of ethical and religious norms are more realized in actual behavior than legal norms which contradict ethical and religious norms. The classical natural law theory even denied the character of law to legal norms which contradict basic religious and ethical norms, thus denying to such norms the value-rating given them by their very nature as "law." The positivistic school of jurisprudence claimed that the "legal" characteristic of a norm cannot be impaired by any substantive contradiction between the content of the legal norm and ethical and religious values, but even the supporters of the positivistic school could not deny that the social efficiency of a legal norm depends to a large extent on the degree to which it expresses ethical

and religious values. In this connection it is interesting to remark that following the Nazi experience, where orders utterly opposed to any ethical or religious values were promulgated in the form of laws, many continental jurists who formerly had belonged to the positivistic school now admitted that norms promulgated as law which contradict basic ethical values should not be regarded as legal norms and cannot claim the obedience due to law as such. Gustav Radbruch, who was one of the outstanding proponents of the positivistic approach, was one of these.

Our hypothesis concerning the dependence of obedience to legal norms on the existence of extralegal values can be illustrated by comparative examination of the effect of similar legal norms enacted in various societies with different value patterns. Let us take the prohibition of polygamy. Polygamy is prohibited in all Western societies, but the extent to which marriages are truly monogamous varies. In the United States, for a long time the prohibition against polygamy was opposed to Mormon religious values, and certain Mormon subgroups continue even today to practice polygamy. In Turkey, until the revolution of the New Turks, Moslem law permitted a man to marry four wives. The reforms of Ataturk introduced monogamous marriage and prohibited polygamy. It seems that the new legal norm has been effective mainly in urban centers and among the younger generation which has adopted new ethical and religious norms, while in the rural communities, where old values still reign supreme, polygamy is in fact still practiced to a considerable extent.

IV

The last illustration introduces us to the dynamic aspects of the relationships between legal norms and other social value systems. This relationship is put to the test when changes occur in the law or in the other value systems. In these cases the problem arises: how far can the law or the other value systems change in isolation from each other and how can the processes of mutual readjustment operate to re-establish the essential equilibrium between the values of the law and the other social values?

The high rate of social change in all Western societies and the even higher rate of social change aimed at in technologically under-

developed countries and in the U.S.S.R. has created many social problems which more and more draw the attention of social scientists to the study of the various processes associated with social change. William F. Ogburn, one of the first sociologists to investigate social change, has used the term "cultural lag" to refer to the slow rate of cultural change as compared with the high rate of change in technology. The concept of "lag" can be also applied to the examination of the dynamic relationships between legal norms and other value systems during periods of rapid social change.

Here we must distinguish between two different possibilities: changes in law which precede changes in the other value systems, and changes in ethics and religious values which precede changes in law. While in most cases such changes in both areas occur simultaneously this distinction will be useful in analysis of some of the essential relationships between law and extralegal values.

Let us take up first a case where changes occurred in social values without being incorporated at once in the law. During the nineteenth century in England, there began to appear generally accepted social values supporting measures to protect workers against the new hazards of the industrial age. There was a tendency to recognize the right of workers to organize, while the law rejected any factory legislation as impairing the freedom of contract and prosecuted as criminal conspiracy any attempt of the workers to organize. Sir A. V. Dicey, in his lectures at Harvard in 1898, presented a brilliant analysis of the slow impact on the law of the new socially accepted values. At first, a significant lag developed between the law and generally accepted social values. As law-making was at that time a monopoly of a small social group which tended to be very conservative, no changes were introduced in the law and the lag continued to grow. This resulted in increasing resort to illegal action and violence which, in turn, strengthened the pressure applied on the law-making agencies to adjust the law to the new social values. With the enlargement of the franchise to Parliamentary elections, the legislative body became more sensitive to the changes in publicly accepted values and the law absorbed the new social values, expressing them in new legal norms which permitted labor to organize and regulated some of the conditions of factory work.

The problem of law's lagging behind changes in extralegal values

was very acute as long as law-making was a monopoly of a small elite, the values of which differed from the more popularly accepted value systems. Today, in all democratic countries, the legislative bodies are very sensitive to public opinion and changes in various values are quickly reflected in new laws. Only in those cases where a rigid constitution limits the law-making authority of the representative body can a lag develop between generally accepted values and the law. This was the case in the United States during the New Deal controversy, when the National Industrial Recovery Act, which seemed to express popular opinion and new social values and which was passed by Congress, was invalidated by the Supreme Court. Even in such cases, the power of popular opinion was so strong in the United States that the Supreme Court was unable to withstand for long the pressure of the new social values and accepted the Agricultural Adjustment Act as constitutional.

Another interesting illustration is provided by the values and legal norms dealing with homosexuality. It seems that ethical and religious values in some countries are now moving toward regarding homosexuality as a private affair, and not one to be dealt with by the criminal law. The Report of the Committee On Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution published a few months ago in Britain follows the changes in the various value systems and recommends relaxation of the legal interdiction on homosexuality. It is not clear whether the change in values concerning homosexuality is a general change or is limited to a small liberal group, and therefore it is questionable whether the law in Britain will be soon changed. In any case, we can observe in action here the processes of adjustment of the law to changing religious and ethical values.

In addition to legislative action and judicial decisions, the adjustment of the law to new social values can be made easier by including in the law itself direct references to external values and standards, such as "reasonable behavior," "trade custom," "Treu und Glaube" and so on. Here, the law explicitly refers to the extralegal value systems, every change of which is therefore automatically reflected in the law.

While contemporary societies usually adjust the law quite effectively to changing values, the development of conscious lawmaking as a device for directed and planned social change poses, in very acute

form, the problem of lag in social values after changes in legal values. The avenue of legislating encourages members of a legislative body to try to use the law to bring about what changes in social values are desired by them. Legislation has one big advantage over other devices for changing values, such as education—it is very cheap. Therefore the temptation, especially in technologically underdeveloped countries, to try to reshape social values by legislative fiat is very strong. This use of law as an instrument of directed social change poses in an extreme form the question, how far can changes in legal values by themselves bring about changes in other value systems? In order to answer this question we must briefly examine the experiences of three nations which have tried and are trying to shape social values by changing legal values. The examples will come from Turkey, Israel and the U.S.S.R.

After the revolution of the Young Turks and the seizure of power by Ataturk, the ruling elite wanted to bring about a total revolution in social values. They wanted the population to give up the traditional Islamic values and adopt instead modern Western values. One of the main steps designed to bring about this radical change in social values was the wholesale introduction of an entire system of European law, including the Swiss Civil Code. The International Committee of Comparative Law, working under the auspices of UNESCO, held a symposium in September 1955 at Istanbul devoted to the reception of foreign law in Turkey.[1] The conclusion to be drawn from the various papers read and discussed at the symposium is that those parts of the new law which did not present any values opposed to traditional Turkish ethical and religious values had a very real impact on actual behavior, especially in the area of commercial law. Those parts of the new law expressing new values radically different from deep-rooted religious and ethical values, especially in the sphere of the family, had only a very limited effect on social behavior. In other words, when there was a direct collision between ethical and religious values and new legal values, the latter were mainly ineffective and did not succeed in displacing the traditional religious and ethical values.

A similar conclusion can be drawn from the case of Israel. The

---

[1]The more important papers read at the symposium are published in *The International Social Science Bulletin*, IX: 1, 1957.

Marriage Age Law of 1950 was one of the various laws enacted in Israel which were designed to change the values of the Moslem population and of the new Jewish immigrants from Oriental countries. This law set down the minimum age of 17 for marriage of girls, admitting pregnancy as the sole exception and imposing criminal sanctions on anyone who married a girl younger than 17 without a special permit from the District Court, or for assisting in the marriage ceremony. This law promulgates a value accepted in all Western society, but which is not included in the realm of family values held by parts of the Israeli population—Jews who came to Israel from Oriental countries and parts of the Moslem Arab population. Here, a determined effort was made to change the values, or at least the behavior, of these groups by legislative fiat. The results support our previous conclusions: it seems that the law is honored more in its breach. Those sectors of the population which accepted child marriage as part of family values continued to marry their girls below 17, arranging an informal marriage ceremony and deferring the registration of the marriage until the girl becomes pregnant or until she reaches the age of 17. Only insofar as these sectors of the population have changed their general values under the influence of the new environment and various educational stimuli, do they also accept the new legal value, prohibiting child marriage. The failure of the law to achieve its objective has been recognized and it appears that it will shortly be amended to relax the prohibition of marriage for girls below the age of 17.

In Soviet Russia, it is of interest to note that while classical Marxist theory regarded law mainly as a superstructure of economic and technological institutions, contemporary Soviet jurists recognize the possible use of law as a device to bring about directed social change. While Russian law was radically changed after the Soviet revolution so as to absorb and express the new values of the ruling groups, the ruling elite at no time relied on the operation of law to bring about changes in accepted social values, but rather depended on more direct methods, including terror, education, displacement of population, and systematic use of mass-communication media. Insofar as the various value systems in Soviet Russia changed under the Soviet regime, this can be regarded only to a very limited degree as being due to the embodiment of the new values in the law, but is rather a result of

the educational and indoctrination activities of the ruling groups.

Examination of other cases of the legal adoption of new values like the experiences of Japan, India, some of the French and Dutch colonies and some of the newly independent but technologically underdeveloped countries leads us to the same conclusion: the effectiveness of law depends on the existence of ethical and religious norms which support the values expressed in the law, or, at least, on the absence of such norms which contradict the legal values. Law by itself, even when supported by efficient enforcement, is unable to change ethical and religious values to a significant extent. Only when new legal values are supported by educational and other means, or when there is a predisposition for the extralegal religious and ethical values to change in the direction of the new legal values, can the values expressed in the law play a significant role in bringing about changes in accepted religious and ethical normative values.

V

Our analysis of the relationship between law and values enables us to draw certain tentative conclusions concerning both the nature of legal values and their relationships to other value systems, and the possibilities and limitations of the uses of law-making as a part of policy studies, which aspire to share in the solution of social problems by systematic interdisciplinary analysis. In this area, the main conclusion to be drawn is that the operation of law depends on the existence of extralegal values which support the substantive content of the legal norms. This prerequisite for the effective functioning of law puts a rigorous limit on the use of law-making as a device to bring about changes in accepted values. Law may be a valuable device for directed social change when accompanied by other methods, such as mass education, industrialization and so on, but law by itself can accomplish relatively little.

This dependence of law on extralegal values is also very significant for understanding the internal relationships between law and values. Law, itself, consists of norms, purposes and values which, to be effective, must be in accord with the ethical and religious values of a society. Although legal norms have some special characteristics, such as orientation toward overt behavior and existence of definite sanctions

administered by agencies of the state, and although the legal system incorporates only some of the values of ethics and religion, mainly the less idealistic and more basic values which are essential for the operation of a society as a whole, nearly *all* values expressed in the law are taken from the extralegal value systems of society as a whole or of those segments of society which dominate the law-making process. Once a value is incorporated in the law, it receives a special status and commands obedience from all members of society, whether they personally accept the value or not, although the place where nearly all the values of the law germinate and develop is within the extralegal value systems. Furthermore, the successful absorption of a new value into law depends on its being supported by parallel extralegal values, which help insure compliance of popular behavior with the norms of the law. Thus law and the values of the law are dependent upon the extralegal value systems which provide the essential raw material from which they emerge and by which they are shaped.

"Values" Institutionalized in the Family

By MORRIS ZELDITCH, JR.

IMAGINE A ROOM in which three philosophers, three anthropologists, and three sociologists are placed—it will only complicate matters to introduce more disciplines—and imagine further that one of this group happens in the course of discussion to use the term "values." The ensuing argument cannot fail to be acrimonious. Few other concepts in general use prove so troublesome. As usual, this is due partly to difficulties in communication; a usage widely accepted within either the scientific or philosophical community, much less cutting across the two, still does not exist. Even among nine men using the term in the same way, however, there are likely to be disputes as to whether one can or cannot study values by scientific methods; whether one can or cannot prove some values "true" and others "false"; whether values do or do not influence human actions; and, if there is some agreement that a line is to be drawn between those questions which are "scientific" and those which are "philosophical," where one should or should not draw this line.

There is, of course, some feeling that disputes of the second type are essentially disputes of the first type. Once we all agree on the usage of the sign "values," then it will be clear whether the sign may be true or false, studied or not studied, and so on. It would follow that the only sane course, if one pretends to investigate values, would be to construct a definitive explication of the concept. Presumably, in this symposium, we are following a somewhat different course. Each of us has a comparatively modest focus on a specific and concrete area

---

MORRIS ZELDITCH, JR., is associated with the Department of Sociology, the School of General Studies, and the Bureau of Applied Research at Columbia University. He holds a Ph.D. in sociology.

of human values from the point of view of a social scientist in the hope that the result will be of some use to those involved in the controversy.

What we have to say may be divided into three unequal parts. There is a first part in which we are primarily interested in examining the classic problem of the factual possibility of a social system without a commonly shared regulative body of norms and moral values, in terms of the special case offered by the controversy over "primitive promiscuity" which once dominated the literature on family institutions. There is a second part in which we are primarily interested in how norms are specified and applied in action and integrated into the day-to-day operation of social systems. As in the first part, what is said draws concretely on illustrations from family institutions but what is said applies, in principle, whatever the substantive content of the norms. There is a third part in which family and kinship systems are, in a sense, defined. The definition of our subject matter, critical as it is, is reserved for this last part because by the end of the paper, the problem of defining "the family" should appear much less simple than it does at the beginning.

I

When, in 1871, Lewis Morgan tried to formulate the principal stages in the evolution of the human family, the first stage he proposed was one of complete sexual promiscuity. In this stage sexual behavior was totally unregulated, both men and women having successions of lovers whose identities were afterwards forgotten; a stage, therefore, in which no one knew who the father of a child might be and "families" as we now think of them did not exist. Surrounding this conjecture, a heated controversy raged for the remaining years of the century. Morgan himself derived his view from his analysis of kinship terminology. His colleagues, in what we will call the "promiscuist" school, cited many other "primitive practices" in support as well. Sir John Lubbock, for example, a tendentious British evolutionist, cited such "survivals" of the promiscuous state as "marriage by capture," from which he inferred that, in order to have an exclusive claim to a woman, it had once been necessary to fight for her, such exclusive rights having been socially unrecognized; and the *jus primæ noctis*, which he interpreted as an "expiation" by the husband for claiming

exclusive rights over a woman who formerly belonged equally to all. John McLennan, another British evolutionist, like the Swiss jurist Bachhofen, saw obvious evidence for a former state of promiscuity in the existence of societies which trace descent matrilineally, that is, through females rather than males. Matriliny proved that the fathers were simply not known, argued McLennan:

> It is inconceivable that anything but want of certainty on that point could have long prevented the acknowledgement of kinship through males; and in such cases, we shall be able to conclude that such certainty has formerly been wanting—that more or less promiscuous intercourse between the sexes has formerly prevailed. The connection between these two things—uncertain paternity and kinship through females only, seems so necessary—that of cause and effect—that we may confidently infer the one where we find the other.[1]

If one were of a Freudian turn of mind, it might be rather simple to dismiss these nineteenth century scholars as simply indulging, in a socially acceptable form, i.e., in scientific theorizing, their own socially unacceptable and repressed wishes for a paradise of promiscuity. It is interesting, however, that essentially similar hypotheses are known in other institutional areas where one can hardly make the same interpretation. The basis of the social contract theory, of classical economics, of the Hobbesian justification of monarchy, each also presume a factually existent state of nature in which no regulation by any shared moral order exists. There is, in fact, a very close relationship between the Hobbesian view of the matter—in which conflicting and unregulated passion results in a "war of all against all"—and Lubbock's view—in which not only did primitive man have to fight to get a wife, but also had to fight continually to keep her, since his rights were not socially recognized.

Tracing the extent of the actual historical relationship between these analogous hypotheses is hardly a problem for the present paper. But the relationship does imply that the promiscuity hypothesis is a special variant of a general problem in the theory of institutions. This problem we may call "the problem of order."

In part the evidence which supported the hypothesis of "promiscuity" was based on sheer misinformation, obtained from ancient

---

[1] J. F. McLennan, *Studies in Ancient History*, Macmillan and Company (London), 1896, p. 129. (First published 1886.)

accounts and the anecdotes of nineteenth century travellers. Pliny's assertion, for example, that the African Garamantions lived in promiscuous intercourse (*Historia Naturalis*, Bk. V, ch. 8) was one such piece of evidence. In the same chapter Pliny describes another African tribe, the Blemmyans, who had no heads; their mouths and eyes were located in their chests instead. In part, also, the evidence consisted in elaborate misinterpretations of "survivals," that is, customs such as "marriage by capture," the "levirate" in which a widow is married to a sibling of the deceased husband, or the sororate in which a widower marries a sibling of his deceased wife, completely without regard to the part these customs might play in the operating society from which they were wrenched by the theorist.

Acquitted of the charge of misinformation and methodological error, however, the evolutionists would still have been mired in serious conceptual difficulties. One of these difficulties was a confusion between "promiscuity" in the sense of moral laxity by our own standards and "promiscuity" in the sense of a complete absence of any regulation of sexual access or its consequences. McLennan, for example, mentions casual adultery, wife-lending and wife prostitution, premarital unchastity and similar behavior in disregard of our own standards as evidences of promiscuity that might be cited from the "primitive" societies then actually in existence. He cites with particular fondness (". . . an admirable report . . .") Mr. Wilson of Mussoorie, who in "A Summer Ramble in the Himalayas" reports of the Gungarees and Perbuttees that "their immorality is something incredible—chastity being little appreciated, even where it does exist."[2]

A distinction between the two senses of the term is critical, however. Promiscuity in the first sense, disregard of our own standards of sexual behavior, is exceedingly common in the world, and by this is meant not evasion and nonconformity in the way that Kinsey might demonstrate it, but rather radical shifts in the conception of what is in fact right and proper. Promiscuity in the second sense, however, behavior entirely without any regulative code imposed by society, is a state that is never descriptive of a factually existent, concrete social system. Every contemporary social scientist accepts in some form the notion that behavior is in part governed by standards of value-orien-

---

[2]McLennan, J. F., *op. cit.*, p. 142.

tation and systems of belief shared by, or held in common among, the members of societies, however variable the content of these values and beliefs might be. By implication, sexual access and its consequences are everywhere regulated in some fashion by society.

It was Darwin who first argued that marriage must have been characteristic even of the state of nature because man is naturally *jealous* and would not permit other men the same rights over his wife that he himself had. Later, Lubbock, McLennan, and other promiscuists made a great point of the *absence* of jealousy in many circumstances—e.g., the unconcern of husbands who lent wives to their guests—as evidence that promiscuity did occur. Westermarck, the most prominent critic of the promiscuists in the nineteenth century, in turn, cited against them the presence and prevalence of jealousy. He points out, after a Cook's tour of the world in which jealousy is found everywhere, that even where wife-lending and wife prostitution occur—

> The fact that a man lends his wife to a visitor no more implies the absence of jealousy than other ways of showing hospitality imply that he is without the proprietary feeling. According to Wilkes, the aborigines of New South Wales "will frequently give one of their wives to a friend who may be in want of one; but not withstanding this laxity, they are extremely jealous, and are very prompt to resent any freedom taken with their wives."[3]

It has remained for the twentieth century, however, to draw the implication of Westermarck's observation. For Darwin's notion, that *jealousy* is a condition that gives rise to marriage, may be replaced by the notion that *marriage* is a condition that gives rise to jealousy, jealousy being neither a prior state nor one that is independent of the social beliefs and values defining the relationships of persons to each other.

The classic discussion of jealousy from his point of view is Kingsley Davis' 1936 paper, "Jealousy and Sexual Property."[4] A consideration, such as we shall try to give, of the nature and conditions of social order in general, might profitably begin with a detailed examination of Davis' line of argument.

---

[3]Westermarck, E., *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[4]Davis, K., "Jealousy and Sexual Property," *Social Forces*, Vol. 14 (March, 1936), pp. 395-405.

1. "*Into every affair of love . . . steps society.*"

We are accustomed to think of the eternal triangle as a private war. Davis is intent on pointing out its social aspects, or, in his own terms, in adding a fourth corner to the triangle so that a "public" participates in the war. This is meant in two ways. In the first way, "society" plays its part in the sense that jealousy, far from arising in "natural" situations, arises only in situations defined by society and, as a consequence, in situations highly variable from society to society. Jealousy is evoked in a situation in which someone transgresses rights and privileges that are defined by society. Wife-lending, for example, does not evoke jealousy because no one has transgressed the husband's rights, which are, in fact, reaffirmed by the very act of wife-lending, whereas to seize his wife without his permission has the entirely different significance of "adultery" and evokes jealousy and rage. Jealousy is an emotion in which one "feels wronged" in a socially defined, meaningful situation.

A public takes part in a second sense, also, in the organized support of retaliation against the transgressor and in aid of the person whose rights are transgressed. The "public" has a continual interest in the actions of transgressors, both to see that the victim is supported by "public opinion" and to see that in fact the victim does retaliate—for it is in some degree problematic that the transgressed retaliate, and one effective insurance that retaliation does occur is that the victim should lose status in the eyes of the public if he did nothing—if, in other words, he did not feel jealous.

2. "*It is through the definition of . . . statuses and roles that the institutional framework governs the manifestations of jealous emotion.*"

A man who dates a girl once may feel mildly jealous of another man who has dated her once also, although the "public" is likely to regard it as illegitimate if either man takes serious steps to eliminate the other. But a man who dates a woman married to another has no right to feel jealousy, and the husband would very probably be considered peculiar if he did *not* feel jealousy. The difference in the two situations turn on differences in the stage of courtship involved. On the one hand, we have two men early in courtship, to neither of whom is the female "committed" in a socially meaningful sense. On the other, we have a case in which a female is committed to one man,

that is, she is married, and from the point of view of both her husband and the public others interested in the female must avoid actually contending for her. Courtship, in other words, involves a sequence of publicly recognized social *statuses*, i.e., social categories to which we attach different rights and obligations. In this instance, the statuses imply progressive appropriation of rights to a male (or female), and the exclusion of others from these rights. Davis thinks of two essential stages, "rivalry" and "ownership": at some point a period of "sorting" of mates occurs, in which many males or many females compete for other males and females and no socially recognized commitments limit the exploration of possible future mates. The activities permitted in this period vary from society to society in the degree to which greater sexual intimacies are allowed. In some this is a stage of "promiscuity" in our view, in that intercourse of a casual kind takes place without implying any commitment—much as in our own society a polite kiss at the end of a date usually implies nothing. A careful examination of such societies, however, indicates that the essential nature of "promiscuity" is the publicity that eventually attaches to it. For two things invariably occur: (1) There is a gradual reduction in the number of potential mates, i.e., a progressive commitment to one, and (2) the "public" begins to be aware of this commitment, defines the partners as a "couple," and eventually recognizes them as "engaged" or "married." In some societies actual "marriage" is recognized only when a child is born to the couple; but in these societies the birth of a child *requires* that a couple be "married" in the sociological sense, that for a time their commitment to each other be publicly recognized. A marriage ceremony, where it occurs, is one way of making the commitment publicly known and reorganizing the attitude of the public to the woman's (or man's, for that matter) availability. In this stage of commitment each has appropriated certain rights to the other, and it is these rights that are being recognized when we say that "engagement" or "marriage" is recognized. At the termination of the courtship sequence in commitment, or, as Davis calls it, "ownership" both the successful contender and the "public" have an attitude of "don't disturb," and anyone who competes after this is a "trespasser," one who, if he takes "possession" of the "owner's" property does so only illicitly. Just as with a house, however, a "trespasser" can be distinguished from a "tenant" or a "guest," i.e., it is possible to define

socially legitimate use of the owner's "property."

3. *The malignant emotions may have a positive social function.*

In some sense, jealousy may be thought of as anti-social, but here we have a clear instance in which the emotion of jealousy, when activated, may very well have the positive social function of preserving an existing definition of the rights and obligations in society. Where jealousy is legitimately felt, it is so felt because legitimate rights are transgressed. Where jealousy is *not* felt in this circumstance, the social order is in danger of erosion. The "public" must *require* a victimized husband to feel jealousy, and consider him not only peculiar but "wrong" not to do so. One can generalize the point Davis is trying to make by observing that the public also feels a kind of malignant emotion. It feels "moral outrage" at the transgression of an adulterer. And in fact, a whole range of emotions that we distinguish in our society by the situation that evokes them have in common this aspect: that they act, in various ways, to maintain an existing order. They may be distinguished by the statuses of the persons who feel these emotions. The transgressor may feel guilt, shame, disgrace, or dishonor, and the anticipation of these emotions presumably plays a part in preventing transgressions. The "owner" feels jealousy, rage, the desire to be revenged. The "public" feels moral outrage, horror, disgust, or perhaps simply delights in "gossip."

II

We may build on the Davis paradigm a more general discussion of normative order in which we approach two rather distinct problems: first, the sociological character of a norm or, more precisely, the way in which a prescription must be specified in order that it can be said to have meaning from a sociological point of view; and second, the way in which norms are bound into the ongoing social life of a society through "institutionalization."

By a norm we generally mean a prescription, or any expression that may be logically cast in the form of a prescription. The following set of norms, for example, are among those that regulate the behavior of the sexes in our own society.

1. Thou shalt not commit adultery.

2. Thou shalt not commit incest.

3. Thou shalt not fornicate.

4. A marriage shall be consummated or it is not legally a marriage.

5. Homosexuality is not permitted.

Taken together these five norms—which, though the last two differ in linguistic structure from the first three, can all be reduced to prescriptions—imply that sexual acts, in our society, ought to take place between a husband and wife, and no others.

Now consider the way in which the fourth norm differs from, for example, the first. Clearly it is not the fundamental *action* implied that differs. Suppose, in fact, that the sheerly prescriptive part of the first norm were stated as

a shall not have intercourse with *b*.

This empty statement form is demonstrably nonsense when *a* and *b* are filled in as in the fourth case. The sheerly prescriptive component of a norm, in other words, has no meaning unless it is clear to *whom* the prescription is to be applied. Those social categories which define *who* a person is in society we call *statuses*; and the five norms we have listed differ essentially in the *statuses* to which they are applied, rather than in the *action* they regulate. Incest differs from fornication, for example, in that a father-daughter, mother-son, or brother-sister relation is involved in the former case, whereas a male and a female that are not close relatives and are both single are involved in the latter.

As a first approximation, then, a norm that has any sociological meaning has at least two parts: a prescription and a pair of statuses. One alone will seldom do, for it is who must do what in relation to whom that is involved. However, we have not exhausted the parts essential to the application of the norm. Examine, for instance, the following two situations.

1. Mr. I. J. kisses Mrs. K. L. They are alone at the home of Mrs. K. L., Mr. L. having left for a business trip the day before. Mrs. J. is at home, reading a book. All four went to school together, eight years ago, and were very close friends in school.

2. Mr. I. J. kisses Mrs. K. L. They are at the home of Mr. and Mrs. I. J., Mrs. J. having invited the L's to a party. The L's have just arrived. All

four went to school together, and were very close friends in school. They have not seen each other for two years.

The two situations differ only in the context in which they occur; perhaps most importantly in whether they occur publicly or privately. In general the first situation would be taken as *prima facie* evidence of adultery in our society, whereas the second would be thought of as either quite harmless, or, with some people, as a clearly defined obligatory action. In other words, the context of the action is a *required* specification of the norm. Without the context, it cannot be said how the norm will be applied.

We want now to see what it means to say that a norm is "institutionalized." To do this, we move to a level of abstraction, in which at first we deal with a social system so simple as not to be imaginable in any concrete sense, and instead of concrete people and concrete actions, we deal only with abstractions named *ego* and *alter* and actions labeled *p*, *q*, *r*. By *ego* we mean one of two actors taken as a point of reference, and imply nothing else. (The usage stems from the way anthropologists report kinship systems, not from the way psychoanalysts refer to part of the personality.) *Alter* is the other actor in the system. If we think of *ego* and *alter* as two individuals with a complete *tabula rasa* so far as norms are concerned—they hold no norms in common, let us say—and place them in interaction with each other—that is, each performs certain actions which the other is aware of—we have an analogue on the microscopic level of the "problem of order" which Hobbes and Lubbock thought of on the level of elemental passions and whole societies. If, now, we divide the stream of actions performed by *ego* and *alter* into the actions of one of them and the actions of the other—that is, divide them at the point at which action changes hands—we may call the actions of *ego, performances*, and the actions of *alter, sanctions*. In doing so, we treat the actions of *alter* as *re*actions to *ego's* actions. The distinction is an analytic one; that is, concretely every action is both a performance in the sense that an actor does it, and a sanction in the sense that it can be viewed by other actors as reactions to what they have previously done. Sanctions are of two kinds: positive, that is, favorable reactions, and negative, that is, unfavorable reactions. The fundamental theorem on which the existence of order is predicated is that both *ego* and *alter* will desire to maximize favorable reactions from each other. The condition of

optimal reward for both is that they be able to *predict* each other's reactions. For example, parent and child normally understand that incestuous overtures from the one will provoke horror in the other. The condition of predictability is that each *shares,* or holds in common, the *same* value-standards. Furthermore, in the perfectly ordered case these value-standards become integrated with the needs of the individual; that is, what he himself desires to do, wants for himself, will coincide with the norms, what he is expected or obligated to do. We imply here two conditions which we will call the *Parsonsian* conditions of institutionalization:

1. *Ego* and *alter* share the norms governing the actions *p, q, r. . . .*

2. Taking *ego* as a point of reference, performing expected actions is not only a means of eliciting favorable reactions from *alter,* but also "conformity with the relevant expectations is treated as a 'good thing' relatively independently of any specific instrumental 'advantage' to be gained . . . e.g., in the avoidance of negative sanctions."[5] [In a non-vulgar sense, when "virtue is its own reward."]

Thus, a norm is institutionalized when conformity is *both* a means of satisfying one's own desires *and* evokes favorable reactions from others.

We imply something further, however, when we say that a norm is institutionalized. We imply, in the first place, that such norms are, in the anthropologist A. L. Kroeber's terms, "superorganic"; that is, that from the point of view of any given individual the norms have an independent existence and, in particular, that they have a continuity beyond the life of the individuals who, at any given time, may be found to believe in and hold the norm in common. This we may state as a further condition, which we can call *Durkheim's condition*:

3. If *ego* and *alter* are replaced by two other individuals occupying the same statuses (having the same social identities) the norms governing the behavior of *ego* and *alter* also govern the behavior of the individuals with whom they are replaced.

The norm, in other words, has continuity beyond the life of any given individuals. This is *not* equivalent to saying, however, that it has continuity beyond the lives of *all* individuals in society; the prin-

---

[5]Talcott Parsons, *The Social System,* Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1951, p. 41.

ciple rests on the notion that there are always some members already holding the values and norms of society who require that newcomers conform to them. In Durkheim's own terms, with respect to any given individual the norm is *exterior* in the sense that others will be found to hold it, and *constraining* in the sense that, where he does not himself hold the norm, conformity is a condition of maximizing favorable reactions from others. The order will remain stable, even if some members do not *wish* to conform, so long as a sufficient *number* wish to and these react to deviant actions in such a way that those who do not wish to conform nevertheless find it expedient to do so.

III

We are likely to think of "a family" in fairly concrete and essentially biological terms; as, in effect, a male and female with continual sexual access, and with one or more children produced as a consequence of sexual access. Yet sexual access is not universally confined to "the family." This, in itself, however, is less likely to "unhinge" our common notions than the fact that the children of the family may not be conceived within this association either. In our own society, when we use the word "father" we generally mean not only the man socially recognized as the parent of a child but also the man physiologically responsible for its conception; we do not distinguish clearly the physiological and sociological meanings of the term because we assume they are identical. Sometimes, however, we use the term when speaking of the father of an adopted child, and here, although we may not feel the confusion, we may find ourselves speaking of a child who has *two* fathers—the one who begot him and the one who adopted him. In such instances we may feel that the "real" father is *prima facie* the "better" father. It would be interesting to know, in this connection, how common is the preadolescent fantasy of being "only an adopted child" in societies other than our own. In many societies, the two concepts (for which we may use the terms *genitor* and *pater*) are kept distinct both legally and in the popular mind. And in these societies what is usually essential is sociological fatherhood; physiological fatherhood may be quite irrelevant. Perhaps an example from an African tribe will clarify this: for the Tallensi, a Gold Coast tribe, the notion of physiological and "jural" paternity are in fact closely identified,

so that a child not begotten by its sociological father is regarded as "illegitimate"; the illegitimate child is, however, easily absorbed into the existing kinship structure and perhaps paradoxically from our own viewpoint it is the adulterine child that is most easily absorbed of all, for *he does* have a jural father. The child conceived by a woman belongs to the woman's husband, regardless who the genitor might have been. This has two interesting consequences. First, the son inherits all the rights of a child whose *pater* is, in fact, the *genitor*, and second, all the many values and the prestige attached by the society to having a son accrue to the mother's husband rather than to the *genitor*. A special variant of the adulterine son is the child by proxy, who is in no sense stigmatized. A husband who is aged or sterile may have a deputed lover beget a child for him. Not only is the child his by jural right, inheriting all the rights of any other son, but—more indicative of the distinction between the two types of paternity—all the sentiments of attachment the jural father would feel towards a son he had himself begotten are felt towards this child conceived by proxy. Circumstances are not so favorable, however, to a child born to an unmarried mother; for here no jural father exists to assume the child as his own, and if the *genitor* does not marry the mother, the child must belong to the mother's lineage. In this case, his rights of inheritance are limited and his status is inferior, even though afterwards the mother should marry a man who could stand as his jural father.[6]

Clearly, the notion of a "family" is neither so "natural" nor so unambiguously identified with the concrete biological process of procreation as we are likely to think. The focus of the institution is in one sense biological: the essence of marriage and family institutions is a concern with the fact of birth, although not necessarily with sexual access *per se*; and with so regulating birth that it occurs *within* families rather than outside them. But it is apparent that in this context, a family is essentially a normative conception. It is distinguished by a notion of "normatively appropriate birth," i.e., by legitimacy, such that some births occur properly (in conformity with norms) and some occur improperly (transgressing the norms); and such that those who

---

[6]M. Fortes, *The Web of Kinship among the Tallensi*, Oxford University Press, London, 1949, pp. 22-25.

transgress the norms are punished or an attempt is made to assimilate parents, child, or both, into the "legitimate" category by one or another means. Wherever we find the notion of legitimate birth we find "the family"; and if it should be possible to find a society in which no such notion manifests itself, it is proper to question the existence of families in that society.

Our subject-matter has been the body of norms and values surrounding the "legitimate" birth of children into a human organization responsible for their care and upbringing. We have approached our subject-matter sometimes directly, sometimes at a tangent, for it is our purpose both to say something about the family in particular and something about norms and values in general. We have considered the "problem of order," the problem, that is, of a social system without a common body of shared, morally binding, norms and values. The problem is a general one, appearing in diverse disguises in the intellectual history of modern Western civilization. Indeed, in the social sciences the problem of order is better known in economic and political theory than in the case of the family. We have discussed this problem in terms of the now burned-out controversy over "primitive promiscuity," the notion that at one time, completely unregulated behavior existed between sexual partners. We have, in the second place, considered the relation of norms and values to concrete, operating social systems, how norms in particular are applied in social situations and how they are bound into the day-to-day life of social systems. We have, finally, building on the concrete illustrative details used in the first two parts of the paper, indicated how the notion of a "family" is itself a normative concept. Our method has been to move back and forth between family institutions and a sociological theory of institutions, with the idea that we should be able to add something to our knowledge of family institutions by drawing on what is known about institutions in general and to add something to what we know about institutions by drawing on what is known about the family.

A STORY

The Celebration

By SYLVIA SHIRLEY

ALEX WAS PARTLY DRESSED by the time his mother barged into the bathroom. The latch had been removed about ten years ago, because as a baby he had been in the habit of locking himself away from the family's noise. Like everything else that might seem important to him, as he grew up, the need for a new latch had been overlooked.

"Why didn't you call me?" his mother demanded breathlessly, shoving her rolled sleeves above her round elbows. "I'll bet you didn't even touch the brush to your back."

His fingers suddenly clumsy on his buttons, Alex huddled smaller on the bath stool. "I figured you were busy," he mumbled. She was always on to him, her shiny, suspicious eyes all over him, scrutinizing the smallest change in his body. He was thirteen, and only that morning in the synagogue he had made a speech dedicating himself to his faith and the responsibilities of manhood. "Today I am a man," he had said, . . . but how old a man did he have to get before his mother stopped helping him in his bath!

"Sure, I am, but never so busy," his mother was saying, "I haven't time for my boy."

Yeah, he nodded. Plenty of time when he didn't need her. But she couldn't take time off from her job to come to the assembly and hear him read the essay on brotherhood, for which the Mayor gave him the prize. A day's pay, she had said, waste not, want not; . . . besides it wasn't as important an occasion as his *bar-mitzvah* or graduation, for instance.

SYLVIA SHIRLEY is a New Yorker. Her stories have been published in *New Campus Writing, No. 1*, as well as in *Collier's*, *Harper's* and other magazines. One of her stories appeared in *Best American Short Stories 1947* and another in *O. Henry Prize Stores 1951*.

Now she said, "I'm proud of you, Alex. Till now whatever you did wrong was charged to my account, but from now on, you'll have to remember that your sins are your own. But together, we'll show them, we'll show the world, won't we, boy?"

He sat quietly teaching himself not to squirm away from her affection. Becoming a man wasn't his principal concern as it seemed to be hers, and it wasn't the world that wanted showing. She was simply showing his father how well they could get along without him. Not that his father cared.

Alex saw him rarely, and when he thought of him, he remembered Linc as the man with the laugh in his voice. Alex didn't dislike him, though he never felt easy with him. It was as though his father was waiting for him to do something he could make fun of. He wished that Linc had died somewhere. You could make up stories about a dead father.

"Your father's just a no-good," his mother said. And on the few occasions when Linc sent him presents, she exchanged the toys for "something more practical." All that fussing about the cost of things, and then all the bragging because she wouldn't take a cent for his support from his father. . . .

She leaned over the tub, and began to scrub it in preparation for her own bath. "It's going to be some party, sonny. Plenty of eyes going to pop, when your father comes marching in with That Woman, believe me. Nobody's expecting that. Cost plenty, too. But it'll do us proud, Alex. You'll see. This is just the beginning. You'll be the man your father should have been."

He started to edge out of the door. "What's the good of it? What's the good of a party without friends?"

His mother got up from her knees. "What do you mean? They're all friends. People I've known all my life. Friends and relatives."

"Relatives." He had seen some of them in *shul* that morning—more jabber about being a man, while all the time they looked on him as though he were something less than Orphan Annie's kid brother. "Your friends. None of mine."

"Well, I like that. You starting to be ungrateful now, at your age, after all I sacrificed, working like a horse in that darn restaurant? I wouldn't get married again because I didn't want to give another man a chance to boss you around. And living here, taking the guff

from my old parents just so you'd have someone to come home to during the day."

"I'd like some of my friends once in a while," he said doggedly. She didn't have to tell him again why she never married Mr. Kridler. The guy had two mean kids to take care of and she had said often enough she was not raising kids for somebody else. And they stayed on with his grandparents because it was rent-free.

She looked at him incredulously. "Well, who's stopping you? You can have your friends in anytime you want."

"That's what you think. Anybody puts his nose in the door, Grandma wants to know his life history right away, what his father does, who his mother's butcher is." And everybody laughing at his old Grandfather who did the family marketing, making the rounds every day, buying day-old bread for economy's sake, elbowing the women and making jokes that somehow never sounded really funny.

"You can't blame her for that, sitting in the house as she does, not able to get out and see people for herself. Besides, Alex, I want to tell you something now, and if you never learn anything else from me, I want you to remember this: don't go around expecting people to be nice for your sake because you happen to be *you*. You're only special to me, not to anybody else, you hear?"

He slid out of the door as though he were squirming out from under her reach. Always those darn sermons. She and her know-it-all, her blustering know-it-all.

Back in his own room, a book in his hands, he found he couldn't read; he worried. He worried that his father's wife, Mary, would tell how he had called her two weeks ago. He hadn't meant to call *her* especially and he had never even called his father before, but there was such a need for telling somebody! Some kids brought their parents to school when they were only in a holiday program, or reciting a poem they'd learned out of a book. Here his own essay was chosen above twenty others to be read at the school assembly and he was ashamed before his teacher to say that there was no one at home interested enough to come. This was more to him than the ceremony in the synagogue that was to make a man of him, but his mother wouldn't ask for a half-day off, his grandfather pretended not to understand the language whenever it suited him, and his grandmother had grown so big and stout she hardly ventured further than the

porch at any time. So he had sneaked out after supper, not daring to use the house phone, and called his father.

He wasn't sure what he'd say, only he prayed that the words would come to him the way they did in stories he read, words flowing easy and right. When Mary answered, he was shocked. In the first place he didn't know what to call her, had never known how to address her. His mother was Mrs. Marascu, but so was That Woman. Yet once, she had been his mother's best friend. He'd seen pictures of them together in the family album. "This is Alex," he'd said timidly, not knowing whether he made himself heard or not, maybe he only thought he spoke.

Mary wasn't sure at first who Alex was. Then surprised, then anxious. "Sure, Alex. How are you? Is something wrong?"

"I thought maybe Linc was there. I got picked to do something special in school tomorrow."

"I'm sorry, honey, he's not here. He goes out sometimes at night, you know. Is there something you need? A little money or something you'd like, honey?"

He felt his voice get smaller and thinner. "Nothing like that. I only wanted to tell him."

"He'll be pleased you called. I'll bet your mother is proud. Wish I could come and watch you myself, . . . but I guess your mother's going. . . ." Her voice had sounded sorry.

"Oh, of course," he lied. A fine thing he'd be doing, bringing Mary and saying this is my mother.

"I'd like you to come here sometime," Mary said, her voice still sorry. "You're a *bar-mitzvah* boy now; a man, really. No reason we can't all be friendly, Alex."

"Oh yes," he'd said. "Well, I'm sorry I bothered you," and he had hung up quickly, remembering regretfully that he hadn't said good-bye, feeling guilty because he liked her, and his mother hated her, even though Mary hadn't married Linc until years after the divorce. His mother didn't want Linc to have anything. He thought a lot about Mary, her quiet sad voice, and the surprised look she had, as though someone had hit her when she wasn't looking.

Alex wondered if she would let it slip tonight that he had called. His mother would never understand. It was a kind of treachery he couldn't explain.

The thing Alex had not quite understood was why his mother had thrown his father out, right after he was born. That's what she said she did. And his grandmother nodded, and his grandfather looked bored. "That no-good run-around," his mother blustered, her face getting redder, her eyes like electricity.

He remembered seeing a pack of dogs off for an afternoon's jaunt over the hill past the city limits, one spring day, and sometimes in the movies he saw pictures of wild horses roaming the range, but he could never quite see his father running around. It made him laugh every time he thought of it. A grown man running around with a pack of other grown men?

When he grew older, his mother amplified her earlier comments. "Running around with women all the time." Since that was something he could only visualize ludicrously, too, he'd asked his grandfather about it. "Ah, he wasn't so bad. A wild young fellow, like any other." The old man had shrugged. But his grandmother had shaken her cane at her husband. "You men (she spat the word out as though it were loathesome)—you always stick together!" "What about the women," his grandfather had answered, and Alex gave up, left them to their bickering. As far as he could see, nobody in that house really liked anybody but themselves, and anything he'd ever read or heard in school pointed the other way. That was why when National Brotherhood Week came around, Alex had chosen for his essay, "Love Thy Neighbor."

He saw it now as he came downstairs sniffing the odors of good cooking, the freshly baked corn bread, the newspaper picture of himself getting the award from the Mayor's deputy (the Mayor had gone South) and the part of his essay that had been reprinted. His mother had stuck copies of it all over the living-room walls. ("This party'll be a double celebration," she had conceded, belatedly.) The one by the front door hung loose, fluttering slightly with every breeze in the room. He stopped to look at it, not liking the picture of himself, with his plastered-down hair, and his big bulging eyes, not liking the deputy with his patronizing smile. His mother had said it was just his luck not to get the Mayor himself, the one time he'd ever done anything that deserved notice, . . . and he started to read the paragraph he'd written, not because he didn't know it by heart, but because he liked the look of *that* all right.

"You ask," he read to himself, "why should I love that derelict (he had written "dirty bum" but his teacher had changed it) as I love myself? It's not him alone you love, but the divinity behind him, the whole *idea* of mankind ("and fatherhood," he had written, but it had been deleted) which will surely perish from this earth without love or understanding." Alex read it again. It rang in his head, it warmed him and gave him stature. He felt big and full of knowledge. Then he heard his mother shouting for him to get her something.

She wasn't shouting, he reproached himself as he obliged; it was just her way of speaking. But the sound of her voice had deflated him.

By the time the first guests arrived, Alex and his mother had given up hope that anyone would ever come. His grandfather had been at the wine all evening, and was softly, dreamily weaving around the room in a kind of old man's dance. His grandmother complained that the food would be spoiled, and a person could die for all one's relatives cared. And then suddenly, they started coming. They kept coming, till the house bounced with their noise.

Alex stood by his mother and greeted people. His head began to feel flat from all the hand-patting. "A credit to you, Clara," they kept saying. "He's a fine kid, a man now, eh? And maybe a writer. Take my Willy for instance, he can't write for a free catalogue without getting tongue-tied. S'help me, Clara, I'm not kidding." And they shook his mother's hand and patted him again, while his own neck was getting stiff from twisting toward the door, looking for Linc. His mother didn't seem to be paying much attention to the well-wishers, either. She had a big smile on her face, but it seemed to have lost its meaning hours ago.

His Great-Uncle Mark looked at the award and said it hadn't much cash value. "Don't be a goof, Alex, next time ask for money. Honor is for those who can't earn anything else. But this here stuff," and he took out a handful of money, "this talks, take it from me." "Yeah," one of the grown-up cousins said, "just *try* and take it from him. He thinks all the writing a man has to know is to sign his name on a check." And everybody laughed at the cousin because he was the embittered intellectual of the family.

His grandmother was saying to his mother, "Serves you right for asking them. Though you have to admit she knows her place. If not for your stubbornness I wouldn't have That Woman in *my* house."

And suddenly without anybody making any special sound, not even a creak from the door, there was Mary standing a little in front of Linc.

There was an awkward teetering hush, and then the grandfather, as though waking from a deep dream, shouted out jubilantly, "Lincoln, you old buzzard, there hasn't been a decent pinochle game in this house since the day you moved out."

People said sh-sh and the women tittered. Alex felt his mother push him forward. "Hello," he said mechanically, "I'm glad you came."

Mary said their car broke down, and everybody wanted to hear what Clara said to Linc apparently, because nobody talked, only looked away politely, as if that would keep you from noticing that they were listening. The grandfather came up with the tray of sherry glasses, and Linc took a glass in his trembling hand. The light caught the ruby eye of his snake ring, and Alex watched his hand lift the glass.

"Looks to me like he's had a head start before he got here," his mother said drily, looking around at the friends and relatives.

Mary said, "Well, you know Linc." Everybody laughed, including Linc, who kept his eyes to himself.

"That's what I like," the grandfather said, as Linc put his glass back on the tray. "A man without character is never a disappointment to anybody. Everybody knows beforehand what he's going to do, eh, Linc? Have another, there's plenty." Now some of the other men went up to his father, and a little circle formed around him, leaving Mary and his mother and himself standing for a moment by themselves.

His mother smiled sarcastically at Mary. "Still thinks he's the same charmer he always was."

Mary said, "This is a proud day for you, Clara."

But his mother turned away from her and shouted to Linc, as he was clapping the old man on his shoulder, "Maybe you can tear yourself away from the liquor a minute to take a little notice of your only son, Linc."

Linc turned around, still holding the old man, but he kept his eyes lowered and his mouth twisted slyly. "*Your* son, Clara. All yours. Not a trace of me in him."

"You bet your life. I'd've knocked it out of him long ago, if I caught any of your ways in him." She was smiling around the room, and Alex wondered what his father found so funny about all this. Everybody was laughing, even Mary smiled uncertainly.

Linc took his arm off the old man, and put it on Alex's shoulder. "Atta boy, take after your mother. She's got character. Never get anywhere without unflinching principles."

Clara drew herself up huffily, looked around the room again, but Alex knew she couldn't find anything to argue in this last quip. She turned to Mary. "Same old Linc."

Mary took a deep breath. "People don't change, Clara. They only get older." Nobody offered her anything, so Alex reached over and took up a wine glass. Before Mary could take it, Linc helped himself to it and the room resounded with laughter. Alex thought, it's no use, he's going to keep on acting like that because he knows that's what they're all expecting him to do.

Mary said, "I was so sorry they only printed part of that article. Your father bought ten copies. I thought maybe you could show us the whole thing. Have you kept a copy?"

This was the first time anyone had addressed him directly on the essay, and it startled him. He was touched to tears almost, by her concern. Only later, he thought she probably did this to take the limelight off Linc.

"I've got it in my room. I'll get it."

She started to put out her hand to touch him and changed her mind under his mother's eyes. "Tell you what, Linc and I'll come up and read it, where it's quiet." She took her husband by the arm and started to follow Alex out of the room, up the stairs.

Alex nearly ran, stumbling over his own feet, fearful that his mother would interfere. Okay, everybody, the show's over, he thought, go on home. But he could hear the voices beginning quickly, even before Linc and Mary were out of earshot. "Poor thing, I don't envy her much, do you?" Well, his mother would enjoy hearing all that. Now she'd stay below for a while. That's what she had them here for in the first place, that's what the relatives came to see.

Inside his own room, he shut the door hastily. Mary sat down on the window-seat, his father slouched on the bed. Alex looked at them happily, his heart doing crazy leap-ups. He was so glad to have them

here, the mystery of their lives so separate from his seemed about to be revealed to him in some inclusive, personal way, and he was flooded with an expectation that was pure, ill-concealed joy.

"It's a nice room, Alex," Mary said. "Your mother keeps things real nice for you."

"Yeah." His surprise at her words deepened as he looked around. It *was* nice. "I guess I don't notice it much," he added.

"That's a man for you," Mary said. "Your father never notices anything either, unless he's missing something."

"Let's have a look at the composition," Linc said, opening his eyes from their half-droop. They were light blue, with little red veins in the whites.

Alex fished it out from the loose papers in his notebook, and then watched Linc as he read it. From time to time he sneaked a look at Mary. She kept looking around the room and smiling at him. He was thinking about going over to sit down next to her, when Linc lifted his head.

"Some pretty big ideas in this for a little kid," he said. "You know what some of this really means, or did you hear somebody else say it?"

Alex felt the heat creep up in him, inch by inch. He was used to his mother's insinuations. She had asked him if he had got it out of a book he'd read, but he had dreamed that Linc would know him better.

Mary said, "Give it here. Of course he knows what's in it. He wrote it and smarter people than you or I decided it was good."

Linc shrugged as he handed it over, lowering his eyes. "That's right. I nearly forgot that from today on he is a man, responsible for his own thoughts, sins." He strung the two together as though they were the same thing. Alex watched the loose hand dangle from its wrist, the snake eye glisten as the light hit it. "Well, maybe there are some that can make a living from ideas," he went on. "Plenty of slaves in the world, no reason why Alex should be one if he can shake off the iniquities of his fathers." He shook himself now. "The only thing is you'll never learn about the quality of love or sympathy in this house. Why don't you come stay with us this summer? Yes, why don't you?"

"You ask your mother first," Mary put in, without lifting her head.

Linc grimaced. "Yeah, ask your mother first. Mary's nephew is just a year older than you and he's coming out. We have a place near a lake. You'd have fun together."

Alex cleared his throat. His mother always looked forward to the vacation time she took with him. "I guess not," he said wearily. He saw now it would take more than a summer to get his father to know about him as he had thought he would. After all, Linc was his own father, he should understand about him, what he thought, how it was with a guy. Now there were the two of them, his mother and his father who hadn't the slightest glimmer of what he was like inside himself. He looked to Mary for some sign, but she just sat there looking at the sheet of paper, her brows pinched together in concentration.

At last she lifted her head. "It's real nice, Alex. I would never have dreamed you could think it up. Real nice and grown-up."

Alex turned away, disappointment lumping in his throat. Mary didn't know anything, either. She just tried to be nice. Let them have her old nephew. He wondered how long they'd sit there before his mother would come along and shoo them out.

She did, too. Clara came in breathlessly, pushing up her sleeves, as though they irked her. "What are you doing up here like a bunch of conspirators? Come down and have a bite of something before those hogs eat it all," she added jovially.

Mary said, "We were admiring his things. He has a nice home with you, Clara."

"Well, sure, what'd you expect?" She looked at Linc, but he had lowered his eyes now, and that dopey half-smile had come over his face again.

His mother waved her hand toward him. "I thought maybe you'd make a man of him, Mary."

Mary's face got whiter. "He was that when I married him."

"You certainly were in a hurry to get what you got, I must say."

Mary stood up. "I'm not sorry, Clara. Are you?"

"Me? I'm independent. I've got my pride."

"Does that warm you? Does it keep you from being lonely?"

"Who's lonely? I've got my boy, my little man." She reached over triumphantly and gathered Alex's shrinking shoulders within her arm. He saw his father look up quickly, almost wickedly, and then away.

"Well, I've got neither that kind of pride nor Alex, so why don't you let me have what I have got?" Mary asked quietly.

"Have it and welcome. My God, I didn't want him!"

"Thanks for the party, then. Are you coming, Linc?"

He didn't answer her, and for a moment Alex thought his father had fallen asleep, he had slumped so far down on the bed. Mary put out her hand and Linc took it, smoothing his thumb over her knuckles for a few seconds, then got to his feet at last.

"You two ought to go far together," he said to Alex. "You've got the ideas, your mother's got the principles. I wish you joy." He started to make them a little bow.

Mary said, "You talk too much, Linc."

"Not me. Never talked enough in this house. Fact is, I'm going to make a little speech. What I want to know first, is what do you want, Clara? You did what you wanted, what you thought was right. You never understood it, you never forgave. But you want the whole damn world to keep on telling you you did right, and anything I did after that was wrong. Right?"

"Let's go, Linc," Mary said.

"You would like something terrible to happen to Mary and me, so you'd know definitely that God was on your side," Linc went on.

"Listen," Clara said. "I threw you out once, I can do it again." Her breathing was heavy, but her voice was not as loud as Alex knew it could get. He felt himself shaking, and he held on to his mother for support.

But Linc only nodded. "You won't have to. I wouldn't have come in the first place, except that Mary thought little Whozis, here, would have his feelings hurt. Right?"

"That's not true," Mary said. "We came because you invited us, and because we were happy for Alex. And I thought you were, too. But you only like the same old quarrel, Clara. Shame on you." Her hand still in her husband's, they went out of the room together. Linc brushed Alex's hair with his free hand as they passed him.

Nobody said goodbye, and Alex stood within his mother's grasp for a long time. The draft, created by the opening and closing of the door had blown the composition to the floor.

Downstairs, the front door banged, and he started toward the window, his mother coming, too, as though unwilling to let him out

of reach. Together they watched Linc and Mary go slowly down the steps, still holding hands, and then start along the walk to the curb.

Alex felt his heart hammer in his chest. "*Don't go, wait for me,*" it shouted so loud he was afraid his mother would hear the cry. He turned and saw her face wet under the silent tears, her mouth slightly ajar, and he knew without asking, that his mother's heart had gone down along the front walk, too.

"Ma," he said, "don't cry." But now that he understood how things were, he knew that there was no use in his saying so. Love and understanding were only two things. Remorse was a third. And God alone knew how many more there would be in the confusion from pushing for your own desires.

Slowly he turned back to the room, his eyes dry and anxious. His essay still lay on the floor, only now, like a seal, it bore the imprint of his mother's heel where she had walked across it to the window. Quickening, he picked it up, making several futile efforts to brush the paper clean.

Tomorrow or the next day, he thought as he folded it resolutely, and slipped it back into his book, he would re-write it; make a fresh copy.

Fitzgerald as Icarus

By ROBERT N. WILSON

> "Fitzgerald was perhaps the last notable writer to affirm the Romantic fantasy, descended from the Renaissance, of personal ambition and heroism, of life committed to, or thrown away for, some ideal of self."
>
> ——Lionel Trilling, *The Liberal Imagination*

THE RELATION between the artist's personality and his work, while obviously intimate, can never be made wholly explicit. Creativity is too elusive, too fundamentally mysterious, to afford a point-by-point correspondence between the man and the art. Yet the artist's role has shifted historically on the question of the individual's degree of identification with his books or paintings or music. From the anonymous art of the Middle Ages, dedicated to the glory of God, one may trace a movement toward ever greater concern with the artist as a person, toward a highly individualized art dedicated to the glory of self. In some instances this tendency has resulted in a relative disregard of the work, its overshadowing by the symbolic importance of the artist's person. Rimbaud, for example, has perhaps been more influential as the prototype of a role—the alienated, rebellious writer at odds with society—than as a poet to be read for his poetry.

As Trilling notes in the passage above, F. Scott Fitzgerald may stand as an exemplar of self-exploitation in the novel. His life and

---

ROBERT N. WILSON has published *The Give and Take in Hospitals* (1956) and is author of the forthcoming *Man Made Plain* (Howard Allen, Inc.), a study of the poet's creative work and his social role in contemporary America. A one-time staff member of the Social Science Research Council and a Fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, he became last fall Lecturer on Social Science in the Division of Psychiatry of the Harvard Medical School and executive officer of a graduate training program in health research.

work were so interwoven that the distinction between them blurs; in a sense, he imagined and created his life and lived in his fictional protagonists. The quiet life of the conscientious artisan, the poet whom Milton counseled to drink plain water from a wooden bowl, was utterly foreign to Fitzgerald's conception of the writer's role. Rather, the author must live as his characters live, must make their style his and his theirs. In living up to a dream, an ideal of dramatic selfhood, Fitzgerald merged both his personality and the society in which he lived into his artistic representations. It would be as true to say that his life was a novel in progress—and, like his last novel, unfinished—as that his novels are autobiographical. As Malcolm Cowley says, "Sometimes the heroes started as very different persons and were transformed imperceptibly, as he worked over them, into an image of the author."

When he strove toward an ideal of self, a receding image of glorious and transcendent being, Fitzgerald expressed not only a personal disposition but a recurrent theme in American culture. In an exaggerated pure form, he struck what many regard as the unique chord in our national experience: a whole-hearted allegiance to an imagined future. This allegiance entails impatience with the present in all its imperfection and enjoins striving toward a yet unrealized state of grace. With maturity, the American dream commonly is scaled down to more modest proportions. The individual learns to tailor his goals, to limit the ideal and nourish his capacities for a more restricted achievement. Fitzgerald, however, was unusually tenacious and his vision of the future was unusually full-blown. His desire encompassed the public life of the celebrity, the semi-private life of a star in a select social firmament, and the solitude of the literary craftsman. His refusal or inability to compromise these alternative and perhaps mutually exclusive selves may lie at the root of his tragic unfulfillment. But that very disdain for discipline, that failure to conserve his personal resources, may also be germane to the marvelous zest that informs his best writing.

If Fitzgerald's ideal of self was marked by a catholicity so extreme as to thin out his talent in diffuse activities, it was at the same time distinguished by an intensity of literary aim. All that we know of his writing habits indicates a constant struggle to excel, to evoke precisely the right response from the reader by character and mood. His note-

books demonstrate how carefully, especially in his later period, he tried to create characters who would not make a psychologically false move. It seems likely, from the evidence of his last years in Hollywood and the incomplete fashioning of *The Last Tycoon*, that Fitzgerald might at length have muted the emphasis on himself as novelist extraordinary and devoted his life more thoroughly to art than had been the case. Nevertheless his foreshortened career stands dedicated to an ideal of self so intense and so demanding that it invites comparison with the Icarian myth.

In a recent essay,[1] Henry A. Murray has described a psychological pattern which he terms the "Icarus complex." This pattern is an induction from a single intensive clinical history, although it is corroborated by a wealth of psychological and literary evidence. While Murray's elucidation of the complex is based on a variety of indices to his subject's personality, including projective tests, interviews, and observed behavior, Fitzgerald's life and work are so well documented that we are justified in seeking out a parallel configuration despite the lack of clinical knowledge in its strict sense. Fitzgerald, of course, does not conform to every facet of the Icarus complex; a scientifically isolated "type" never corresponds precisely to any richly unique human being. Yet the psychologist is inevitably struck, in this instance, by an amazing correspondence between the themes exhibited in an exceedingly interesting male adolescent personality, studied clinically, and those exhibited in Fitzgerald's personality and the characters of his novels. These engaging parallels by no means "reduce" Fitzgerald to a clinical type; rather, they contribute to a coherent portrait of an extraordinarily talented writer.

The Icarus complex is distinguished by the following themes, most of which may be strikingly illustrated in the novelist: burning ambition and exhibitionism; desire to ascend to great heights; desire to be the center of all eyes; a precipitous fall; craving for immortality; depreciation and enthrallment of women. Obviously, the gifted and ambitious individuals of most societies exhibit some of these characteristics in some degree. The poet or philosopher may be peculiarly marked

---

[1]Henry A. Murray, "American Icarus," Chapter 28 in *Clinical Studies of Personality*, edited by Arthur Burton and Robert E. Harris (New York: Harper and Bros., 1955).

by them, according to Murray, but "for the fullest expression of the complex one must turn to ardent romantic poetry (Byron, Shelley), to mythic philosophy (Socrates in *Phaedrus*, or Nietzsche in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*), or to some form of up-yearning (erotic) mysticism." In significant literary and psychological respects, Fitzgerald may be viewed as a romantic poet.

Fitzgerald and his created figures abound in "burning" ambition and exhibitionism as Arthur Mizener notes in *The Far Side of Paradise:* "As a small boy Fitzgerald lived, as he said later, 'with a great dream' and his object was always to try to realize that dream." His sights were set very high, and they continued to be on a transcendent scale long after the usual fantasies of adolescence. Two remarks he made in his early days are significant: "If I couldn't be perfect I wouldn't be anything," and, in undergraduate zeal to Edmund Wilson, "I want to be one of the greatest writers who ever lived, don't you?" The idealized self is perhaps a conspicuous feature of any artist's or any man's self-picture. What makes it unusual in Fitzgerald is the height of his aspiration, and his habit of comparing himself on a life-long basis with the giants of literature. As Mizener observes, "But like Jay Gatsby's, his life was modeled on 'his Platonic conception of himself.'" And again, "He was thirty before experience succeeded in convincing him that 'life was [not] something you dominated if you were any good.'"

Exhibitionism and its complement, voyeurism, come through clearly. The endless parties of Scott and Zelda, their outrageous, funny, pathetic escapades, the final confession Fitzgerald wrote for *Esquire*—all contribute to the impression of a profound desire to exhibit, a desire not at all confined to the display of admirable qualities. It may well be that all writers are somewhat voyeuristic, that their stock in trade is a propensity to peer into other worlds, other styles of life. Fitzgerald, however, in his unalloyed curiosity about the milieu of the rich (the curiosity displayed in his story, "The Rich Boy," and embalmed in the famous exchange with Hemingway) showed extreme needs of this sort. Recall, too, the mood noted by Malcolm Cowley in Fitzgerald's Princeton days, the feeling that Eastern university life and the parties of the wealthy were to him like the candy store to the urchin, pressing his nose against the window to an exotic world.

All of Fitzgerald's heroes are ambitious, and all except Anthony Patch of *The Beautiful and Damned* are immoderately so. It should be remarked that their aspirations are not confined to a single path, for instance to a vocation, but embrace many facets of work, love, and informal social intercourse. The heroes are self-consciously playing roles and striving for effects. Their eyes are on the future, on the creation of a dramatic personality and an orbit in which the personality may most graciously move. The two earliest heroes, Amory Blaine and Anthony Patch, aspire without fulfillment, although their dreams are not lessened by lack of success. Of Amory Blaine:

> Always, after he was in bed, there were voices—indefinite, fading, enchanting—just outside his window, and before he fell asleep he would dream one of his favorite waking dreams, the one about becoming a great halfback or the one about the Japanese invasion, when he was rewarded by being made the youngest general in the world. It was always the becoming he dreamed of, never the being. This, too, was quite characteristic of Amory.

The later, more mature figures back up their ambition with genuine ability, but it is still overwhelming in magnitude. Jay Gatsby, Dick Diver, and Monroe Stahr each dream of brilliant success. Diver and Stahr are transcendent individuals in psychiatry and movie production, respectively, but strive even higher. The mysterious Gatsby is entirely transparent about his central concern, his dream of self:

> The truth was that Jay Gatsby of West Egg, Long Island, sprang from his Platonic conception of himself. He was a son of God, a phrase which, if it means anything, means just that—and he must be about his Father's business, the service of a vast, vulgar and meretricious beauty. So he invented just the sort of Jay Gatsby that a seventeen year old boy would be likely to invent, and to this conception he was faithful to the end.
>
> And as I sat there brooding on the old, unknown world, I thought of Gatsby's wonder when he first picked out the green light at the end of Daisy's dock. He had come a long way to this blue lawn, and his dream must have seemed so close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of the republic rolled on under the night.
>
> Gatsby believed in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eludes us then, but that's no matter—tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. . . . And one fine morning ———.

It is perhaps symptomatic that *The Great Gatsby* is generally acknowledged to be Fitzgerald's finest novel and one of the truly distinguished American works of the twentieth century. In addition to its marvelously taut form and precise language, *Gatsby* epitomizes the mystery and glamor of the future dream; without question, the struggle to fulfill a lofty unrealized conception of self is prominent in American values and central to Fitzgerald's psychic economy.

The desire to rise, leap, fly, and be tall among men is obviously akin to the zealous ambition which characterizes Fitzgerald and his characters. It is astonishing to find how often and how vividly images of flight occur in the novels. Indeed, *The Last Tycoon* is explicitly built around the transcontinental flights of its hero, Monroe Stahr, between Hollywood and New York, and Fitzgerald's notes show that flight was to have been an even more important theme in the unfinished portion. Fitzgerald appears as a literal Icarus in a curious description written by his wife Zelda in her avowedly autobiographical novel, *Save Me The Waltz*: "There seemed to be some heavenly support beneath his shoulder blades that lifted his feet from the ground, as if he secretly enjoyed the ability to fly but was walking as a compromise to convention." In his notes for *The Last Tycoon*, these images occur under the heading, "Airplane Trip":

> My blue dream of being in a basket like a kite held by a rope against the wind.
>
> It's fun to stretch and see the blue heavens spreading once more, spreading azure thighs for adventure.

The sexual symbolism of the latter is interestingly in keeping with the fantasies of the individual from whom the Icarus complex was originally derived; that young man dreamed of flying through the air on a maid's rump.

Probably the most coherent single expression of the ascension theme and Icarian imagery is found in the discussion of Monroe Stahr, the incredibly gifted Hollywood producer of *The Last Tycoon*:

> "What I wanted to know," he told me ruefully, "is how he ever got to be Mr. Stahr."
>
> I'm afraid Mr. Stahr could never have answered that one; for the embryo is not equipped with a memory. But I could answer a little. He had flown up very high to see, on strong wings, when he was young. And while he

> was up there he had looked on all the kingdoms, with the kind of eyes that can stare straight into the sun. Beating his wings tenaciously—finally frantically—and keeping on beating them, he had stayed up there longer than most of us, and then, remembering all he had seen from his great height of how things were, he had settled gradually to earth.

Murray's next component is "a craving for unsolicited attention and admiration, a desire to attract and enchant all eyes, like a star in the firmament." Fitzgerald and his heroes display a keen appetite for this kind of adulation. The social worlds of the novels revolve around the heroes' persons, not simply because the story is told from their perspective but because they are in fact at the center of a universe.

From the start, Fitzgerald experienced the overwhelming admiration of others; for his mother, and later for teen-age companions, he was an admirable figure, glorying in the role of cynosure. Arthur Mizener speaks of "his mother's undiscriminating admiration." Fitzgerald himself later said, "I didn't know till 15 that there was anyone in the world except me." In the days of frantic partying, when in Zelda's familiar remark "it was always tea-time or late at night," the Fitzgeralds stood in the center of a circle. One feels they never cared to stand anywhere else. It was as if they said, "Come, look, marvel at how we can be at once so witty and talented, so gay and handsome." The thirst for recognition, as writer and as person, may be related to the constant entertaining which helped insure a state of perpetual insolvency for an author whose novels and short stories were almost uniformly successful.

Brilliant and exciting gatherings of people, of the *best* people, invariably center on the magnetism of such protagonists as Gatsby, Dick Diver, and Monroe Stahr. The invited and uninvited guests of Gatsby's great house parties were perhaps as much in search of a legend as of free liquor; his very mystery and lack of identity served to focus a myth of distant, awe-inspiring personality. In one of the most intriguing passages of *Tender Is the Night*, the girl Rosemary sees Dr. Richard Diver as symbol and center of a company so gay and rich and diverting that the world seems to balance at his dinner table. Any other setting, any other party, is cosmically irrelevant. But their élan is not a group achievement; it is created and controlled by Dick Diver and his wife, Nicole. An ephemeral thing, this grace and spiritual plenitude rests in Dick's hands, so that its continued existence depends upon his ability to maintain a somewhat euphoric mastery.

A variation of the theme is observed in *The Last Tycoon*. Here Stahr, while he is not the partying type, makes a dramatic entrance into a crowded club. At once all action stops, except the action of watching Stahr and whispering—as lesser figures do throughout the book—about his character and supposed motivations. Like all Fitzgerald heroes, Stahr asks a great deal of life; the notes for the novel make this clear, and the words *underlined* below might serve as a motif for the heroes as for their creator:

> Back to the main theme: Stahr cannot bring himself to marry Thalia ["Kathleen," in the novel]. It simply doesn't seem part of his life. He doesn't realize that she has become necessary to him. Previously his name has been associated with this or that well-known actress or society personality, and Thalia is poor, unfortunate, and tagged with a middle-class exterior that doesn't fit in with *the grandeur Stahr demands of life*.

Murray, finally, has recapitulated the blending of psychological elements which characterizes Icarus before his fall:

> Already we begin to see a close, emotionally logical—indeed, an almost inevitable—connection, if not fusion, between ascensionism and cynosural narcism: the way to attract all eyes is to be very tall, to stand erect above the multitude, and best of all to rise in the air like a god.

Having attained a certain height, in most cases towering dominance, the hero falls like Icarus when the sun had melted his waxen wings. Of the five novels, only one concludes with the hero at or near the position he had held when the story opened. Amory Blaine, in *This Side of Paradise*, has lost romantic illusions but retains his youth and a life to come. Dick Diver (*Tender Is the Night*) lives on, but is socially dead, corrupt, isolated from the mainstream of his profession (medicine) and his friends, and divorced from his beloved Nicole. Anthony Patch (*The Beautiful and Damned*) sails with his psychosis toward an unknown port. The remaining two, Gatsby and Stahr, meet violent death: Gatsby is shot, and Stahr, exemplifying Icarus, was to have died in an airplane crash at the end of *The Last Tycoon*. Fitzgerald seems to say that the gaudy dream—and the dreams are vital, for "the handle by which he took hold of his characters was their dreams"—is at length unrealizable, or, if realized, unsatisfying. It is, nevertheless, difficult to imagine any of these men as "settling down," as striking any kind of compromise with their aspirations or living an uneventful and undistinguished life. They are exciting to author and reader only while

they are on the top of the world and larger than life. Perhaps, then, Fitzgerald is also saying that the game is worth the candle and that one should have few regrets even if the descent from the heights is precipitous.

The life Fitzgerald lived, as well as the ones he wrote, hewed starkly to the Icarian theme. He went far up in popularity to become the poet of the Jazz Age and far up in critical esteem as the author of *The Great Gatsby*. His books brought wealth, fame, and a dramatic life-style. He won the wife he sought, the Southern beauty who had once (before publication of *This Side of Paradise* and overnight success) seemed beyond his reach. Parties, travel, friendships with men and women of literary and social distinction—all these fell to him easily and quickly. Descent from such heights of self-realization could only be brought about by a cruel convergence of inner and outer circumstance.

The Fitzgeralds overspent to maintain the houses and clothes and parties which meant so much to both; saddled with debt and constant financial anxiety, the novelist was forced to write rapidly, to interrupt his plans for major works and produce saleable short stories. *Tender Is the Night*, the effort of several years, failed to sell, although it is now recognized as one of his most exciting and sensitive novels; the popular explanation for this failure cites the fact that it deals with the personal problems of the wealthy and talented, a theme poorly calculated to interest Americans in the Depression year of 1933. Alcoholism began to interfere with his writing and living. Perhaps most telling of blows, the beautiful Zelda developed a psychosis which required hospitalization and destroyed family life. And so Fitzgerald fell to the depth in which he wrote that he now knew the dark night of the soul as described by St. John of the Cross, "where it is always three o'clock in the morning."

If Fitzgerald thus suffered the same fall from grandeur which he had charted for his heroes, it is most important to stress that his own story does not end at the nadir. Rather, he was able to come back part way toward artistic excellence if not toward the resumption of his total dramatic social role. The heart attack which foreshortened *The Last Tycoon* is believed by many critics to have interrupted his finest novel as well as ending a stubborn struggle for artistic rebirth and the revival of personal integrity.

The craving for immortality may be taken as intrinsic to the writer's role; in Herbert Read's phrase, he yearns for "a paper eternity." It is not strange, then, that Fitzgerald wanted his books to last. However, his heroes, none of them artists if one excepts the tentative longings of Amory Blaine and Anthony Patch, also strive for an immortality of a different variety, a type well-described by Murray:

> If resurrection [re-ascension] is not to be vouchsafed a man, there is the possibility of *replication*, which may be defined as the process whereby one or more persons are transformed in the image of the subject. It is the complement of identification, or emulation: the implanting of a memorable and impelling image of the self in the minds of others.

To imprint others with the seal of self, as a ring cuts an image in soft wax, is a prominent aim of Fitzgerald's chief characters. Thus the whole theme of *Gatsby* could be seen as Jay Gatsby's unforgettable impress of his self-conception on the mind and spirit of the narrator, Carraway. As Carraway says of this fascination:

> I wanted no more riotous excursions with privileged glimpses into the human heart. Only Gatsby, the man who gives his name to this book, was exempt from my reaction—Gatsby, who represented everything for which I have an unaffected scorn. If personality is an unbroken series of successful gestures, then there was something gorgeous about him, some heightened sensitivity to the promises of life, as if he were related to one of those intricate machines that register earthquakes ten thousand miles away.

So Dick Diver, too, lives on in the minds of those who surrounded him as an epitome of social grace. The last hero, Monroe Stahr, was to find his immortality by exerting a very powerful and specific influence following the plane crash that caused his death. Fitzgerald's notes tell us that Stahr's briefcase would be found in the wreckage by a small boy, and that its contents would then inspire the boy to follow an honorable, outstanding career.

Depreciation and enthrallment of women, a conception of them "as objects to be used for narcistic gains," is the one component of the Icarus complex for which the evidence in Fitzgerald is scant and often contradictory. It is true that the women his heroes marry or hope to marry are always, except in *The Last Tycoon*, creatures of unusual beauty and remoteness whose social status is high; thus marriage to them is a self-enhancing achievement which gratifies the hero's wish to be admired and envied. It is also true that in no case is a stable,

lasting relationship achieved. An exceedingly narcistic view of women is given by Gatsby in his remark, on being told that the woman he desires really loves her husband, that, "in any case, it's only personal." That is, the personal concerns of another are inconsequential in the light of Gatsby's cosmic self. Finally, there is little doubt that Fitzgerald's own marriage to Zelda, the Southern patrician, represented both a triumphant achievement and a reward for his success with *This Side of Paradise.*

But depreciation is surely not a prominent feature of these relationships. Rather, the women in Fitzgerald are adored in a wholehearted way, in a rather quaint, old-fashioned mood of romantic chivalry. In some respects one feels his attitude toward them never advanced far beyond the worshipful gaze of the Ivy League undergraduate, circa 1920, toward the prettiest girl at the ball. This adoring stance also deepens and becomes enriched through the devotion lavished on the ill wife, on Nicole by Dick Diver and on Zelda by Fitzgerald. One is forced to conclude, then, that while women indeed fed the self-exaltation of the hero, they were also valued for themselves. As part of the dream and partners in reality, Fitzgerald's women secure a central place; they focus some of the most tender and moving passages in the novels.

The life and novels of Fitzgerald may thus be said to represent a sequence of themes characteristic of the clinical syndrome termed the "Icarus complex." This personality style overreaches, and founders on the insatiable quality of magnificent dreams, of idealized images. To analyze the progression of psychological elements is to see the writer more clearly, but decidedly not to "explain away" or undercut his creative achievement.

And one must of course beware of pushing an analogy too far; despite their similarities, the college student who modeled the Icarian career and Fitzgerald are quite different individuals. Fitzgerald was a successful writer and attained a very hard-won maturity, while the young man on whom the Icarus complex is based had not yet achieved his vocation or outgrown an adolescent attitude toward sex.

In striving for transcendent success, Fitzgerald accomplished much. A less noble conception of self might have produced less noble works of the imagination. Although he called himself, "an indifferent caretaker of my talent," the astonishing fact is that, given the half-

world of life with Zelda, life with alcohol, life with a party in the making or made, he sustained a recurrent creative thrust that affords us his small but fastidious artistic legacy.

Questionnaire

By Paris Leary

Date Of Birth: Nineteen Thirty-One.
Nationality: American.
Occupation: "Clerk In Holy Orders."
White Caucasian; no disfigurations.
Height: six-foot two. Weight: one eighty-five.
No history of venereal disease.
Allergies: pecans and out-of-doors.
Languages: two modern and three dead.

Two Thousand Word Autobiography:

Was hung by my heels and slapped as Wall Street fell
and the Japanese acquired Manchuria;
became a boy when Ethiopia
bled from a Pope's apostolic blessing;
learned terror from the MGM lion
while Spaniards killed each other, helped by many;
learned how to read while Hitler took the Ruhr,
and how to ride a bike when Poland fell;
when Pearl Harbor burnt I had the mumps.

Paris Leary is a young American poet now doing graduate work at Oxford. His work has appeared in literary magazines both in Britain and America; most recently he guest-edited an issue of the *Beloit Poetry Journal* containing a selection of unpublished poetry by the so-called "New Movement" in British verse.

The nights had soothed the itch of adolescence
when Hiroshima blossomed out of sight.
Read English Lit., and heard Korea break,
discovering that, like uncles, friends can die.
A breather for theology, some poems,
and, for a three-year instant, almost easy;
more poems, friends and music, friends and books,
the green Isis occasional with swans,
and Oxford's towers in an empty sky.
Then, bored with sham, when I was twenty-five
the world restored itself in Hungary,
and once again the air was natural
with steel, and everything seems right again.
From war to war the years derive their meaning,
and "hearts are restless 'till they find their rest . . ."
in war, not God. Hobbes and Augustine knew,
though each of them would have denied the other,
that violence is our security
and betrayal our peculiar habitation.
Christ's scourging never seemed so relevant.

Future Plans? . . . this form is out-of-date,
two thousand words is much too long for that.

Adam

By Sandra Hochman

Dripping winners from the house of Abel
Peer from wood-work in this fake Sistine,
Watch my muscles stretch out of dreams
Till fingers rest upon the looking glass
Gripping suspect figures of the past.
Adam in the mirror, who am I?
I have not died but I have seen my soul
Plunge from ceilings to the bedroom wall
And so, when I say death, I mean each time
I've loved, and could not love, each time I've wept
Because I reached for something which leaps
Over death into a sullied pane.
Who opens up the looking glass again
Finds dust inside, nothing but dust
Caked with tears and cataracts of rust
Streaming from the sockets of the sky.

Sandra Hochman is working to complete a book of poems to be titled *Ivory and Horn* and a novel as yet untitled. Her poems have appeared in a variety of little magazines.

Eve

By Allison L. Burnett

Snatched from the torn side of the Apple-King
She whirled once around the tongued asp
And brought the red bough down.

Deliverance in the first white act of love
She sought in the rocking limbs
And stirred like a child in the desolate deed.

Child, asp, and Apple-King all naked over the splendor
Of the seeds that shot up pillowed grass
As Cain broke from the chains of his sleep.

Exit first from the green land, you, belly down,
For there was envy in the blades of your eyes
And where you watched the weeds have flourished.

And you Apple-King did not know of your sleeping son
And sought only to dry your bleeding side
In the bandages of her white loins.

It is for you departed Eve that we weep,
There were fangs under your cloud-white breast.
You could not hold the panthered Cain in his cage.

Allison L. Burnett's poems have appeared in literary journals in England and India as well as the United States. Presently he is working towards a Ph.D. in Zoology at Cornell University.

A STORY

St. Anthony and the Glass Houses

By ELIZABETH DE VEGH

MISS ELLEN HOWE was on the path that led to the glass houses of the Jardin Botanique. Above her, their imperial domes were white in the sun. It was warm for early summer in Belgium; too warm, in fact, for walking about like this. But there had been a man at the museum.

The stealthy squeaking of his shoes had sounded behind her for quite a while, but she had been too absorbed in the paintings to pay attention. Then she stopped for a long time in front of the Temptations of St. Anthony, that awful picture; of all the versions she had seen, this was the worst. She had wanted to move on, but could not tear herself away.

St. Anthony, poor old man, sitting on a rock, while beaked and snouted creatures peeped at him from a wilderness of creepers. And there in one corner, that woman. Her back was half-turned; she was facing St. Anthony, and leaning forward a little. Oh, she wore a long grey dress that looked modest enough from the rear. But one could tell from the way the folds of her skirt went, curving up to a bunch near her bent elbow, what she was doing. Yes, and from the intent angle of her chin, gleaming through Medusa ringlets of hair. One saw nothing, but one knew. . . .

Ellen's face grew hot, remembering it.

At this point, she had become aware of the man. He had stopped a few paces away, pretending to look at a picture. Pretending. She could tell from the set of his shoulders. She could always tell. . . . Certainly Father had impressed upon her that men would be after her for her money, but that was only half of it. Perhaps, being her father,

---

ELIZABETH DE VEGH published a book of short stories *The Eye of the Beholder* (Random House) last March, and William Heinemann (London) is to bring out a novel of hers, as yet untitled, in 1958. She is a native New Yorker.

he had not realized any more about her than that.

Of course, the only thing to do was to leave the museum.

It was still too early to meet her friends for lunch. From her last visit to the city, years ago, she remembered the shady well-kept park of the Jardin Botanique; she told the cab driver to take her to its lower end.

But the gate was locked. Here, the park was below street level. People leaning over the wall looked into the hearts of trees where wild pigeons roosted and merles sang, hidden by leaves. From there the ground rose to a sweep of green hillside, a forbidden paradise now. It ended abruptly in a fiasco of dusty bushes planted there in the half-hearted attempt to hide the gash of a new highway that was flanked by raw concrete sidings. Beyond that were the glass houses and their surrounding gardens, the only part of the Jardin Botanique that one could enter.

Cut off from the park, the gardens seemed to have lost their supply of life-blood. Few flowers bloomed, and the bordering hedges were scraggly and thin; the buildings on their dais of terraced steps had a neglected air.

Ellen looked about her in discontent; then she drew a breath. Over there, brown juicy young men in blue trousers were digging one of the flower beds. They made the only spot of color in a barren landscape. She would have to walk past them. . . .

But the young men did not look up as she went by. Well, they were talking among themselves. Absorbed.

There was no one going in or out of the houses. At least they would be beautiful inside, with lush ordered green things growing, and extraordinary flowers. One entered through a building at the right.

Ellen found herself in a tall dingy hall that abounded with signs in French and Flemish concerning the Institut d'Arboriculture that was located at the back. A guard with a moustache as thin and scraggly as the hedges outside indicated the door to the greenhouses, and she went in.

More heat closed behind her like another door. Ahead lay a disorderly jungle of creepers, potted shrubs, palms with sad brown ends. Some things had grown rampant, others had languished and lost their leaves; no clearing away had been done. The usual greenhouse smell

held undertones of mildew and corruption; there were no flowers anywhere. Maybe the next house was better. On the narrow cement walk, Ellen had to dodge tattered banana leaves, and then there were other things in the way.

Presently there was a rustling; not footsteps. Uneasily she thought of the beaked and snouted creatures peering at St. Anthony from a tangle not unlike this one. But no; coming toward her was a tall old man with a square bushy white beard. He wore a shabby jacket and trousers that did not match, and there were sneakers on his feet; it was a relief to see why there had been no footsteps. He politely held a palm frond aside for Ellen to pass, regarding her through spectacles that made his eyes seem wistful and large. Smiling faintly, Ellen thanked him and went on.

The other two houses were the same disappointing thicket of tropical growth. She went to the end and retraced her steps because there was no other way out. Halfway back, she met the old man again, apparently coming to look for her. Rusty-voiced, he said something to her in Flemish.

"Je ne comprends pas," she told him, inviting no further exchange.

In halting French, he persisted. "You have seen that the door at the end is closed? One must go out this way."

Seeing a badge of the Institut d'Arboriculture in his lapel, Ellen decided he must be a curator; there could be no harm in being pleasant. She felt sorry for him, all alone in this unkempt jungle that no one seemed to visit. "Yes, thank you," she said; then added, lying, "It is very interesting here."

He looked at her sadly and said something unintelligible.

"So many things one doesn't see every day," she went on, to encourage him.

"You are French?" he implored suddenly.

Ellen was pleased that he found her French this good, and smiled. "No, I am American."

"Ah, then we can speak English," he said with a certain measure of ease; but this seemed to desert him as he went on. ". . . Yes, . . . there is much to see, but the—visitors do not come here, since the park is—is. . . ." He gestured with one hand. "The new auto-way has cut off. The city does not interest itself here now. Is alone—a wilderness. But I stay, so."

Ellen nodded. "Yes. Yes, I understand."

He looked at her eagerly, mouth open, but no words came. To help him along, she said, "They are very foolish not to be interested, with so many wonderful things growing here. It must have taken years to collect them."

He shrugged. "It is not—bringing money. That is all they think. . . . And what is growing here—the trees, they are not very well. The sun. . . ."

"The sun?"

He was in the middle of a long strangled hesitation; really, his English was no better than his French. But perhaps he had been so long in this glass-house wilderness that any kind of speech had become difficult; a dedicated life. Ellen gave him a warm look and said, "Yes, tell me, *I* am interested."

"The sun—it makes of the houses—a Dante's Inferno. The trees have their leaves burned. They need—caring. But there are not enough men for—working here."

"That one certainly looks healthy enough," she said cajolingly, and pointed to a palm tree whose top almost touched the glass roof.

The old man smiled. "He is very ancient, that one. Very—strong. Ah . . . but the most interesting is the sequoia—from your country. You have seen?"

"A sequoia, here?" Ellen opened her eyes wide. "No."

"Please?" He made a motion for her to go ahead.

She had to pass very close to him to get by. All at once, she noticed that his lips were full and red in his bushy beard, that they were parted slightly to show long yellow teeth. In the hot atmosphere, he gave off a strong goaty smell. . . . Leading the way, she had to weave around the leafy obstructions on the path, swaying as she walked. She hoped he did not think she was walking that way on purpose.

There was certainly no sequoia here; she must have misunderstood him. . . . In the hall, she turned and said formally, "Thank you so much; it has been most interesting."

"But you have not seen—in here. The sequoia, the archives!" The old man seemed agitated, and pointed to a door at the end of the hall. "Please?"

A tour of the dusty archives of the Institut d'Arboriculture, with this old man who smelled goaty—might well have goaty intentions?

And the guard must have gone to lunch, for his post was empty. Ellen looked again at the full red lips in the bushy beard, thought it was time to go. Again. After all these years, she ought to know.

"Please," he repeated. "You are interested?"

Compressing her lips at her own feckless good-heartedness, she moved toward the door he had indicated. The room beyond it was long and dusty and dim, as she had imagined. But instead of books, there were upright segments and cross-sections of tree trunks, mostly of an extraordinary size. A holly tree, a linden, a cedar of Lebanon, bleached as old bone; a great mahogany trunk with the evenly grained bark peeled back to show dark red wood underneath.

"Big, very big!" he said, looking at her eagerly and pointing to the mahogany trunk.

Any moment now, he would make some indecent suggestion.

"Is mahony."

"What?" she asked sharply. ". . . Oh, mahogany, I see."

"Yes, mahony. It has beautiful—bark, no?"

Ellen smiled at him in forgiveness, and looked around. In a show case were dried giant fungi, jars with toadstools preserved in alcohol, indecently reminiscent of anatomical specimens. On the wall was a fragment of tortured root that looked like a sculpture of bodies entwined. She kept her eyes averted from it after the first quick glance, although they kept straying back; of course, he was waiting for her to look again.

But the old man was pointing to a long wedge-shaped section of wood. "The sequoia!" he announced. "Most interesting of all. Thirteen hundred fifty rings!"

"Oh, yes," she answered absently; those bodies in the root, just how did they go? She gave the old man a wary glance. . . .

Then it was too late; he was looking at her again. "Come," he invited, reaching out his hand, "the rings are better seen from—closer."

Ellen moved away from the hand. "*Very* interesting," she said firmly. "But I am afraid I must be going."

"Ah . . . there is much, yet—" He looked around rather forlornly, as though to find something else to show her; a pretext, of course. "It is—seldom that—"

"Thank you, so much," she repeated, and walked toward the door.

"A pleasure," he said, following her.

Good heavens, he was coming outside after her. . . . But then he turned off on the terrace, bowing goodbye, and went up some steps that led to the street; the stone balustrade turned at an angle and continued, above the gardens. A little nonplussed, Ellen walked down the path, parallel with the street that led to the gate where she had come in.

Then she realized what he was doing; she had always had good lateral vision. Without appearing to look, she could see the old man's head above the balustrade. . . . He was watching her, keeping pace as she walked.

She slowed down, stopped a couple of times, pretending to look at the labels on a bed of withered iris. He was still there, stopping when she stopped, peeping at her over the top of the stone railing and disappearing again. She wanted to look at him, as she had wanted to look at the root of entwined bodies, at the painting of St. Anthony.

At the end of the path, she would have to turn away entirely. She could stand it no longer. Lateral vision or no, she had to make sure. She had to look up.

A stout red-faced man was walking there, some distance behind her, at a steady pace; he was looking stolidly ahead. She waited; but there were no hiders and seekers here. Wild and bereft, Ellen's eyes swept up and down the balustrade as the man passed and disappeared.

There was nothing, no one.

Discussion - - - -

SOCIOLOGY AND THE HUMANISTIC INTELLECTUALS

One of the problems that Bennett Berger considers in his article "Sociology and the Intellectuals" (fall, 1957) ought to concern social scientists more. I refer to the problem of the relationship between social science and the humanities. For a number of years, some educators in the natural sciences, in engineering and business administration have been concerned with what they call the "general education" of their students, and by this they usually mean getting the students to take more courses in the humanities. Many social science educators, on the other hand, are likely to discourage their students from taking courses in the humanities, possibly because they feel that their own courses are more rigorous presentations of the same sort of subject matter that the humanities deal with. On the research level, the hiatus is even more serious than it is on the educational level, and it is to the scholarly relationships between the humanities and sociology that this essay will be devoted.

We sociologists have probably been so intent on achieving status as scientists that we have largely ignored our role as representatives of an intellectual discipline which is also partly dependent on the humanities. But this setting up of *science* as independent of *intellectual discipline* is scientifically and logically false. Science is not mere fact-gathering; it is a system of ordering ideas or theories which can interpret facts. A science *is*, among other things, an intellectual discipline, and a true scientist must be an intellectual. One might agree with this, but still raise the question whether any given scientist might be only an intellectual in a very narrow field. Some physical and biological scientists are now debating whether they do or do not need education in the humanities and the social sciences, but it is not our concern to enter into their debate.

Our question is whether social scientists need to be "intellectuals" in the sense of scholars in the humanities, and my answer to that is a very strong affirmative. The subject matter of the social sciences is human behavior, and for progress in achieving knowledge about that complex matter we shall need all the ideas, theories, and interpretations that intelligent and insightful observers of human behavior can provide. There are diverse ways in which the humanistic intellectuals can aid our efforts as social scientists; particularly is this true for sociologists.

The literary people—the novelists, poets, and even the critics—are specialists in the analysis of "cases," the way in which human behavior

develops and works out in given situations. It is a mistake to think that social scientists are interested only in the typical or the average; they must also know about the unique and the extreme. If scientists start out with studies of the typical or the average, they make progress only by study of the exceptions. The creative writer can require a hundred pages to report what goes on in two minutes in a single person's experience, and this is "fact" about human behavior as much as a finding of any sociological study. It is only when the writer describes something that is physically or humanly impossible that his descriptions are of no value to the social scientist.

Historians do not agree whether their discipline should be classed among the humanities or among the social sciences or both. But whichever it is, history has a number of important contributions to make to sociology.[1] Our concern here is only with the intellectual contribution: Knowledge of history not only offers the same kind of insight which creative literature provides into the unique case, but it is the only source of an essential premise which must be added to most kinds of sociological hypotheses before they can be tested. This is the premise which specifies the social situation in which the hypothesis is valid. The deeper the analysis of the historian into the social situation, the better is the sociologist able to specify the conditions under which his hypothesis may be valid. For example, even for such an abstract hypothesis as Stouffer's, relating number of migrants to distance migrated in terms of the number of "intervening opportunities,"[2] there ought to be a specification of the conditions under which people can and do migrate in a modified free-enterprise industrial society. The discipline of history can help us specify these conditions, and a proper knowledge of history is the only means for adequate specification.

Students of language and literature offer to sociologists information about the forms of thought, as they are expressed and molded by words. Sociologists are concerned with "things" and "relationships" only insofar as they have meaning and value for people. Meaning and value can be expressed only in words or other symbols. This is what is meant when it is said that man is a "symbol-bearing animal," and the sociologist differs from, say, the physiologist or psychologist in being interested in man in his symbol-using capacity only. Sociological theories and hypotheses must be couched in terms of man's symbolic behavior, never his purely physical behavior, and the students of symbols are those who specialize in language and literature,

---

[1]For a discussion of these contributions see: Arnold M. Rose, "The Relationship Between History and Sociology," *The Alpha Kappa Deltan*, 26 (Spring, 1956): 28-34.

[2]Samuel A. Stouffer, "Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating Mobility and Distance," *American Sociological Review*, 5 (December, 1940): 845-867.

who are among the humanistic intellectuals. In this sense, the students of foreign languages and literature are just as potentially useful to sociologists as are students of what happen to be, accidentally, our own language and literature. The ways in which choice of words, varying ways of expressing meanings through words, and grammatical structure have provided the framework for that very behavior which the sociologist is interested in studying have been relatively neglected by the sociologist, to the detriment of his science.

The production of literature, fine art, music, philosophy—both "serious" and "popular"—is as much human behavior as is man's family life, economic activity, and so on. Only a relatively few sociologists study the former, thereby revealing a bias in selection of subject matter. The humanistic or intellectual behaviors may provide peculiarly valuable study or they are more purely expressive and relatively less molded by environmental conditions, and so provide a more "unadulterated" lead to social man's conscious and unconscious meanings and values. Literature and the other arts might serve as the sociologist's "projective tests" just as the contrived Rorschach, TAT and other individual projective tests lead the psychologist to an understanding of the personality. A collaboration between Bernard Bowron, Leo Marx, two students of American literature, and myself as sociologist led to a fruitful way of analyzing allusions to the machine in nineteenth century literature.[3]

Such are among the ways in which the sociologist should find it valuable to lean upon and borrow from the humanistic intellectuals. In this process he ought to be an intellectual himself: he must know something about and "appreciate" the full range of man's intellectual products; and he must understand the nature of man's ideas and use of symbols. Insofar as the sociologist has rejected the work of the humanistic intellectuals that has been his loss. But the fault does not lie entirely on his side. A sizeable number of humanistic intellectuals have rejected the very possibility of sociology.[4] Whether consciously or unconsciously they have accepted a philosophy of idealism which is not required by their humanistic endeavor but which leads them to reject and deprecate sociology. In Italy, where Croce's philosophy of idealism dominated academic and extra-academic intellectual life for over thirty years, the humanistic intellectuals actually killed a budding sociology.

---

[3]"Literature and Covert Culture," *American Quarterly*, to be published.

[4]An excellent analysis of the stereotyped conception of sociology held by the humanistic intellectuals appears in Bennett M. Berger's "Sociology and the Intellectuals" referred to above.

There are other attitudes and activities of some humanistic intellectuals which lead sociologists to be justly suspicious of them. One is the tendency to manipulate words for the sake of creating an effect without regard to the truth of the words. Such persons should not be regarded as humanistic intellectuals but as sellers of entertainment, since their interest is not in ideas, but in acquiring an audience which will bring them fame or wealth. These word-manipulators are no more intellectuals than are the popular radio or TV comedians. In the long run, they will be regarded as contributing nothing to the humanistic understanding or portrayal of man, and hence they can contribute nothing to the sociologist.

Then there are the humanistic intellectuals who would be sociologists while rejecting the rigorous requirements of science. I am not recommending that the humanistic intellectuals learn and apply the scientific method when they practice their art. Their role is to produce a better art, or a better understanding of art, and they may—if they choose—collaborate with or help sociologists while they do so. But they add nothing to the total of human achievement if they practice an amateur sociology for an uninformed audience when a more scientific sociology is available. This kind of amateur sociology seems to have a great appeal for many intellectuals, as may be illustrated by an advertisement for a book on "mass culture," written largely by humanistic intellectuals, which appeared in a magazine for intellectuals.[5]

> Their scholarship is directed at some exceedingly down-to-earth questions. For example: Is L'il Abner's mother over-protective and masculine? (And if so, why did Al Capp name her Pansy?) Why do "naughty" girls in Hollywood films turn out to be "good"? (And why do good girls in French films turn out to be naughty?) Was it just a coincidence that Spillane and McCarthy happened to the same country at the same time?

These questions are either a misrepresentation of the contents of the book, or they represent an offer to amuse intellectuals rather than to present them with "scholarship." That many intellectuals are willing to accept such an offering as scholarship justly leads many sociologists to regard them with suspicion. Amusement has its place in life, and not less for intellectuals than for any other segment of the population, but it ought to be presented as amusement and not as scholarship. Otherwise, it falls into the category of a magazine advertisement of a man in a white coat (a "doctor") showing his enjoyment of a certain brand of cigarettes.

What has the creative artist or the serious student of the creative arts to gain by distinguishing art from sociology and offering to collaborate with

---

[5]It should be understood that I am not here evaluating the book, but rather the appeal to intellectuals as made by the advertisement.

the sociologist? Perhaps not much, except the satisfaction of knowing that he is contributing to a science of human behavior. He may also learn something about human behavior that he did not know before and thereby add something to the truth he depicts in his art or in his study of the arts. Of this, each humanistic intellectual must judge for himself. Insofar as the sociologist himself is an intellectual, he ought to be more capable of offering stimulating materials to fellow intellectuals. In the case of the scholarly student of language and literature, there ought to be an additional contribution from the sociologist by way of providing new leads for scholarship and additional ways of interpreting the findings of existing scholarship. At least there is the possibility of these things happening, if the intellectual sociologist and the humanistic intellectual occasionally give unbiased attention to the work of the other.

—ARNOLD M. ROSE

Department of Sociology
University of Minnesota

SOCIOLOGY AND "SOCIOLOGY"

American sociology died with Lester Ward in 1913 and the First World War buried the corpse, so that since then we have had just an uneasy ghost scrabbling trivialities because too pallid and timorous to try to hold up to the American Way of Life a full-size mirror, as a living sociology would have been bound to do.

The real issue is not between "Sociology and the Intellectuals," as Bennett Berger phrases it. It is not a question whether sociology has a tangible field of its own. It is rather that "sociology" abdicated, hiding behind weird verbiage about inconsequential details without frame of reference. If sociologists would be as universal, as integral, as a sound sociology requires, they would cover all the ground that the (literary) intellectuals claim, and as feelingly, for nothing is authentic unless it expresses a whole personality facing a whole situation. It is not true that "one cannot legitimately expect either that science be beautiful or that scientists be literary stylists." Science *is* beautiful; and *adequate* communication requires literary style. Scientists are the last people in the world to have a right to be slipshod, and if sociology is what it set out to be, it is precisely that grasp of the cultural whole which Mr. Berger assigns to the intellectuals.

If "scientific method" cannot (as Mr. Berger says it cannot) deal with "big problems," it is not scientific, but merely technic. Science always takes

the *whole* situation into account. Any good scientist is always saying things "that he cannot prove" (now). Science advances by doing precisely that—by putting forth hypotheses. Moreover, *no* sociologist "functions under the rule of strict separation between facts and values," however much he kids himself that he does. That something is a *fact* constitutes it a *value* in any sane universe, and the scientist has "to defend his position against his intellectual enemies" as much as the "intellectual" does. It would indeed be a queer world of science where everyone were agreed or indifferent.

Facts themselves are not science; a certain apperception of them together with a certain interpretation may be. It is not true that in science, opinion is tolerated "only when facts are not available." Again, what are hypotheses but opinions, and hypotheses are more important in the advance of science than are "mere" facts or than dessicated facts. If science is so fixated on "facts" that it has no eye to a frame of reference, of course it can not deal with "big problems," but if science is a matter of piddling trivialities, we are lost for sure.

Sociology's lack of prestige is due to the fact that for forty years it has squirmed away from the issue of social revolution, to which big men—Ward, Giddings, Small—had faced up; and that was precisely what made them big. The humanists, however, are no more deserving than the sociologues, and that is why literature is so dead and sterile that it lacks power to stir anybody to anything.

As for the editor's "Note" on Berger, there is no reason why social solidarity should mean loss of individuality. Indeed it would be impossible to make a coherent pattern out of identical segments. A dissected map does not stick together unless the pieces are so shaped as to interlock. Neither does social science lead to disenchantment, any more than physical science does. To extend the frontiers of "knowledge" merely extends our boundaries on the mystic unknown.

—Arthur W. Calhoun

Department of Sociology
Illinois College

Once, Upon A Time

By Hollis Summers

Christian, Socialist, he, undone
With the wearily twirling world, carefully paid
The smiling clerk six dollars—a five and a one
Properly inscribed—and made

Small comments on the April night
Before he followed the whistling boy into
The elevator cage, a box blinding bright
With light and the smile of the girl who

Was accustomed to the quick jerked soar
Of flight. "Good evening," she said, her custom,
And almost at once, "Goodnight," at the eighteenth floor.
The boy, whistling, carefully dumb

To men and women who rented sleep,
Checked the soap, raised the window, smiled:
"Will that be all?" It was, and he could keep
The change, and he was reconciled

To little men in glasses, rich
And quiet. Sighing, the little man removed
The several letters from his pocket which
Were written to the world he loved

And placed them, history, on the table
By the bed. Lovingly he took
From his eyes the glasses which were able
With his mind's help to look

Deeply at the world, a task
For brave men. Then he stepped through air
Sightless in April. Do not ask
About his glasses. Do not ask where.

Hollis Summers, whose poetry has appeared in these pages before, now teaches English at Ohio University. His third novel *Weather of February* (Harper) appeared this past fall.

At Twenty I Was Forty

By Eric Pfeiffer

At twenty I was forty
hundred miles from home
in a town that knew no strangers,
where even the cats spoke
only to certain people.

Sundays were the devil's
own precise dull hell,
and here it was my birthday
miles from home.

The wind from the dry fields
blew as bitter as bread
from a stranger in alien autumn,
blew like the wind
near the end of a war
that did not concern me.

Luckily the rent was paid
for another week
of dying in a war that was not my own.
I sought sleep and forgiveness.

Outside the cruel cats sang
sex in a dry wind.
From their desolate animal night
they shut me out
In my twentieth fear of dying.

Eric Pfeiffer came to this country from Germany in 1952, and now at 22, is a medical student at Washington University. He has a book-length collection of verse ("Flute Songs for the City") looking for a publisher.

Books - - - -

THE NOT SO MODERN TEMPER

By GERALD WEALES

When *The Modern Temper* was reissued in paperback (Harvest Books) in 1956, Joseph Wood Krutch added a preface in which he said, "Hence the situation which *The Modern Temper* presents as hopeless does not now seem to me entirely so. But by the diagnosis I will still stand." In the twenty-five years that passed between the first publication of that book in 1929 and the appearance of *The Measure of Man*, which Krutch prefers not to call a reply to the earlier book, the author has passed from pessimism to a limited optimism. The seeds of the change are already in *The Modern Temper*, which ends with its author, like a humanist Job hurling defiance at a mechanistic God, insisting, "Ours is a lost cause and there is no place for us in the natural universe, but we are not, for all that, sorry to be human. We should rather die as men than live as animals." It was this conclusion that made Bertrand Russell, reviewing the book in *The Nation* (April 10, 1929), assume that, for all his despair, Krutch had found a personal solution in the search for knowledge. Although Russell's own attraction to such a solution made him elevate a desperate gesture of survival into a principle of action, he did manage to be prophetic. Krutch has come to believe since 1929 that the cause is not lost and, strangely enough, that men are most men when they recognize that in some sense they do live like animals.

The Modern Temper is an attempt to define a mood which was common enough to the late 1920's to make Krutch's analysis widely acceptable. His subtitle, "A Study and a Confession," indicates that primarily his diagnosis is for and of himself, but the implications make the book a record of the dilemma of a particular kind of intellectual of the period, the man whose allegiance was with all the humanistic values that had come to him across the centuries, but who had come to accept that those values were the stuff of illusion and not of reality. In the world of *The Modern Temper*, God is

---

GERALD WEALES, whose "I Remember Mama Two Times" appeared in our Fall, 1956 issue, became Assistant Professor of English at Brown University last fall. His latest work is a children's book, *Miss Grimsbee Is a Witch* (Atlantic-Little, Brown).

dead, killed by the science that made him unnecessary, and science itself has been unmasked as nineteenth-century illusion; the laboratories have no comfort for the humanist. The values that once clustered around the deity, or at least around the dignity of man implied by such a deity, have gone too; there is no nobility, no honor, no love. Those values, like love, that outlasted a belief in God, have fallen victim to psychological, biological and economic determinism that has reduced man to the animal, or, worse, to the machine. Art, too, has gone, for it depends upon faith in God or in man, and the universe has made man so trivial that he can no longer command tragedy. Thus "Nature reveals herself as extraordinarily fertile and ingenious in devising *means*, but she has no *ends* which the human mind has been able to discover or comprehend." Man has so developed that all that he values, all that distinguishes him from the animal or the machine, is making him more and more helpless in the face of a universe which has no use for his illusions; society "is already too completely human in both its virtues and its vices to live either comfortably or safely in the universe of nature." The dying humanist must contrive to live in the world that has no place for him "not in searching for a means of escape which does not exist but in making such peace with it as we may." Krutch is not quite the "consistent pessimist," that Reinhold Niebuhr called him in *The Christian Century* (May 1, 1929), for, as Bernard Shaw once said, the real pessimist would kill himself if he stuck to his principles, and Krutch prefers to live even with despair. This determination is the beginning of the path that led to *The Measure of Man*.

In the early book humanism and nature are set up as antitheses; in the later book nature has come over to the side of humanism (or humanism, in the person of Krutch, has adopted nature). In *The Measure of Man* the target is mechanistic determinism; the villains are the psychologists and sociologists who accept determinism not only as true but as desirable and the "human engineers" who look toward conditioning as a solution to the problems of modern society. To combat determinism Krutch offers the concept of the Minimal Man, who, once he is accepted, opens the door to human values, to free will, to responsibility. The Minimal Man cannot come alive unless the determinists

> grant us only that what we call "reasoning" is not always rationalization; that consciousness can sometimes be more than merely an epiphenomenon accompanying behavior; that "value judgments," even if never more than "tastes" or "preferences," are nevertheless not absolutely and "nothing but" what we have been conditioned to accept. . . .

The Minimal Man, however, cannot merely exist; his existence implies a willingness to take part in the Discourse, Krutch's designation for the unending discussion of values without the expectation of solutions that

makes up the whole body of art, philosophy and the other humanistic disciplines. Krutch finds the first step to his Minimal Man in the fact of consciousness, "self-evident and yet as difficult to reconcile with complete mechanism as the soul itself," and his greatest comfort in the metaphor of the physical sciences where the unpredictable and the indeterminate have again become acceptable. *The Measure of Man* can almost be reduced to one sentence from it, "What it comes down to is salvation, not through the solution of the problems of morality, but through the mere recognition that they exist."

There is much in *The Measure of Man* that is attractive. Its attack on many of the material and ideational assumptions of today's society is not a mask for political conservatism, as are so many such attacks today; almost completely unpolitical, the book demands a re-examination of proposed solutions to human problems which might make nervous or make healthy the political man at any point in the spread of political opinion. Its doubt about the soundness or the advisability of adopting scientific attitudes, often glibly and unscientifically, in certain human situations does not carry with it the kind of condemnation of science that we get in Charles Morgan's work. Its distaste for mechanistic determinism and its desire to escape from such a belief does not force its author to seek the comfortable shelter of a faith in God which he has never been able to accept; it only reawakens his faith in man.

Yet with all its positive qualities, *The Measure of Man* is not so good or so powerful a book as *The Modern Temper*. It has two main weaknesses. The first is the method of its argument. In attempting to refute mechanistic determinism in terms that the determinists might (but probably would not) accept, Krutch is forced to rely heavily on the evidence of introspection. As Ernest Nagel pointed out in a review in *The New Republic* (June 28, 1954), such evidence is not easily admissible in philosophic discussion. In a sense, Krutch has given too much to the enemies whom he would overcome. What he really wants, in *The Measure of Man* and elsewhere, is to combat the irresponsibility that follows on the too easy assumption that man's every act is determined. Krutch has accepted as a result of his own observations that man does have the power of choice and that there are values which make one choice better than another, but finally his acceptance is an act of faith; one faith has seldom triumphed over another through the power of reason. Krutch would have been on more solid ground had he used metaphor or myth or personal revelation, as he does in his nature books. Too much of *The Measure of Man* depends on the determinists' granting ideas that they would no more grant than Krutch would accept that man is "nothing but" a machine.

The book's second weakness is its assumtion that mechanistic determinism has such great control over today's thinking. Krutch's humanistic suspicion of the social scientist and the psychologist, which I share to some extent, is actually a distaste for the kind of determinism that becomes an excuse (oh, yes, but he had such an unhappy childhood), a mechanical process that rules out responsibility for acts that should be seen in moral terms. Krutch also fears that those men who would attempt to control the determining factors in men's behavior, who would manipulate the environment to bring order to society, are actually tending toward a totalitarian destruction of individuality. But are the excusers and the manipulators so plentiful as Krutch suggests? There is ample evidence that determinism has strong adherents among sociologists, psychologists and educationists, but there is justice, too, in Ernest Nagel's "there are good reasons for doubting whether the small handful of writers he singles out for attention are really representative of current trends in the social sciences." At most, Krutch uses only four or five examples, primarily B. F. Skinner's *Walden Two*, to set up the opposition he intends attacking. Even in the social sciences there are voices speaking out for values (you can hear them in the pages of *Commentary* and *Dissent*, to offer but two opposing examples).

More important, however, is a general concern with morality that seems to be in operation among intellectuals today. Krutch, who caught so exactly the temper of 1929, is still reacting against that temper; he does not quite realize that he is not fighting alone, that his trip from 1929 to the present was made by a whole generation and that another generation has grown up since who accepts that man is more than a machine. The much-discussed religious revival since World War II is but a small indication of that feeling. In *The Measure of Man* Krutch insists that the creative writers of this century have echoed the determinists, have tossed out values and reduced the dignity of man. Yet Krutch examines no writers later than Gide and Faulkner and there is evidence that he has misread much of the moral background against which the writers of the 1920's operated. He seems completely unaware of the hard-headed optimism, tough not tender-minded, to use one of his favorite phrases, that marks much current fiction. Saul Bellow took his Augie March on an old-fashioned quest for verities; John Cheever let the Wapshot boys learn something of the continuity of family life; J. D. Salinger's Zooey taught his sister the significance of Seymour's fat lady; Herbert Gold's man who was not with it learned that "There's a good and with it a way to be not with it, too." These writers are reaffirming the dignity of man in an idiom personal to themselves, just as Krutch is.

Krutch's way of reaffirmation, however, is not really the argumentative way of *The Measure of Man*. It is a tricky business to attempt to trace the

development of a man's ideas, but there is at least an indication, in the books that Krutch has published recently, of the paths that led him to want to animate the Minimal Man. He seems to have made personal use of the two men, Samuel Johnson and Henry David Thoreau, who are the subjects of his most recent biographies. On the first page of *Samuel Johnson*, he writes, "But pessimism had another advantage, for it gave him courage," and in the phrase there is the suggestion of the power that led from the despair of *The Modern Temper* to his more recent belief in the possibility of man's survival. From Thoreau, Krutch borrowed much more. Thoreau has become a kind of touchstone that runs through all of Krutch's later work. Like Thoreau, Krutch turned to the natural world and found in it and in man's relation (kinship even) to it the evidence for his most optimistic view of life. The distaste for the animal and the natural that marks *The Modern Temper* has been replaced by an enthusiastic appreciation and understanding in books like *The Twelve Seasons* (1949) and *The Desert Year* (1952). In his most recent book, *The Great Chain of Life* (1957), he attempts his most ordered relating of man to the other forms of life and in it, too, with the reintroduction of vitalism (or something very like it) into the definition of evolution, Krutch makes more effectively the points that he argues in *The Measure of Man*. Actually, however, he had already made them in the earlier nature books. In *The Desert Year*, in the chapter "From a Mountaintop," Krutch states neatly and quietly the rebirth of values in him and for him.

To say that the pessimist of *The Modern Temper* has become an optimist is perhaps too simple and too glib. Krutch is no Pollyanna. In going to the natural world for his metaphor of life he has not revived the pathetic fallacy. He sees the natural world with the eyes of a lover, but not with eyes that hide the struggle and the death that is so much a part of it. Krutch's optimism, as much as his pessimism, takes courage, and it is now his belief that man is capable of the necessary courage to survive and to hold on to values that make that survival worth the struggle. It is paradoxical (and how Krutch loves paradox) that the Krutch of the '20's, so much a part of New York urban life, should despair of man and should be able to rise above that despair only by forsaking man in favor of the animals and the plants. Running through all of his later works is the suggestion that although Krutch admires man, he is not particularly fond of people. Yet in the last ten years he has become one of the most determined propagandists in the cause of humanity.

Strangely, his best argument (and his most beautiful book) is *The Twelve Seasons*, which is no argument at all. This book, which followed quickly on the heels of his biography of Thoreau, describes a year, from

April to April, at his home in Connecticut. His patient and loving examination of the awakening, the flowering, the death and the rebirth of the natural world becomes, implicitly and occasionally specifically, an insistence on the continued rebirth of man as a part of all life. Since *The Twelve Seasons*, he has become more certain that he has got hold of something valuable and in his attempts to make it clear in book after book he has become more insistent, but never quite so effective.

I have only a small personal experience of Joseph Wood Krutch. I do not know the man with the magnifying glass on the cover of *The Twelve Seasons* or the grinning farmer in the straw hat who decorates the jacket of *The Great Chain of Life*. I know only the university lecturer, and then only across the gigantic classes that are endemic at Columbia University. Man and boy (graduate and undergraduate), however, I have heard him lecture on Restoration and modern drama. I can see him, encased in tweed, striding up and down the platform as he talks, stopping occasionally, lifting his head quizzically to catch an unexpected question from somewhere in the class. Without ever having seen his home in Connecticut (which he has long since given up for Arizona), I can transfer him in my mind from the lecture platform to the New England countryside, where he stops his purposeful striding, lifts his head in the familiar questioning manner, this time to catch the voice of the *Hyla crucifer*, the Spring Peeper, heralding the reawakening of the earth. *The Twelve Seasons*, not *The Measure of Man*, is the real answer to *The Modern Temper*.

THE PRESIDENT'S POWER

The Presidency in the Courts. By Glendon A. Schubert, Jr. University of Minnesota Press, 1957. $5.50.

In this study Professor Schubert squares off and takes a long, penetrating survey of the presidency in an endeavor to see how it looks as viewed through the eyes of our federal courts. What he discovers should make Senator Bricker and his friends turn pale. The study of the 720 pertinent cases in the appended table at the end of the book together with the 876 footnote citations, largely of court cases, buttress his conviction "that the judicial formulation of the institutional role of the President is the Dark Continent of our public law." Of course the courts are the guardians of the supreme law of the land, that is, of the Constitution, federal statutes and treaties but "the most significant aspect of judicial review of presidential orders is its ineffectiveness." Evidently there are some things the courts either cannot, should not,

or would not settle. Thus they have very properly abstained in general from attempting to resolve the major controversies as to public policy that confront each generation. In departures from this self-restraint the Supreme Court damaged its prestige enormously in such ventures as the Dred Scott decision of 1857 and the Income Tax decisions of 1895. Only Congress and the President are in a position to mediate the hot controversies of a pluralistic, self-governing society.

Professor Schubert marshals an astonishing range of matters on which the courts either positively or by default complacently accept the exercise of doubtful presidential powers. "There are today," he asserts concerning executive orders, "no apparent limitations upon the power of Congress to make such delegations of authority to the President either prospectively or retroactively." This reviewer wonders whether this signifies that the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court that the N.R.A. was, as one justice pithily put it, "delegation run riot," has virtually been reversed by twenty some years of failure of the Court to find an unconstitutional delegation of its power by Congress. Schubert observes that "with respect to certain subjects, the Supreme Court and other courts have recognized the right of the President to act affirmatively in the public interest even when there is no apparent authority in either statute or the Constitution." There are simply no judicially determined standards of form or procedure for executive legislation and a presidential proclamation or executive order is public law just as statutes are. The courts always assume that the President has acted legally and the burden of proof consequently rests squarely upon the litigant who would challenge his acts in the courts. Only 14 presidential orders have been held unconstitutional in all our history, an average of one in every 12 years.

It is refreshing to find Professor Schubert just once departing from academic calm and showing deep feeling, verging on wrath, but this must be dug out of the footnote appended to the chapters—in this case the final chapter. He is irked by the fact that the courts are not at all so concerned when the President uses his prerogatives or implied powers against persons as when he touches property rights. For example, the Supreme Court did not challenge President Truman's assertion of the existing emergency when he "seized" the steel plants in 1952 but serenely ignored the pertinency of the emergency. "In any event," declared Schubert, "that opinion of the Court is *sui generis*." He grows downright bitter over the circuit court opinion in United States v. McFarland, 15F 2d 823, 827 (4C.C.A., 1926), comforting the complaining wool growers who felt they had been mistreated during World War I. "They wanted to help the government in its (*sic*) hour of difficulty provided they were not called on to do more than they

thought was their share," declared the Court. Concerning which Schubert asks, "What was their share of the war dead and maimed?"

Because the President is the sole organ of the nation in foreign relations he possesses undefined plenary powers in that field simply because he is the chief executive of a nation—which office affords him whatever powers belong to the head of a nation as determined by the usages of international law. At any rate that is what the Supreme Court decided in 1936 and such agreements become part and parcel of the supreme law of the land to the dismay of those who would like to restrain such presidential power by a constitutional amendment. The First Congress decided that because the President is responsible for administration he must possess unlimited power to remove his executive subordinates although the Supreme Court did not get around to a case confirming this fact until 1926.

It is as Commander-in-Chief that the President has the widest range of unchallengeable powers. In wartime he has virtually the power of a dictator. He can declare a community to be under martial law, establish military commissions (courts) whose convictions, even of civilians, cannot be appealed to civil courts and can be reversed only by the President. "Alien enemies," which term in World War II constructively included American citizens, may be seized, imprisoned, or interned in concentration camps as were many American citizens during the recent war with the Supreme Court sustaining, however reluctantly, this executive power. Professor Schubert has reached virtually the same conclusion as Professor Clinton Rossiter in his *The Supreme Court and the Commander-in-Chief*, that "there is apparently nothing the President cannot do constitutionally if war should strike the country."

This book was published before the Little Rock controversy was precipitated but the devotees of State Rights will not get a particle of comfort from this study. If one of the Whiskey rebels of 1794 could have experienced a resurrection and appeared in the midst of the Arkansas crisis he must inevitably have wondered what had happened in the intervening 163 years to unsettle the matter so decisively settled in western Pennsylvania in the very first years of the republic. Washington took decisive action in sending 15,000 "federalized" militiamen against the defiers of court orders—that is the Whiskey rebels. In 1794 there had been tarring and feathering of federal marshals who attempted to serve writs on persons refusing to pay the whiskey excise. Washington simply called forth the militia under the authority Congress had vested in the President "whenever the laws of the United States shall be opposed or the executive thereof obstructed in any state by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." So court orders and judicial proceedings were

involved in 1794 as well as in 1957.

The principle of the act of Congress under which Washington acted against the Whiskey rebels has never been repealed but has been incorporated in later federal law. It is significant that when Lincoln called forth the militia, or "federalized" it, to use the current term, following the capture of Ft. Sumter he used precisely the same words as Washington in 1794, that the execution of the laws of the United States was obstructed "by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Thus judicial proceedings have always been involved when the militia or federal troops have been used to enforce federal law.

In calling forth the militia no less than in ordering federal armed forces to Little Rock, President Eisenhower was but following in the footsteps of Washington and Lincoln when federal authority has been obstructed. And when the question as to whether or not the President can legally use armed force to enforce a court directive, as he did at Little Rock, reaches the Supreme Court of the United States if it ever does it hasn't a ghost of a chance of being decided against the President's action unless the exhaustive researches of Professor Schubert have been in vain. In the opening sentence of his final chapter he observes, "It should be perfectly clear by now that the most significant aspect of judicial review of presidential orders is its ineffectiveness." This generalization is doubly true when confined to the President's action as Commander-in-Chief, in which capacity he acted in the Little Rock crisis.

Ohio Northern University —Wilfred E. Binkley

THE NEW FICTION — A SUMMARY

Leftover Life to Kill. By Caitlin Thomas. Atlantic-Little Brown, 1957. $4.50.

The Temple of Gold. By William Goldman. Knopf, 1957. $3.75.

On the Road. By Jack Kerouac. Viking, 1957. $3.95.

Jamie is My Heart's Desire. By Alfred Chester. Vanguard, 1957. $3.75.

Room at the Top. By John Braine. Houghton Mifflin, 1957. $3.75.

The Losers. By Clifford Irving. Coward-McCann, 1957. $3.75.

The Savage Place. By Leon Arden. Crown, 1957. $3.95.

Some Came Running. By James Jones. Scribner, 1958. $7.50.

The Ginger Man. By J. P. Dunleavy. London: Neville Spearman, 1957. 15s.

Last Tales. By Isak Dinesen. Random House, 1957. $4.

James Joyce and the Cultic Use of Fiction. By Kristian Smidt. The Humanities Press, 1957. $2.75.

A Death in the Family. By James Agee. McDowell, Obolensky, 1957. $3.95.

The Lonely Londoners. By Samuel Selvon. St. Martin's Press, 1957. $2.95.

The Two Deaths of Christopher Martin. By William Golding. Harcourt, Brace, 1957. $3.75.

On the Line. By Harvey Swados. Atlantic-Little Brown, 1957. $3.75.

Color of Darkness. By James Purdy. New Directions, 1957. $3.50.

A review of the books here listed cannot be done with the usual pattern. Plot summaries of the novels will only be repetitious, for these young writers to a great extent tell stories that are similar. Their themes and what have to be called their characters are pretty well accounted for on the dust jackets.

With the few exceptions noted, the fiction here deals with the young writer himself, and with surprising, if ultimately unsurprising, autobiographically vertical talkativeness. It doesn't seem possible that first novelists, or even second novelists, can "make" novels these days. They tell them. They talk them. This could be admirable. But wait a moment. Just what is all the "talk" about?

It's about being "beat," "lost," about being a "rebel" or "wanderer." Again, the dust jackets are all too helpful. To pluck a few adjectives, the

subject-characters are "snarling . . . rootless . . . heavy-drinking . . . brawling." I must say, with characters quite similar, here is fiction greyly similar. Our "young man's novel" has become as rigid in form as the sonnet. Its substance has become as standardized as cornflakes.

It is clear that what appears to be the novel's lack of form is always a massive and catastrophic attraction. It seldom strikes the young writer that precisely for this reason the novel form is a challenge, at least in the manner of control, of selection, of discipline. There should be some responsibility to give form to life's raw gush of material. Instead, "Life!" is shouted on every page, the life of "Me, me, *me*!"

What results is little of what a reader expects in the way of "created" characters who take on a compelling life of their own; of a story line that carries us, somehow, from a beginning to a middle and, finally, to an end. Any *realized* experience of life is unrealized. We get only faithfully, endlessly, monotonously unselected and unrelated tape-recorded incidents.

Take the by now standard protagonist. One jacket recipe concocts an amalgam of "Huckleberry Finn, Penrod and Holden Caulfield." By my own digging into these novels, I must add the late James Dean and Thomas Wolfe, as well as such recently published, self-educated Non-U attention-getters as Colin Wilson and John Obsorne. We have a prevailing skid-row type hero, in or out of school a "campus bum"; or his English counterpart, the state-educated lower-class bright boy who, being neither a gentleman nor a scholar, has formed a new skid-row Bohemia of his own, preferring Bach to be-bop, if careful not to admit it. Our American campus bum having few class-conscious traumas, yowls sensual experience as the New Truth—the new corner-bar snobbism, maybe. The fraternity take their kicks at the source: alcohol, jazz, fast driving, preferably in beat-up cars (the English lads frankly lust for Jaguars, usually with built-in mink-lined mistresses), sex, "pot" and the pub-crawling and partying which has been the stuff of Hemingway and Fitzgerald since the '20's—a period which, by now, has become the Golden Age, an adventurous era (oh, those naughty speakeasies! those breastless flappers!) for which there is a mistaken romantic yearning.

The soul-searching in all these novels is fretful, humorless if not grotesque, above all, intently personal. It's that "Me, me, me!" again of the classic sophomore. If it is autobiography we must have, the hope of the reader is for the interesting person who tells all. We can be all the more grateful for Caitlin Thomas, though her *Leftover Life to Kill* gives fiction a handicap, being so frankly a permissive invasion of privacy that her reader, if not feeling as guilty as a Peeping Tom, is simply embarrassed. We finally ask, "Why must we listen to all this?" It is the truth, of course. But too often the truth is a bore. The fictive truth simply *can't* be, therefore, much else

but boring, palatable or digestible.

Very well. Life hurts. In Goldman's fast-moving novel—incident after incident moving fast, anyhow—his Raymond Trevitt believes Life has a "handle" and he should be able to find it. He doesn't. Kerouac's Sal Paradise speeds up, down, and across America (oh, that American night! oh, that America that Tom Wolfe loved: October! October!) looking, looking, feeling, feeling—ah! feeling. How swell it is to feel alive and write a novel about it. Life may have a "meaning" after some hoped-for mystical experience, however inexplicable, however humdrum—this from Alfred Chester, whose hero, at least, is not a writer, though he is the friend of a young boy poet and an older novelist; he does, indeed, have a job; he is a receptionist in a funeral parlor. The life that John Braine's Joe Lampton wants is that of the "secure" upper-middle-class businessman, along with the good food, fine clothes, pubs, cars and girls of the best quality. Is it new, this materialism? The romantic yearning for it is, undiminished, so it would seem, by the guilt complex Joe Lampton develops in his getting of what he wants. Actually, what Joe Lampton turns out to be is a Horatio Alger hero with a bitter taste in his mouth. Clifford Irving's Charles Hall is a once fine artist now a comic strip manufacturer. As he sees it, fate decides. Some are "losers." Some are not. There's Dave, the costume jewelry man: "When he was a boy Dave believed he could do anything, go anywhere, and be whatever man he dreamed himself to be." So Dave is a "loser." He commits murder, then suicide. Leon Arden's Andrew Williams is a photographer free-lancing in Spain. Andrew has a problem. He is sexually impotent. Once this difficulty—this phenomenon (in view of the ready lust of his companion heroes)—is overcome, Andrew is "aware of feeling peaceful. Neither the pleasure of success, nor the glory of escape from humiliation. It was as if everything else had been forgotten. He had not the slightest wish to remember. He did not even think of trying."

With James Jones in his tirelessly and tiresomely long *Some Came Running*—which will be, I suspect, the great disappointment of promise for all who admired *From Here to Eternity*—we have more of the same. Not Robert E. Lee Prewitt the bugler is here, but Dave Hirsch, who has written two obscure novels. Hirsch fits Jones himself more like a glove than I find it necessary to detail: he is a returned vet; he returns to the hometown of Parkman, Illinois, where he finds an amazing literary milieu, a woman teacher at the local college who is a literary critic—as well as a thirty-five year-old virgin, a case-history Jones finds fascinating—a younger novelist at work as well as sundry club women who, of all things, subscribe to *The Kenyon Review*. Dave falls in love with the college teacher; he marries Ginny, a barroom "pig"—out of spite; he is killed by a crazed vet. 1266 pages

for this? Jones has much to cover—mainly the education he has been getting as a writer, the books he has been reading (as in all these novels, the name-dropping of literary greats is a continuous thunder-roll) and the long, grave—and, I am afraid, strictly undergraduate—thoughts he has been thinking. His novel will be a success—less enlightening than any of the Kinsey reports, if as statistical.

And finally, we have *The Ginger Man* by J. P. Donleavy, as yet unpublished in this country, but admired in England by the Osborne-Amis-Wain phalanx. Donleavy is an American. His novel is about an American, Dangerfield, a writer, living the literary bum's life in Dublin, Joyce's center of the universe. As above noted, this too is more of the same. Only the writing is more interesting—being Joycean with additives of Henry Miller, now every young writer's spiritual Old Man.

Risk that it is, I would say that Dunleavy, along with Alfred Chester and John Braine, are the writers of this group worth watching. All three show more evidence of talent, as all three have more control. That is, they "make" characters; from these characters they "make" story. They show a little capability of creating something more than what the Cardinal in Isak Dinesen's recent collection, *Last Tales* (the story is "The Cardinal's First Tale"), calls "the literature of individuals." The Cardinal has some nice comment. "The literature of individuals . . . is a noble art, a great, earnest and ambitious product. But it is a human product. The divine art is the story. In the beginning was the story. . . . A story has a hero to it, and you will see him clearly, luminous, and as upon a higher plane. . . . But by the time when the new literature shall reign supreme and you will have no more stories, you will have no more heroes. The world will have to do without them, sadly, until the hour when divine powers shall see fit, once more, to make a story for a hero to appear in."

Perhaps the life we are living is, simply, insufficient for the stuff we call fiction? What, then, can the writer do? Is it the loss of cultural identification, thus a loss of hero-gods, which has had so dismal effect on the redundant quantities of recent fiction?

I don't think I accept this. As Kristian Smidt in her recent study of Joyce points out—*James Joyce and the Cultic Use of Fiction*—(I am responsible for the summary here) fiction *is* simply fiction. However the artist finds the world, it is without order. Therefore, he must order it. His fiction is, therefore, or should be, the end-product of an intelligence at work with talent. As we have differing intelligences, Joyce's habit of thought being antithetic and dialectic, certainly we can expect, as we can welcome, differing forms of fiction. We cannot welcome *similar* fictions. All these "young man's" fictions are alike only in that their prevailing point of view, their

unrealized synthesis—simply, only their unrealized recordings—of life is unachieved.

Whatever their lack, maturity personal or artistic, if their groaning and moaning is just about all there is to hear, that we can find a-plenty without opening books—at least, these books, above mentioned. I just don't think the novel has failed—the novel as novel. Perhaps it is the wrong writers who are writing it, writers who could work better under a more restrictive discipline.

Such a discipline, for example, has been well exercised, I think, by two novelists I now mention. James Agee's last novel, *A Death in the Family* (this writer died at 45) is a beautiful creation of a family life in Knoxville forty years ago. In the best sense, it is achieved recreation. Tragedy hits the family, the universal tragedy of death. The uncommon commonness of the people here, the Follet family, particularly of the boy, Rufus, is honestly good in that, after the reading experience, it is precisely the experience shaped and made aware that is remembered and unforgettable. It is the writer who takes authority here. It is his way of controlling the experience that makes for the reader a compelling synthesis of what he has felt.

If there is any flaw in the writing, it is the almost always prevailing thematic control Agee exercises over his sentence-rhythms. One gets the sense he is viewing a film with theme-music dominating just a little.

Certainly this music-making, poetry-making with prose, is the chief fresh novelty of *The Lonely Londoners*, a short novel by Samuel Selvon, a native Trinidadian who writes about his countrymen in England. This is an attempt, however successfully authentic I cannot tell, to write with calypso beat. "Was a long room that Galahad see, shape like a L, and it have a counter going all the way, and on this counter it have files that in immediate use. It have some folding chairs at the beginning and the ending of the L, where some tests sit down waiting like guilty criminals. Over the counter it have numbers on placards, 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on. Over the counter it also have a pipe what have the electric wires in it, and the clerks and them have pencils tie-up the pipe with long string, dangling down to the counter, for the boys to sign up with."

The effect of these black West Indian citizens in chilly London, is gravely sad and at the same time jocular. There couldn't be any other writing like this, just as there couldn't be any better way of catching truly what it would be like to be one of the characters, to feel what it would be like not to be white and welcome.

The Two Deaths of Christopher Martin is the second novel by William Golding to be published in this country, the first I have read, and it is an amazing story—that of a man desperate in loneliness, struggling for survival

on an almost utterly bare rock in the Atlantic. Here is the world, in memory and self-torture when stripped bare to the single, persistent and instinctive will to live. As I understand the prevailing symbol, life is the naked rock. It is all that *is*, providing little or much. Read simply as a story, this is a haunting, even unnerving experience. As it comes out, life is also a vision, a nightmare. Christopher Martin has not died on his lonely rock. He has died in the sea before he reached it. Chris Martin is what he always was, as there on his rock it seemed to him, in his moment of realization, that he "came out of the curious isolation inside the globe of his head. . . ." As sanity is the ability to appreciate reality, the necessity to accept the reality of one's position is imperative.

The final word here is to recommend the reading of two collections of short stories. That of Harvey Swados', *On the Line*, is the tying together of the narratives of nine men working on a fast-zipping assembly line in an automobile factory in Detroit. These are so real, these men, that if I were to tell you simply "about" them, you might think I heard their stories as in a soap opera—which means they are not "real" at all. It is Swados who makes them so. Take Walter, crucifying himself on the line in order to make enough money to go to college. All sympathy to Walter and his burning exposure to the cynical Joe—the "Vanishing American." Or take Pop, the widower whose idolized son is killed in the convertible given to him upon his graduation from high school. A heart-breaker, Pop. But never a mushy note is sounded in this requiem. Swados is too masterful a writer. He dares to write of such people and their minor but forever meaningful tragedies; he dares and he can.

A new writer, James Purdy, deserves more than a word of comment for his stories, published under the title, *Color of Darkness*. At first glance, Purdy would appear to belong to the dead-pan school of writing. But there is more here than that. I have seldom read such plain language conveying so much in the way of tension. The title story concerns a husband whose wife had left him and his strained relationship with his son. Another, "A Good Woman," is about two middle-aged ladies, both losing their looks, as well as their shapes, their mutual dream-doting on movies, strawberry sodas and the boredom of their marriages. Does anything happen? Almost nothing. But the father in the previous story, like the two women in the latter, will be hard to forget. James Purdy in a very low key makes unforgettable the naked look of ordinary but frighteningly countless lives. His people could be anybody, are probably almost everybody; we are stunned by our look at them, caught as they are in his stories, and we will never forget them.

—Nolan Miller

A "CRASH" PROGRAM FOR EDUCATION?

Education for a New Morality. By Agnes E. Meyer. Macmillan, 1957. $2.50.
Education and the Good Life. By Frederick Mayer, Public Affairs Press, 1957. $3.25.
A Fourth of a Nation. By Paul Woodring. McGraw Hill, 1957. $4.50.

Educational policy has been put in the public domain by recent events. Nuclear physicists, retired generals, successful businessmen, newspaper columnists and various other until recently disinterested individuals now offer suggestions, proposals and panaceas for our schools.

In many instances these proposals are likely to have merit, and it is to be sincerely desired that this vital interest in education continue and bring about desirable changes. Contrary to much popular opinion, many persons more closely connected with education have not been complacent. Three books, written in the pre-panic era, illustrate the concern of those close to our schools, and may serve as useful guides in assessing our educational system and proposals for change.

Mrs. Agnes Meyer is well known as a writer and lecturer on social and educational problems. Dr. Frederick Mayer is a distinguished educator and philosopher, a member of the faculty of the University of Redlands, author of many books on philosophy and on education, and an editor of *Wisdom* magazine. Dr. Paul Woodring, an educational psychologist whose previous book, *Let's Talk Sense About Our Schools*, was very well received, is a consultant for the Fund for the Advancement of Education of the Ford Foundation. All three of the writers have been careful students of our schools, all are troubled by at least some aspects, and all address themselves to current educational problems.

A Fourth of a Nation, so entitled because this is the proportion of our population enrolled in schools and colleges, is the most ambitious of the three books. It examines the American educational system, its historical development, and its philosophical conflicts; and it makes proposals for resolving the difficulties, improving the education of teachers and finally for reorganizing the American school system. The basic theme of the book is that American education is the result of two trends: a devotion to the development of the mind, "the classic thesis," and a devotion to the growth of the whole child, "the pragmatic antithesis." It traces the development of these two contradictory forces and finds much merit in each. Yet it finds the classic thesis failing to meet the challenge of the twentieth century through ignoring psychological findings. The major blind spot of the classic scholars is their failure to recognize the limitations set by individual differ-

ences. On the other hand pragmatism has suffered from the influences of Gestalt psychology, field theory and psychoanalysis. Having made a thoughtful and carefully developed, though necessarily limited, analysis, the author, obviously much influenced by Walter Lippmann, calls for a new philosophy —a public philosophy—acceptable to the people. This philosophy is to be developed by someone with a strong scholarly background, who is, however, in touch with the people and their schools. Then a program of education based on this philosophy can be devised and presented to the people. It is not clear, at this point, whether the "synthesis" presented by the author is supposed to represent this philosophy or not: there is some discussion of aims, of man's competitive nature and of social change. There is a listing of "the solid core of agreement." Then follow detailed plans for school reorganization and the education of teachers, along with some seemingly irrelevant material. Regardless of the merits of the proposals made, some of which seem very sound and others of which seem quite questionable, the book fails by falling into the trap of expediency which has caught so much of our educational system. It is surprising that this happens, for Dr. Woodring has displayed a great deal of sophistication in recognizing the danger to others. However, the book does not "point the way to a new philosophy of American education," as the jacket says; it points the way to a new accommodation of the expressed wants of the American people—and in this instance American people means all those who yell loud enough. *A Fourth of a Nation* is a stimulating and challenging book, but its failure is characterized by a statement of Professor Mayer in *Education and the Good Life*: "The danger in our time is that we may be *seduced* by expediency. . . ."

In many ways the rest of *Education and the Good Life* is an expansion of the quote above and its conclusion, ". . . and so we overlook the potentialities inherent in man and his creative genius." Mayer does not offer concrete proposals, but he examines some important questions for our time.

The author identifies himself as a pragmatist, differing from John Dewey, however, in putting a greater emphasis on liberal education, intuition, and metaphysics. Perhaps this is the position considered necessary by Dr. Woodring. He deals with his problems with clarity and thoughtfulness; he quotes richly from the fields of literature and philosophy, ranging from Emerson, of whom he approves, to T. S. Eliot, of whom he does not, and from Epicurus, with whom he agrees, to Hutchins, with whom he disagrees. His use of illustrative anecdote occasionally seems naive, but actually reveals a directness and simplicity which are illuminating. This book is not for those who wish quick answers or panaceas; but those who are willing to consider difficult problems with a literate, somewhat troubled,

but basically optimistic mentor, will find it rewarding.

Education for a New Morality is the twenty-ninth volume in the Kappa Delta Pi Lecture Series, a series which has produced many important books and in which this small volume has a rightful place. It is grounded in a sharp awareness of our times and of the conditions under which we live, and it offers not a new philosophy, nor an accommodation of popular philosophies, but a reaffirmation of the educational philosophy of John Dewey, to whom the book is dedicated. The pre-eminent position of science, so forcefully brought to the public's attention now, is the basis for re-examining education, not only in schools but in the family and in the community. Mrs. Meyer's conclusion is that "We Americans must recapture our confidence in the capacity of human nature for self-determination by the intelligent application of scientific method not only to education but to all the problems of life." To achieve this end it is necessary "to develop a new philosophy of education which heals the gap in our thinking between science and humanism." This includes rewriting our histories as has been suggested by the French physicist Pascual Jordan and the British historian, Geoffrey Barraclough. We must turn to scientific methods to "break down encrusted habits of thought and behavior and create a new morality which can control the powerful instruments of life and death which the natural sciences have devised." As in Professor Mayer's book, concern with our unrealized promise and clear appraisals of some of the symptoms of our failure are accompanied by a strong faith in our ability to accomplish moral objectives through "a scientific humanism and a cosmic religiosity that will constitute the foundations of a wiser, freer, happier world." Before anyone rushes into a crash program it would be a good idea to read this book.

Antioch College —PHILIP ROTHMAN

ANTIOCH COLLEGE FOUNDERS DAY LECTURES

A series of major addresses by outstanding intellectual figures, published for general distribution. The third lecture, that of Dr. Faust, will be ready soon. Standing orders for the series are accepted.

No. 1. DAVID RIESMAN. ***The Oral Tradition, The Written Word, and The Screen Image***

The well-known sociologist discusses the relationships of communications and culture patterns and the problems of the two in contemporary societies.

No. 2. EDMUND WARE SINNOTT. ***Life and Mind***

An exploration of the characteristics of living matter and its relation to the world of human thought, purpose, and value, conducted by a renowned biologist.

No. 3. CLARENCE H. FAUST. ***Toward Understanding American Education***

The president of the Fund for the Advancement of Education takes a deep look at education to determine the role it should play in meeting today's social needs.

—price 50¢ each—

THE ANTIOCH PRESS

Associated with Antioch College • Yellow Springs, Ohio

STATEMENT REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, and JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) SHOWING THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION OF THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, published quarterly at Yellow Springs, Ohio for September 23, 1957.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Antioch Review, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio; Editor and Managing Editor, Paul Bixler, Yellow Springs, Ohio; Business Manager, Paul H. Rohmann, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) The Antioch Review, Inc., Yellow Springs, Ohio; a non-profit corporation.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.

(Signed) Paul H. Rohmann
Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 23rd day of September, 1957.

(Signed) Henry Dyer
Notary Public, Greene County, Ohio

(My commission expires December 31, 1957)

INVITATION
To Authors

PAGEANT PRESS (AMONG THE LEADING PUBLISHERS IN THE U.S.) OFFERS TO PUBLISH YOUR BOOK AND PAY YOU A ROYALTY OF 40%. WE ARE NOW PREPARING SCHEDULES FOR 1958 AND WOULD WELCOME MANUSCRIPTS IN THE FIELDS OF HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, BELLES-LETTRES, RELIGION, BUSINESS, ECONOMICS, AND OTHER SPECIALIZED SUBJECTS, AS WELL AS FICTION AND POETRY. WRITE FOR FREE BROCHURE A OR SEND US YOUR MANUSCRIPT. WE WILL MAIL YOU FULL DETAILS ABOUT PUBLICATION POSSIBILITIES WITHIN ONE WEEK.

Seth Richards
PUBLISHER

PAGEANT PRESS
101 Fifth Avenue, N. Y. 3, N. Y.

A handbook of help for story-tellers everywhere

Story-Telling for You

by RUBY ETHEL CUNDIFF and BARBARA WEBB

"For modern practitioners of this ancient art, two distinguished librarians offer suggestions for enthralling listeners of all ages. . . . Here are tips on selecting and preparing a yarn, on rehearsing and presenting it. Here are suggestions, also, on sizing up an audience and learning to develop an intimate, harmonious relationship with it. They apply to bedtime stories, campfire stories and classroom stories." (N.Y. Times)

cloth $2.00
paper $1.00

THE ANTIOCH PRESS
Yellow Springs, Ohio

Values in GOVERNMENT

as seen by four distinguished authorities in public administration in four outstanding books—

IDEAL AND PRACTICE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Emmette S. Redford

Efficiency, rule of law, competence, democracy, and the public interest are the five ideals. Do they permeate the practice of administration?

GRASS ROOTS
Roscoe C. Martin

Little government is inherently virtuous, implicitly democratic—or so they say. But is it?

PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATION
Dwight Waldo

What illumination can history, literature, the other social sciences, throw on the discipline of public administration?

REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
John M. Gaus

Are there philosophical backgrounds for the young, vigorous, rapidly growing profession of political science?

Order direct at $2.50 each

University of Alabama Press
Drawer 2877
University, Alabama

OXFORD books of exceptional interest

The Correspondence of Arthur Hugh Clough

Edited by F. L. MULHAUSER. A selection of letters from the Clough collection which includes 165 new letters of Arthur Hugh Clough and unpublished letters of Mrs. Clough, Carlyle, Froude, Lowell, Emerson and other English and American figures of the period. An appendix contains a complete catalogue of the Clough collection letters and all known letters written by Clough. $16.80

Georgina Hogarth and the Dickens Circle

By ARTHUR A. ADRIAN. This fascinating psychological study, set against the changing social scene from 1827 to 1917, tells of the relations of Georgia Hogarth with her sister Catherine Dickens and her brother-in-law Charles Dickens. Professor Adrain has drawn on unpublished correspondence, diaries, and family reminiscences to tell the story of Miss Hogarth's fanatical seventy-five year devotion to Charles Dickens.

12 half-tones $7.25

The Homilies of Wulfstan

Edited by DOROTHY BETHURUM. This is the first book to collect all of the twenty-six homilies that can be confidently ascribed to Wulfstan. The introduction deals with his life, style, influence on the scriptorium at Worcester, and political and social aspects of his career. $8.80

Ancient and Oriental Music

Volume I of the New Oxford History of Music

Edited by EGON WELLESZ. This new history presents music as an art developing in constant association with every form of human culture and activity. In Volume I a group of experts discuss the music of primitive peoples, music in the Bible, in the Far East, in India, ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome, and Islam. Index. Numerous musical examples.

Illustrated. 530 pages. $9.50

At all bookstores **OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Inc., N.Y. 11**